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1
A Sisyphus Myth for Modern Times
How could one not remember The Prisoner – the cult British 60s se-
ries in which a giant bubble frantically chased the hero played by Patrick
McGoohan? These days, our world is in a similar situation – each and
every one of us are hostages of bubbles because the world is full of
them, and not just from the speculative bubbles that plague our markets.
Indeed, there is nothing easier than differentiating the bubble that im-
prisons and isolates our politicians, the salary and bonuses bubble for
the executive managers of large companies and in the finance world, the
youth unemployment bubble, and finally the inequality bubble. Just like
the bubble that tirelessly chased the prisoner of our TV series, it would
seem that our financial system has been affected by a similar curse
because the collapse of a bubble displaces like clockwork the specula-
tive fever of another instrument or another market, which then blows up
to make another speculative bubble! Indeed, financially we are progres-
sively losing control of our lives. It wasn’t for any reason that Joseph
Stiglitz, the Nobel prize winner in Economics, questioned whether or
not a person’s life nowadays depends on “their income or the education
provided by their parents”.
Financial deregulation has given rise to almost twenty-five years of
banking and stock-market crises. This laissez-faire, having spread
throughout the English-speaking world to Continental Europe and
reaching Latin America and Asia, is the culmination of a planet that has
been progressively plagued by speculative bubbles, which have blown
up to some devastating financial, economic and of course human, ef-
fects. A non-exhaustive list covering modern times would go from the
resounding failure in 1984 of what was then the seventh largest Ameri-
can bank – “The Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust” – to the
Wall Street Crash in October 1987, to Japan’s Lost Decade, starting in
1990. It would further include the banking crisis in the Scandinavian
countries between 1987 and 1991, the violent financial shake-up in
Mexico in 1994, the 1997 Asian debacle, the 1998 Russian crash, the
implosion of technology stocks from the year 2000, with the grand
finale of the current crisis that started with subprime mortgages in the
Spring of 2007. The latter remains more persistent than the others in the
sense that the brief lull periods have been followed by ever more serious
developments since 2007, and in different locations. The current up-
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heaval is also vastly more complex than those that came before it,
probably due to the liquefaction of financial products, whose sophistica-
tion can in no way be compared to the products wielded in the nineties.
Nevertheless, the first stage was punctuated by significant crashes, like
those of Northern Rock in Great Britain (Fall 2007) and Bear Stearns in
the United States (March 2008), existential threats to American mort-
gage giants (Fannie Mae et Freddie Mac ending up nationalized) and to
AIG, the largest insurance company, ending with one of the most dra-
matic exits of its kind with Lehman Brothers. These last ones created
unparalleled effects given that they all occurred in Fall 2008.
If the orthodox economists and conservative political directors
agreed today on austerity being the only remedy to the crisis of the
European periphery countries, the streaks of bad luck in countries such
as Greece and Spain must therefore be analyzed from a different angle,
with the neoliberal circle of influence being greatly less favorable. The
diagnostic arising from current public deficits, accused of being respon-
sible for all of our sorrows, deliberately avoids the pending questions by
only engaging organizational aspects and the consequences of actions
being settled with massive public debts. We forget, for example, that
even in 2008 Spain respected the Maastricht criteria (the utmost acco-
lade of financial orthodox) and that it was considered as an excellent
student of the Euro Zone. We also tend to ignore that the Greek crisis
was part of a sequence set off by the liberalization of the world-wide
financial system, of which the establishing of the Euro Zone formed a
supplementary stage. This persistence in laying down the budgetary
rigor does nothing more than mask the immense labyrinth of financial
innovation. High finance had indeed managed during the 2000s to
completely separate the decision to grant loans to households and busi-
nesses on the one hand, from the latent risks and creditworthiness from
their debtors on the other hand. In this respect, let us make no mistake,
the public deficits are in no way the cause of our current troubles, which
are to be found through the immense generosity of the suppliers of loans
dispensed to entire sectors of the population, regardless of whether or
not they qualify for them. It has likewise made use of a leverage effect,
in a completely indifferent way, by a totally unrestrained system by
financial instruments that promote schizophrenia and irresponsibility.
This hypercomplexity of new financial products and sophistication of
securitizations have ended up in an explosion out of all proportion to
demand (especially in the United States and in Great Britain). Really,
finance has forced the hand of the consumer by literally inundating him
with loans through an increasingly inventive financial engineering. This
generalized euphoria takes place through financial and prudential cor-
ruptions and of a general laxity of our economic and political leaders,
desensitized by and financial system which they were convinced would
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have become optimum. Disguised by the financial products’ complexity,
ordinary citizens were thus preyed upon, becoming speculators, similar
to those of a Ponzi scheme, convinced that the value of their real estate
would hit a breathtakingly high summit.
How could one resist such a whirlwind when the U.S. retail price in-
dex was apprising around 15% each year between 2001 and 2006? This
unprecedented, easy profit pyramid was nonetheless easily knocked
down in 2007 shelling the brushed-aside financial heavyweights in Wall
Street with a disconcerting ease and, more importantly, with devastating
consequences for the American, and therefore global, economy. It is
thus the Anglo-Saxon events in 2007 and 2008 – rooted in the specula-
tive euphoria of private lending – which provided the decisive impetus
to a crisis that consequently spread throughout Europe. It is the gradual
infection of the global banking system, the collapse of international
commerce and toxic financial products and other “zombie” debt held by
private lenders who have lit a match that still consumes us to this day.
These are not public debts. Certain countries harshly affected by the
crisis today benefit from the sizeable budget surpluses, such as Spain,
thanks to their tax revenue from their real estate bubble. It is thus absurd
to hue and cry about the States adopting a budgetary rigor which is
supposed to correct the inequalities that their responsibility is in no way
invested in.
The international financial community demanded no less from the
Western nations than a return to budgetary balances. However the States
almost lost all power over their economic policies because they gave up
on influencing the financial variables. Isn’t progressive deregulation
effectively expressed by determining the exchange rates by the sole
exchange market? By continuous market speculation (where shares may
be listed night and day), minute by minute establishing the capitalization
of a business? By a bond market handling enormous – or even reduced –
amounts on loan to private debtors or indeed the States? It is thus an
environment in which structured financial products where derivatives
and other so-called “exotic” instruments have confiscated the very
substance of the States’ financial and economic power – even the most
powerful ones like the United States of America – with the financial
community demanding a fiscal consolidation that they no longer have
the means to carry out well. The power of our States has also insidiously
been diluted by the liberal globalization, insofar as our companies are
totally dependent on globalization.
The European Union has, in addition, glaringly highlighted this pro-
cess whereby the States give up the majority of their competences and
prerogatives so as to be in a position to weigh in and be relevant (re-
garding Asia and the U.S.) in this global battle of capitalism. The relin-
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quishing of powers yet again to the States has been completely lost to
the international crisis. The result today is one of financial ruin in which
politicians can no longer do anything as they have been stripped of
almost all of their leverages. This is why today’s emperors have resorted
to “normal” clothes, which fit them all too well! Additionally, not happy
with being saved and bailed out by their respective supervisory govern-
ments, the establishments and finance world today blame the States for
their deficits… the very ones who have been worsened by saving the
financial markets from the money pit they had thrown themselves head-
first into. It is a comical situation, albeit immoral, in which the States
are baffled by a power placed in the hands of the financial markets, and
unbalanced by steep amounts injected into the balance sheets of the
flowerets of this globalized financial world and are required to clean up
their public accounts. The wide range of final demands from creditors
who bear a strong weight on the States to be reimbursed, at the risk of
speeding up the generalized financial collapse of which they themselves
(the creditors and the financial system) would be the first ones to suffer
from! There is nothing but incoherence for this financial community that
has not stopped demanding rigor and austerity from the States all the
while bemoaning a growth that is too weak to allow the repayment of
public debts! When will the markets, and with them the caste of ortho-
dox policies that slavishly monitor them, realize that budget economies
are not a credible strategy to reduce public deficits?
Rigor is but a sedative – albeit a temporary one – slowing down the
creditors and a bitter pill to be swallowed by the population. Or even
worse, given that it is the countries that have implemented a tough
austerity and who are the most punished by the financial markets, ones
that have gotten out of control by a growth that naturally undermines
them. Is it not strange to consider a State’s deficit in the same light as a
household budget or a company’s balance sheet? It is most certainly not
reassuring for a creditor to learn that its debtor is having payment prob-
lems or that he or she runs the risk of losing their job. Because of all
this, this type of comparison can in no way be applied to the public debt
of a sovereign nation for the sole reason that a state has a duty to stabi-
lize the economic and financial conditions of the area it is responsible
for. It is unacceptable to wallow in deceitful reasoning and suspect
demonstrations of rationality that confuse the necessary budgetary rigor
of a household or a company with the responsibilities of a state as a last
resource to revive their activity and economic make-up. Who will take
the reins and who will fill in the gaps if the private sector is paralyzed in
its expenditures, in its production, and in its investments? Without the
regulatory intervention of the state, unemployment is condemned to get
worse and the economy to recant, together with an unavoidable deterio-
ration of public accounts. In times of crisis, austerity most certainly does
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not go well will fiscal consolidation, even if this technical debate masks
another, even more fundamental debate.
Indeed, it is the State’s role in the economy, which is at the heart of
these diametrically opposed (or even antagonistic) solutions – between
those in favor of budgetary rigor, with an additional setback for the
state, and those who tolerate public deficits, considered as the price to
pay for a state taking on its duty as arbitrator and regulator. Accepting
budgetary economies doesn’t just mean going back to a financial and
accounting orthodox that is both unjustified and counter-productive in
times of crisis. It means resigning oneself to yet again and even more
cut back the rights of the state, and by extension, ours. It means accept-
ing the verdict of the markets and leaving the overwhelming majority of
our citizens defenseless. A real trench warfare is unveiled to this effect
by the tenants of this strict orthodox, who don’t hesitate in employing
“budgetary fear tactics” (to use Paul Krugman’s expression) in order to
their final goal consisting in an almost total eclipse of political powers.
To do this, a specious argument is developed to cover all defenses,
which deliberately and happily mixes individual solvency and the
solvency of the state, against a public that is bombarded with cataclys-
mic images, the sole goal of which is to put pressure on their govern-
ment to adopt slimming measures. At the same time, we put up with the
cynicism of our leaders who, without asking too many questions, accept
the dictates of the markets and impose the rigor. Such cynicism is
believed by a citizen who accepts all the sacrifices under the false
pretense that the debts must one day be paid back. Paradoxically, the
current financial crisis in itself serves as an argument for the tenants of
this orthodox who argue in favor of further constricting public powers.
So it is clearly the European countries in which the state again as some
importance (such as Scandinavian countries and, to a lesser extent,
France) who have best endured the ordeals.
Does austerity, then, aim to reduce the deficits, or is it but a pretext
to move the state backwards, demolishing in the process what remains
of social programs? In a situation in which the profits of large compa-
nies and financial establishments are beating records, in which access to
low-cost capitals allows them to increase leverages and investment
possibilities, how can one not be troubled by these incessant calls for
austerity that are nothing but smoke screens designed to confuse? Let us
remember the premonitory words of Aldous Huxley in “Brave New
World”: “Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth”.
The real objective evidently being a complete anorexia of the state,
which, like clockwork shall translate as a bulimia of the private sector,
starting with the finance sector. It would now be a good time recall
Keynes again who (in 1936) concluded his “General Theory” with a call
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for the “socialization” of investment – a business too serious to be left in
the hands of the financial markets.
15
2
Money – Monopoly of the State
and the Solution to the Crisis
Despite all the attempts of economists to reduce its importance,
money is not neutral. It has systematically refused to allow itself to be
categorized or boxed into a rule that such school of thought or such
theory of economics has assigned it. One this is for sure – it is absolute-
ly essential during periods of great weakness as shown by the expan-
sionist policies and other cash injections implemented in the United
States and China furthering the current crisis. The latest example being
the massive emergency stimulus put in place in January 2013 by the
new Japanese government. In the same way we may note, implicitly, the
devastating European effects caused by the absence (and fear) of ex-
ploiting the benefits of money. Money effectively absorbs the cash crisis
that paralyses the economy and avoids deflation that slowly kills it. Karl
Marx (1818-1883) and John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) agreed that
money is the goal of all production and all services rendered. Production
begins and ends with money. Did Keynes get it wrong with the “mone-
tary theory of production”? Even Milton Friedman (1912-2006), cham-
pion of the monetarist school, ardent defender of ultra-liberalism and
Winner of the Nobel Economy Prize, joined Mark and Keynes in their
appreciation of the crucial role of money. It was not just that he believed
money is the source of inflation and depressions given that it allows it to
be manipulated by the state who assumes the monopoly and who prints
too much of it. According to Friedman, the state acting as printer en
masse of notes, puts into questions the efficiency of companies and
markets are supposedly regulate themselves. In fact, the success of the
monetary theory and its laissez-faire policy should have been accompa-
nied from the end of the seventies with a loss of power for the central
banks, which were asked to do no more than monitor and maintain the
inflationary threat by using one weapon only – that of the monetary
policy consisting in raising or lowering their interest rates in a humdrum
way. These trends (and monetarists) likewise managed to demand from
the state, and actually get it to control its lifestyle, in order to balance its
accounts. This restriction of public power was, at the same time, com-
pensated by a hyperbolic expansion of the financial sector that would be
able to regulate itself as the excesses and embezzlements were by no
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means in its interest, according to the very same theorists. Financial
stability would naturally be the meeting point, together with its prize of
financial prosperity and its generalized material comfort, in which the
most deserving of citizens could have a slice of this “deregulation cake”.
This inevitable logic was further hindered within the framework of the
European Union set-up. Strict quotas on public spending were effective-
ly halted, thus furthering Member States from any possibility and from
any temptation of making use of money’s virtues. To do this, the Central
European Bank was implemented according to a model of total discon-
nection with the budgetary and fiscal policies of the Members. With
accomplished, and one could say, statutory, autism, the CEB would also
ensure the monetary supply of EU Member nations without getting
involved in their public accounts. The founders of this ultra-liberal
Europe considered (further to Friedman) that money is so suspect that its
use must be strictly monitored by a body in which the States have no
special authority. Money was this box of matches snatched away by a
child, but not without being punished. This European counter-example
is today particularly eloquent as we realize that, in doing this, all the
ingredients of an even worse conflagration than the Great Depression
were voluntarily put in place.
Money, however, is not to be taken lightly. It is not some type of
food or dough that can be molded according to our needs at that time.
Nor is it a lubricant. Money is very likely the most decisive institution
of our capitalist system. Being the only measuring instrument for work
carried out, for anything produced or exchanged, it is at the heart of our
social machine. As is normal for such a monetary policy to be in the
hands of the state – a sign of the good operation of public affairs – all
the separation attempts between the creation of money and the real
economy are doomed to failure. Indeed, it is impossible to separate
economic life from political life because the transmission belt between
these two worlds is money, itself exclusive to the state, and thus to
politics. The only definition of an objective or of an inflation channel by
a central bank is, in itself, a political act, in the sense that it responds to
the demands, or serves the interests of a group. It is, at the same time,
natural and legitimate that the state uses money as a lever in relation to
economic activity, to fulfill the needs of certain social groups, to make
others pay (or contribute) or to monopolize resources. This important
and fundamental act for “monetization” is thus omnipresent in the
expression of the state. It is effectively in terms of money that social
contributions and government subsidies are set or that the fines and even
the sentences are formulated. As it is the state that benefits from the
monopoly of printing money, it is likewise the state that sets the game
rules and the conditions it agrees to be assigned it. Furthermore, our
companies have fully assimilated this power that they recognize as
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exclusive to the jurisdiction of the state, accepting to pay taxes, running
into debt, or agreeing to loans – as much actions expressed in one sole
unit of account, the creation of which is the responsibility of the state.
Even so, the very serious sentences inflicted in France to counterfeiters
– scalding in the Middle Ages and the guillotine up until 1832 – correct-
ly reflects the way in which those who got in the way of this absolute
privilege of the state were punished. A crime of lèse-majesté back then
and against the Republic today, is still punishable by death in 2012 in
certain countries!
The fundamental problems of our companies in relation to money
are, at the heart of it, due to the lack of money, that is, default payments.
Monetarists, such as Friedman and his peers, have further been embar-
rassed by the function they attributed to money because they have
systematically dismissed – or forgot about – the only assumption of
bankruptcy of a financial establishment, and even more, of a sovereign
country. However, a crisis is still accompanied by a rush towards the
most secure assets, the first of them being money, knowing that this
intensive search for money increases its subjective value while it (me-
chanically) decreases the other assets. In times of crisis, only the state
therefore can swim against the current while sticking up several defense
lines. Its central bank may also remember the unlimited loans to finan-
cial establishments that suffer a devaluing of their investments and
heavy withdrawals of their deposits. Additionally, the central bank acts
on another level consisting in buying up assets at risk and those which
nobody wants anymore, until then held by banks and companies. The
goal being to avoid the absolute evil that is the “debt deflation” de-
scribed by Irving Fisher (1867-1947). The use by the central bank of its
money anticipates the general sale of assets, equity and other securities
from the operators short on cash. Sales which could lead to a downward
spiral affecting all sort of investments. The central bank may well
provide the Government with the money to ensure the reflation of the
aggregated demand, with a beneficial impact on growth. Only this
“dance of the dollar” to recall the important expression of Fisher, would
be the only way to ensure economic recovery.
Within the framework of the current crisis, the central banks are not,
however, rising to the occasion as they, like the governments, have let
the recession take place and let unemployment get worse. As regards
countries like the United States, who have implemented stimuli, they
have failed due to a lack of ambition because these measures were not as
consequential or sufficiently generous to become decisive in guarantee-
ing a long-lasting revival of economic activity. Whatever they were
before the crisis or brought about by the same crisis, public deficits have
been powerful impediment having significantly curbed public policy.
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The States having been persuaded by the economists and experts that
they can no longer allow themselves to spend more. The founders of this
ultra-liberal Europe considered (further to Friedman) that money is so
suspect that its use must be strictly monitored by a body in which the
States have no special authority. While the economies where weakening
and the governments were handcuffed by their deficits, against all
expectation and despite common sense, the interventions of central
banks were limited therefore to their strictest expression (except in the
United States). That is why, in the context of depressive episodes where
the private sector is forced to repay its debts (the famous “deleverag-
ing”), the central bank needs to flood the economy for which it is re-
sponsible with cash. Faced with a situation where finance must digest its
excesses, and businesses such as the private ones are reluctant to invest
and spend, the central bank has indeed no other choice but this expan-
sionist policy. Even if it drops bundles of banknotes by helicopter, to
use the famous phrase of Milton Friedman when he spoke about Japa-
nese deflation. These stimuli can certainly not be properly calibrated,
and appropriately targeted, it remains that spending – even seemingly
less useful – are likely to enjoy the workings of the economy. In a
depressed context in the presence of a notorious slowdown, monetary
officials must be deflected exclusively toward this economic resurrec-
tion and should therefore not skimp on resources. Since a too timid and
stingy stimulus would have almost no effect, and would amount to “a
sword slicing water”. Caution is certainly a virtue, but in the presence of
such fundamentals, it can be a real vice for economic actors in the
private sector that must be rescued by the central bank. A state that
refuses to call on its central bank cannot therefore call upon any legiti-
mate pretext preventing it from straightening out its economic activity
and improving the unemployment situation. This is why it is crucial to
understand how this monopoly of money-creation operates and how it
can – and must – serve the general interest.
The existential questions on the powers of the state and the reports of
exhausting its fire power taking place nowadays – with equal amounts
of concerns never even taking place – in actuality mask a substantial
debate on its role in our economic life. A state that avails it citizens and
businesses of its monetary system considers money as an instrument that
favors its prosperity. Without this determination, the State’s action is
useless or nothing more than a minority. This deteriorates into “poverty
in the midst of plenty”, to use the words of Keynes, which perfectly
illustrates its aim by describing a context “a condition where there is a
shortage of houses, but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in
the houses that there are”! The state must therefore avail its nation of all
of its resources and possibilities – including monetary ones! In doing so,
public deficits must not run into any obstacle or any limit (although isn’t
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this the very raison d’être of any state?) in the restoration of full em-
ployment and price stability. A system exists allowing the restoration
and reconciliation of these two, on the surface antimonial, fundamental
components of our economic life. On the other hand, it lacks the politi-




Public Deficits – A Stick Shift
to Revive Economic Activity
The explosion of public deficits, a spectrum of default payments of
one or several countries or restructuring of their sovereign debt, are in
no way specific to the crisis that has been sweeping through our western
nations since 2007. Since the French Revolution, it has been possible to
count four major phases marked by an uncontrollable escalade in na-
tional debts. The first period goes back to the Napoleonic wars in 1848
in which half of the countries, States and kingdoms at the time were
successively declared bankrupt. The second period really got going after
the foundation of the German Empire in 1870 and lasted about twenty or
so years. The Great Depression, of course, clearly originated in the stock
market crash in 1929 and lasted until the end of the 1940s. Finally, a
fourth crisis, limited to the emerging markets, had devastating effects
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Japan, an industrialized country with
an integrated economy, was also affected by this crisis, having suffered
the implosion of several bubbles since the start of the nineties. Modern
day is thus marked out by crises linked to debts which last on average
two decades… or indeed longer, Japan for example still hasn’t escaped
its “lost decade” which has been going on now for more than twenty
years! The monstrous deficits preceding and accompanying the Great
Depression were decreased in due form by the bankruptcies of certain
States, while hyperinflation vehemently took on the role of eradicating
the debts of several others (Weimar’s Germany naturally comes to
mind). We also call to mind the fact that all of the countries allied with
the United States during the First World War defaulted against this
company – with the sole and well-known exception of Finland. None of
the nations that defeated Germany at the time were in a position to repay
the United States for their engagements, which worsened the declining
economic conditions disguising the Great Depression. The colossal
deficits of the First World War and the Great Depression – never paid
back – ended up in default payments or restructurings consisting in
partial repayments or in sudden rises in inflations. A bit closer to home,
the crisis in the emerging countries was also regulated by a combination
of restructurings topped with hyperinflation. This also allowed the
cleaning up of debts and speculative bubbles to come to an end. Debts
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also form an integral part of a State’s operation and its way of life. They
likewise form the pattern of our own daily life.
The current crisis has nevertheless highlighted the deficiencies of our
economic models where the debts’ variable is strangely absent despite
the controlling and active role it plays in them. Our current economic
system naturally includes salary and price variables. It is further deter-
mined by the central bank that, through its traditional inflation control
instrument – namely, interest rates – has a fantastic lever to measure out
our prosperity. It is because of all this that the essential ingredient of
debt seems painfully to be to default on our current economic models to
which nobody has had the guts to incorporate the credit variable. The
body of economists, and with the credit rating agencies that parasite the
system, are in this way late in globalization and seem stuck at the previ-
ous stage of closed economies in which all debts must be necessarily
offset by debts of equal amounts. If we find ourselves today in a world
where the credit rating agencies can dictate their law and where the
debts of a country (or a region) are susceptible to collapsing an amazing
human venture (the European Union), it is purely because of the defi-
ciencies in our economic models, which do not include the debt and
which, perhaps more importantly, overlook its effects. Our financial
stability and prosperity depends nevertheless just as much on monetary
policy (that is on interest rate setting) as on non-conventional tools and
levers (such as injections of cash, and thus debts). And yet, our political
leaders and our economists confine themselves to academic ponderings
in which deficits are completely forgotten about. The balance of
measures and approaches is at once slanted and the imbalances are
systematically accentuated by decisions and positions that brush aside
the (often beneficial) effects of the debt. The central banks, the minis-
tries for Treasury and Budgets, the regulating bodies such as universities
and academic research departments must therefore understand and
include the active (and often “straightening”) role of debt in the eco-
nomic grid. With economic framework no longer being able to be
defined as a circuit (and a closed one at that), a great rethinking must
occur based around these questions: What is the nature of our debts and
how are they shared out between private debts, company debts and
public debts? When does debt become excessive? When does invest-
ment make the economic growth of a country indebted to foreign funds?
Are loans and bond issues the only mechanisms allowing the redistribu-
tion of funds? Why aren’t the risks fairly divided out between the vari-
ous stakeholders? Is it not logical for the credit providers to assume a
certain degree of non-repayment risk for their loans given the interest
charged?
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Furthermore, the responses to these questions must include a certain
amount of evidence too often denied by economists and leaders. Indeed,
resorting to loans allows households and individuals to stabilize their
consumption and their daily life when their income fluctuates or is
actually uncertain in times of crisis. In the same way, it allows business-
es facing erratic turnovers to regulate their investments and their produc-
tion. Credit allows the state to continue on with its public spending
without taxing its citizens too much all the while providing it with
important levers to revive entire sections of it economy. All in all,
public debt offers liquidity to economic agents by greasing up the
wheels with inevitably positive consequences on private and company
investments. The citizen’s lifestyle and the improvement of economic
conditions are thus tightly correlated to the debts of its state, because the
volatility and macroeconomic uncertainties are exacerbated by the
refusal to seek sufficient credit. In short: no public debts, no growth!
This is because it is the debt that will allow our societies to become
more modern, to build themselves, to enrich themselves and be confi-
dent that better days will come. Our material comfort, the development
of our mentalities and even the blossoming of our democracies are
indeed due to this capacity of becoming indebted, and this willingness
and ability to live on credit, at least in part. Without debts and without
this transmission belt of financial tools, we would still be poor, our
Western world would not have been able to play its role as an engine of
global growth and modernism, the average citizen would certainly not
have been able to consume, to become owner of his home, or even just
buy his cell phone, and companies would not have been able to invest
and develop.
A country’s economy, like an individual’s budget, is condemned to
restrict itself as soon as the credit tap dries because of, for example, a
financial crisis. A painful deleveraging process is thus implemented
consisting in repaying, at least in part, these debts, combined with
default payments from debtors unable to fulfill the requirements of their
creditors. Consequently, the States logically employ drastic reductions
in their spending while the affected households stop any unnecessary
consumption. The creditors, whoever they may be, are in no way tempt-
ed to take the helm by increasing their spending because of the inactive
general climate and their losses for those that haven’t been repaid. Such
a convergence is liable to paralyze an economy, or indeed global activi-
ty, within a general self-feeding deflationary spiral framework. The
decrease in consumption and public spending translates therefore into
stagnation, or indeed cuts, in salaries having in turn a negative impact
on prices. The latter are indeed restricted for trying to conform to a half-
mast request, with a disastrous cascading effect on revenues for all the
stakeholders. Put otherwise, these essential debts do not impoverish the
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world because the commitments of a household, of a business, or of a
state evidently constitute assets for their creditors. In fact, the never-
ending arguments created by the neoliberals in which our States can no
longer get themselves into more debt and in which this crisis would
have been worsened by the excessive debt, are truncated. This is be-
cause a quick and easy answer justifies the debt reflation in times of
crisis. The size and extent of global debt has no effect on the level of
world wealth, because the debt of an individual or a state is the debt of
another, or indeed, several others. Moreover, it is essential to introduce a
decisive qualitative distinction in this approach and in this analysis of
the debt because all debts are not valued. Indeed, the profit of the debtor
is crucial because one may remain solvent while another becomes liable
to default in their payments. In addition, it is what explains the size of
our current crisis and it is what allows us to come to the conclusion that
the new debts taken out nowadays by solvent economic agents or by
States (who may freely print the money) contribute to considerably
relieving the excess of debts of the others. Spending and investment
made by a state will have a necessarily positive impact on the employ-
ment and unemployment of unexploited resources. Companies and
individual liable for debts will be in a position to progressively pay
back. The growth will thus be the meeting point… if only the private
sector – at least partially relieved of its debts and having new-found
confidence – took the reins. The private sector would most certainly get
into debt again, which would allow the state to take a breather in reduc-
ing its deficits, but the debtors’ profile will have changed and cleaned
up. Indeed, these are solvent and strong debtors, in the sense that they
fulfill their obligations, who will have taken the place of weak links who
had a devastating effect on the economy. The global debt level will not
have decreased, but the confidence and investment will be re-established
by this simple debt-transfer to credible operators. Debt, thus, may well
remedy debt, whilst conversely, breaking the chain of debt leading
fatally to economic depression.
Excessive debt creates certain weaknesses, none of which highlight
the fateful landing of 90% deficits (decreasing the GDP of the country
in question), above and beyond which national debt strongly damages
growth. Its excessive accumulation is obviously not devoid of risks.
Common sense and intuition tells us that the ability of the States (much
like the ability of households and companies) to pay their interest and
their debts is seriously put into question by the sharp drop in their
revenue. These situations, in the extreme, lead to a default payment for
the state, or in individual bankruptcy for the debtors whose debts are
becoming progressively more vulnerable to bumps. It is at this moment
that consumption stagnates, that investment takes a step back, that
unemployment gets worse, that creditors stop giving out loans – in short,
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when confidence collapses. Indeed, the causal link is shown between
excessive debts, the collapse of economic environment, the volatility of
the situation and the bankruptcy of financial stakeholders. Because of all
this, confidence is vital and its revival must be the absolute priority of
the States, especially in stormy climates. In times of crisis, the State’s
duty is to fill the gaps left by the collapse of the private sector. Further-
more, only the force of a public kick is able to get a growth, dangerously
hypothecated by the increase in deficits (whatever their nature or their
origin may be) and by the aging of populations, back on track. Let us
remember by counterexample the USA, which upon the election of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 and while it (and the whole world) was
still in a depression, reduced public spending so as to stop its debts.
These austerity measures decreed at the time by the Roosevelt Admin-
istration to please the financial sector caused unemployment to jump to
19% of the working population and forced the aim of the American
public power to create jobs in order to compensate for the massive lay-
offs in the private sector. Indeed, it is close in this context to the big
uncertainties that Keynes suggested to the state to pay people in order to
dig holes to bury bank notes in. Boutade however highlighted the crucial
role of the state Regulator, revealing the pressing necessity to maintain
employment at a level permitting consumption and keeping confidence.
For that matter, hasn’t the British Empire’s public debt, throughout the
course of its history (more exactly, since the start of the 18th century)
reached unbelievable levels, at times exceeding 250% of its GDP? In
effect, it is the gradual but irreparable decline that would have had to
strike this country, in any case according to the standards wanting the
landing of 90% debts in relation to the GDP trigger a restricting and
volatile poverty cycle. However it is not its massive debt level that
prevented the British Empire from taking down Napoleon and from
jettisoning it in the Industrial Revolution taking place in the world. It is
probably thanks to this lever of its debt that this empire prospered and
got a relatively stable growth throughout the 19th century until the First
World War.
To put it another way, if our political and economics leaders wish to
avoid the return of the “Great Depression”, they shouldn’t deceive
themselves about its reasons, at the risk of having to suffer a new one in
the near future. Because the both dramatic and long period from the
1930s was not so much provoked by the financial collapse (which was
no doubt striking and memorable) than by the irreparable increase in
unemployment. So when it was of course inconvenient to let the banks
go bankrupt one after the other, the main tragedy was taking being
played out elsewhere – that is, in the employment market, which was
unfortunately threatened by the American Federal Government’s inabil-
ity to react forcefully. This was reduced thanks to an economic adjust-
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ment due entirely to the preparation of the Second World War. Waiting
for this impressive revival initiated by the war industry, a Keynesian
showcase, the USA nonetheless suffered (worse than the Depression)
combined deficits reaching 25% of their GDP at the time, equivalent to
$4000 billion in today’s money. Why did the Federal Government
manage to get into such advantageous spending at the end of the 1930s
and going into the 1940, given that they could have done it in 1931 and
thus avoid a decade of superfluous suffering for a country? Put simply,
for similar reasons to those that nowadays create tension between be-
lievers of growth and believers in austerity – that is for reasons of
principle and ideology. In fact, the obsession with deficits – as prevalent
in politicians then as it is now – was leading to counterproductive
decisions. Indeed, public spending and other New Deal stimuli was
substantially restrained in 1937 with the already known harmful effects,
taking place while the economy was giving encouraging signs and
unemployment was decreasing to 10%. Nowadays, rigor leads inevita-
bly and in the same way to a similar debacle to that of the second half of
the thirties in the general context of a stagnant employment market.
Because the obsession with deficits eclipses the fight against unem-
ployment which must be the priority. It goes without saying that it is not
the decrease in deficits – as important as it is – that presides over the
affected confidence of the general public. In this respect, the politicians
have proved time and time again that they are bad economists given that
the deficits in no way constitute a source to revive consumption, which
takes the lion’s share in aggregate demand. In addition, it is the very
anemic employment market that is at the same time responsible for a
consumption that remains at levels that are unable to have a domino
effect on the economy and salaries that are reaching their limits. An evil
combination that translates into a decrease in demand. Current perspec-
tives, which are hardly brilliant, risk therefore of being worsened by the
return of a new “Great Depression”, due entirely to rigor.
Why was this austerity policy imposed on peripheral European na-
tions? Has the deterioration of economics 101 been inevitable? Or is
austerity the result of the panic that seized hold of the markets which, in
turn, has paralyzed political leaders? In this respect, the correlation
between the soaring cost of financing the sovereign debt of these coun-
tries and the increase in austerity implemented is eloquent. Effectively it
is the countries which have suffered the highest “spreads” – i.e., those
which the markets were gradually squeezing for more and costly financ-
ing – which also implemented austerity measures and the most drastic
hardships. The intuition according to which it is the financial markets
and their threats of excesses which applied intense pressure on the
European Union and on its leaders with respect to intense budgetary
economies is therefore? Knowing that, conversely, austerity was not
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implemented among the countries where the spreads remained stable.
Since then, where does that leave us? That markets are “simply” in the
end messengers, bearers of bad news? Namely that the deterioration of
the public debt and the competitiveness of nations mechanically trans-
lated into a surge in their financing costs, which could only be con-
trolled through all-round savings? Or that it is fear and collective panic
which had a disastrous impact on the hollowing out of these spreads
which are irrevocably far away from the fundamentals… a little like the
surge in stock markets is regularly totally incompatible with the state of
the real economy? Since the response to this dilemma is not obvious,
you may doubt and opt for a second hypothesis Nevertheless, it is
crucial that a central bank be involved in this type of situation. Indeed, it
is only its determination and action to provide liquidity is able to calm
things down. It means accepting the verdict of the markets and leaving
the overwhelming majority of our citizens defenseless. The ultimate
objective of its intervention is to appease the markets and other stake-
holders in order that the fundamentals are analyzed for those they are,
and not through the prism of collective panic. And, indeed, the decision
of the European Central Bank in 2012 and its governor, Mario Draghi to
support the Euro “whatever happens” was spectacularly decisive. By
agreeing to assume its role as lender of last resort, the ECB has calmed
markets and eased the affected countries that have gradually seen a
significant improvement of these spreads. Rather than consolidate public
accounts of peripheral European nations, the ECB confined itself to
having its presence felt, with a resulting collapse of financing costs in
these countries. Thus, it is the countries where these spreads were the
most degraded (Greece and Portugal) which benefited from the sharpest
decline. As economic data did not naturally improve with the wave of a
magic wand, it is thus easy to deduce that the financing costs fell at the
same time as the “fear” factor. Moreover, it is in the countries where this
fear had been the most intense that ECB intervention proved to be the
most effective, since it is there that the spreads had fallen the most. It is
even possible to push this reasoning even further. And to assert that the
soaring cost of financing sovereign debt of these peripheral countries
had no correlation whatsoever with economic fundamentals! Otherwise:
how do you explain that these spreads are at reasonable levels today –
far from their records in mid-2012 – whereas the debt ratios/GDP likely
worsened in all the countries in the spotlight? Should the erosion in
these statistics relative to their public accounts and their growth not have
been “mechanically” translated by new records on the financing of their
debt? Yes, but in the meantime the ECB had appeared suddenly con-
firming the intuition that it is the market panic – not economic funda-
mentals! – which had initiated the surge in these spreads. Austerity is
therefore only the result of intense panic which seized our politicians,
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themselves, under pressure by the financial markets, in the absence of
lender of last resort. Let us push this reasoning one last time, since it is
now very easy to make this statement: it is countries which implemented
the most extreme measures of austerity which today have suffered the
biggest decline in their growth. In short, there are nations which suffered
an unprecedented austerity by panicked markets and European leaders,
knowing that these sacrifices did not in any way produce the expected
results. Indeed, they deteriorated more the foundations of these coun-
tries, including their ability to pay their debt. As such, the cash crisis
degenerated into an insolvent crisis! This is the cost of listening reli-
giously to financial markets which, far from being the messengers, are
confined to sending bad signals all the time. Signs very wrongly inter-
preted by European leaders who are woefully ignorant in matters of
finance and who embarked lightheartedly into a crossfire against public
deficits. Meanwhile, for its part, the ECB was complacent in its splendid
isolation until the situation became truly untenable, whereas its more
precocious intervention would have avoided so much human suffering.
To paraphrase Paul Krugman who uses the significant metaphor of
“ducks”, the determination of our politicians and the economic and
financial elite to impose austerity won’t get rid of the vermin or the bad
taste in our mouths! It always returns despite all possible treatments,
like the rigorous madness that persists to reduce public deficits that it is
on the contrary essential to use wisely during a recession.
The paying back of debts is thus practically inefficient as soon as it
takes place in a general situation of stagnant revenues. We will never
repeat it as much: growth will only be brought back with public policies
aimed at promoting full employment and improving revenues. Once
returned, this growth will only be maintained under cover of a legal and
equitable redistribution, crucial to re-establish the link between a grow-
ing productivity and increasing salaries. Without the progression of
revenue, no long-term growth will take place. That is unless our politi-
cians and economists have deliberately made the choice to transform our
nation into one of leisure… Only “reflation”, a term borrowed from
Fisher – will break the current infernal spiral.
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Cleaning up the Financial System –
A Prerequisite to Reducing Deficits
In times of crisis, a recurring phenomenon wants private debt to pro-
gressively fall into the public’s lap, or out otherwise, that they become
debts owed by the public. The worsening of the crisis mechanically cuts
into the ability of companies and households to pay back debts taken out
with the banking sector. And this is where the state takes an increasing
cut of the debts of its financial sector as the credit crunch intensifies.
And this is why banking crises almost always precede sovereign debt
crises. The escalade in private debt (of both companies and households)
is cleared – in light of the crisis and using the banking transmission belt
– by an explosion of public debt. To put it another way, the state re-
solves to call into question its own solvency by assuming the debts of
the private sector. The States that have absorbed the losses and assets of
financial establishments haven’t done it so much as in collusion with, or
out of kindness to, the banks, but rather in order to spare the economies
of the potentially devastating consequences of bankruptcies. Nonethe-
less, the nationalizations and the losses – a far from saving the root
problem – have transformed the banking crisis into one of sovereign
debt. This is because our current crisis likewise tells the story of succes-
sive rescue plans, with a permanent characteristic being that both are as
Paranoiac as each other. The billions injected in 2008 into Royal Bank
of Scotland, Lloyds, AIG or again into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
like those allowing the bailout in 2009 of establishments that were
sinking in the Dubai real estate market, certainly authorized placing the
financial institutions under artificial breathing. Because of all this, this
deferment – or this administered electro-shock therapy – agreed to by
the financial establishments was but the inflation price of state debts. In
this way, and although in appearance, the drama in the peripheral Euro-
pean countries had been initiated by its growing difficulties in assuring
its market financing, the exposure of European banks to these countries
was, in reality, what detonated this crisis. It is thus undeniable that the
European banking system, which was in a risky situation, to say the
least, played a central role in the financial liquefaction of the peripheral
states of the EU.
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This undeniable interaction between public and private debts must
thus be translated as an involvement of each citizen in the fight against
deficits. In other words, this tendency (or this plague) of debt is charac-
teristic of our developing countries, which have cultivated since about
30 years ago, an almost chronic tendency for cycle of booms in debt
followed by implosions. Indeed, we could estimate that the private
sector debts of OECD countries have advanced at an annual average rate
of 4-5% during these last thirty years! The deficits have, in this way,
formed an integral part in the daily lives of our populations and of our
States since the start of the 1980s, knowing that a hyperbolic increase
occurred when the crisis started in 2007. It is this dramatic drop in
market, real estate and, in general, assets valuations, that gave the
decisive impetus to this financial crisis triggered in the spring of 2007.
Indeed, it is in the countries encouraging property ownership – or rather
real estate speculation – with the extremely lax rules in granting mort-
gages that the real estate market met its greatest slump. Among these
countries are the USA (with the most threatened states, such as Florida,
whose market dropped 60%), Great Britain, and even “new” countries
but addicted to leveraging such as Dubai. The collapse of these valua-
tions being the object of bank loans thus froze all the loans granted to
companies and individuals by the financial establishments, leading to an
understandable stagnation in economic activity and a worsening of the
financial crisis. This growing scarcity of credit to the real economy since
2007 is thus responsible for an economic tightening, while it was the
previously and very generously granted credit (between 2001 and 2004)
that was responsible for the real estate bubble. Put another way, without
debt our economies cannot develop and prosper, with the knowledge
that economic activity always ends up dearly paying the price for too
much debt.
Public deficits are therefore what result from this decrease, the im-
mediate translation of which is the decrease in the State’s tax revenue
and the increase in unemployment compensation payments and other
social security provisions, directly linked to the difficult economic
situation. It is also in this way that at least half of the public deficits of
the peripheral EU countries in 2012 are due to the fall in tax collections
and the unbearable increase in their debt interest. It is useless and coun-
terproductive to reduce public spending in such a situation because these
represent less than 10% of their deficits. When will we finally realize
that the deterioration of public deficits is due only to the increase in
unemployment? These days, our politicians are at a crossroads and must
fight – and show a real obsession – by the “passive” deficit, which is
mechanically created, because the increased unemployment prevents the
state from offsetting its spending. The key priority being employment,
those who are unemployed evidently will not be put back to work due to
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reductions in public spending or the increase in taxes. The state on the
other hand must consider the “active” side of deficits that consists in
creating new employment and ensuring all welfare payments for its
citizens. The only solution to reduce the public deficits brought about by
unemployment is, obviously, to eradicate the unemployment. Passive
deficits must be transformed into active deficits, that is, into deficits that
are of use to the public which take over a depressed financial system to
finance and re-establish all economic sectors. To put it another way, the
path that will allow public deficits to be decreased is the one that will
settle the financial crisis because the role of the state is evidently not to
finance the economy forever. This reconstruction of the banking system
must necessarily be carried out based on new rules. After having ridding
the banks’ balance sheets of the toxic assets and having cleaned up their
accounts, enforcement personnel must necessarily monitor the practices,
supervise the payments and rethink in depth the training of bankers. At
the same time, a restructuring of private debts must occur which,
through a rationalization, or indeed wiping out, of a portion of their
debts, shall re-establish their consumption and saving capacity. Public
deficits must thus cease to be examined with fear by both politicians and
central banks because to this day, they remain the only lever to recreate
employment. Provided that the deficits are advisedly utilized, that is as
passive one, they shall become active. In the absence of private financ-
ing, unemployment can only be reduced by public deficits in the
knowledge that the private and banking sector must again fulfill their
duty as liquidity providers whilst the financial crisis fades out.
Moreover, one after the other, all the arguments – or pretexts? – in
favor of austerity fall like nine pins. Would deficits be an extra charge to
be borne by future generations? Those who claim so have not always
understood that increasing the debt today is not in any way an inter-
generational transfer, but an intra-generational one. Since it is the debt-
ors – tomorrow – who should in fact reimburse tomorrow’s creditors.
Do deficits harm investment? So in times of a depressed private sector,
the state must specifically step in rapidly to pour cash into its economy.
Would these deficits lead to soaring interest rates? Indeed, to the contra-
ry, in any case in heavily indebted countries, which nevertheless have
their own “sovereign” currency, namely the United States and Japan…
In short, the state should instead take on more debt and bigger deficits in
order to restore full employment, even if our current leaders flatly refuse
to use debt to stimulate economic activity. Their single and only objec-
tive – or obsession? – thus being to balance their budget. Is tax consoli-
dation a policy? While the ambition of our leaders (men and women)
should instead be to stimulate investment and reduce inequalities! How
can they continue to defend austerity – and therefore the acceleration of
unemployment – when they can use tax as a leverage wisely and fairly
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at the same time, while putting pressure on the European Central Bank,
which is completely uninterested in growth. Public spending is drastical-
ly revised downwards while efforts and energies should be focused on
increasing the taxation of the wealthier classes, and the active contribu-
tion of the ECB to growth recovery. Unless the fallacious argument
behind which lurk the proponents of orthodoxy which are being used to
divert attention from their real motivation. Who would have the state
take a step backward time and time again, exactly as the current British
model and the admission of the Prime Minister who just stigmatized the
poor and unemployed, according to him, had “made a choice life-
style”… It is therefore in the name of “structural reforms” and “there is
no other alternative to stringency” that we blithely saber social spend-
ing, and we oppose any veto contemptuous of any job creation that
would call for state stimulus. Like the President of MEDEF professed,
as “life is fragile, love is precarious, why would work not be insecure?”
Thus, the ardent defenders of finance and healthy accounts require that
the employment level be dependent on only the degree of confidence
prevailing in the business community. While it has been repeatedly
documented in the last twenty years that the stock market and financial
speculation was the main reason for the deterioration of economic
conditions. Under the guise of an economic argument, this diehard
obstinacy which fights fiercely against the doctrine of full employment
yet masks less and less its true political, even ideological, motives.
Narrowing public spending strictly to income earned by the state is in
fact nothing more than a moral tale told by those who set themselves up
as lecturers in liability 101. Behind their storytelling which abuse ordi-
nary people who are made to believe it is necessary to manage the
budget of a state in the same way as the purse strings of a household,
these destroyers of deficits preserve very prosaically the interests of the
dominant class. The very one who, seeing everything through the prism
of material accumulation and enrichment, saw itself described by
Keynes as “semi criminal” and “semi pathological”… All the while
supportive of the dominance of annuitants on our economies, this dictate
of austerity also reveals a ruling intellectual class that definitely fails to
address the economic fundamentals from the right angle. Why not
indeed integrate this debt equation into parameters as compelling as the
level of interest rates and inflation? And why continue to insist that a
healthy economy must necessarily be balanced (budgetary and account-
ing) when an economic activity – by essence dynamic, i.e. unstable –
occasionally requires the soothing injection of public funds? It is there-
fore important not to confuse economy with morality, for those who
need support have committed no sin. Before – well before – the state
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France in Consequently, we better understand why austerity
measures and other cuts in public spending are instantly doomed to fail
in times when the economy is in desperate need of oxygen. Economic
activity is thus condemned to fall back and public deficits to worsen
with it, in the absence of sufficient loans granted by the financial system
to economic actors, and in a situation when the government reduces it
spending or increases tax rates. It is also in this way that 25 billion
Euros worth of French taxes in 2012, with 33 billion Euros to be added
to them in 2013, just like the latest Spanish austerity plan (to only
mention this country) consisting in new efforts of 65 billion Euros, will
inevitably and logically translate into an economic recession, becoming
totally counterproductive. In particular, who has undertaken to “find”
100 billion Euros in order to balance out its budget in 2017, must quick-
ly choose its side. It is undeniably half-way between the inner core and
periphery of Europe, which likes to flaunt a “Norwegian” tax system,
risks finding itself in the short term in an unsupportable position in
which it competitiveness decreases even more due to an overvalued
currency. In fact, by wanting to be a part at all costs of the inner Euro-
pean core, (on the same level as Germany), France shall be cruelly left
(by rejection) on the periphery. In fact, isn’t France Europe’s runner up
in terms of taxation of capital? Does she not try to discourage invest-
ment from the top of her implicit tax rates (capital) which is (according
to 2010 statistics) 37.2%, just behind Denmark’s current rate of 39%? In
2013, the taxation of the return on corporate capital, the increase in tax
on profits, the tax surcharge on households should, for once, put France
at the top of this classification. Knowing that it occupies already second
place in Europe – and therefore the world! – regarding the taxation of
property, just behind Britain. Indeed, it is in the countries encouraging
property ownership – or rather real estate speculation – with the ex-
tremely lax rules in the excise duty of mortgages that the real estate
market met its greatest slump. Gripped by a vice between their European
commitments and market demands, our European nations thus get us
into a terrifying circle in which withdrawals – worsened by the goal of
trying to respect their commitments in terms of limiting deficits – slows
economic activity down even more. Not only does it ask us to suffer the
costs of this slowing down of activity but our want to consume and
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invest is definitively disturbed by the reduction in our revenues. So then,
because of the decline suffered by the Euro Zone in 2012, these are quite
the opposite of the public support measures that would need to be
implemented in a general context, in which the global investment,
consumption and commerce engines are broken down. The austerity
imposed on weakened nations in the midst of an economic downturn is
turning out to be harmful. This is in addition to the knowledge that this
same austerity becomes totally useless insofar as the financial sector
gets better and starts to take on its role as a lender again. Consequently,
public deficits and their ratios (reducing the GDP) are a necessary and
unavoidable evil until the financial sector restores itself. In reality, these
public deficits are the only engine that economic activity can avail of…
the only lifeline for growth. They will naturally be inclined to take a
step backwards, or indeed be completely diminished, as soon as the
private sector takes the helm of the action and public funds. But let us
not skimp past social spending in times of crisis because it is not these
economies that will reduce our deficits but rather it is these economies
that will weaken and worsen the citizen. Cuts in public spending, de-
creases in unemployment budgets and minimum salaries such as the
reduction in the State’s lifestyle will have little long-term effect on our
public accounts while they kill of the economy in the short term. We can
see an increase of these deficits because of the additional decrease in the
State’s tax revenues. But let us get one thing clear – these are not debts
that damage growth. Rather, this causal link should be inversed: deficits
are mechanically created by the step-back in growth. This is fortunate
because we can but congratulate the state for being there to inject its
cash that will prevent the paralysis of our economy. It is imperative that
we consider this inversed causality and accept that economic crises are
not induced by public deficits so as to no longer adopt bad measures that
will only worsen the situation. This is why the appropriate responses
within the framework of a recession initially caused by a drastic weak-
ening of banks and the financial circuit – supposed to clean up the
economy – consisting in more public spending, combined with tax
reductions in order to revive activity. The revival, which will inevitably
be the meeting point, will bring back the growth that will in turn allow
the decrease, or indeed disappearance, of public deficits. It is thus, to
paraphrase Keynes, in times of luxury that are the ideal times to use
austerity and not times of economic crisis. With the spending of one
being income for the other, these are the revenues of all of the consum-
ers, stakeholders and business owners that are also condemned to drop if
they reduce their spending at the same time in order to repay their debts.
That being said, the problem with debt only worsens because, as Fisher
put it “the more the debtors pay the more they owe)” in describing this
calamity that is the “debt deflation”. It is precisely in this kind of set-up
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– when the private sector is only worried with repaying its debts – that
the public sector must do exactly the opposite, i.e. spend!
The improvement of my personal financial situation is necessarily
dependent on the increase of my income or the decrease of my spending.
Nonetheless, the problems that I am personally faced with are not
similar to those that society must manage. If I reduce my spending in
order to improve my own financial situation, it the global income of
society that will decrease due to an individual’s decision to spend less!
In the same way, if I wish to increase my spending without resorting to
loans, I must inevitably call on my savings. The logic is thus unappeas-
able: if society’s consumption has to increase without worsening the
loan situation, it’s savings that must be called for. One this is for sure,
the post-crisis economy will necessarily have to be restructured based
on healthy values such as savings. Today, these saving however hinder
the resolution of our immediate problem by slowing down the increase
of aggregate demand at the heart of our economies. Keynes had very
cleverly identified this paradox of frugality: to promote saving in pre-
sent conditions will only increase the recession. The challenges for
society are thus not equivalent to my own challenges, just like the long-
term measure to clean up and consolidate our economy are not similar to
the actions that are undertaken today so that this recession does not turn
into a depression. In fact, certain decisions liable to improve our condi-
tions in the long term do nothing else but worsen it today! Consequent-
ly, all of our efforts must go towards increasing the aggregate demand
and, in this perspective, the States must strongly contribute to increase
their debts in order to promote demand and consumption. These growth
engines shall be subsequently replaced by exports and by the investment
of businesses, which will allow States to reduce their debts, due to a
reduction in their spending, together with tax revenue stimulated by the
recovery.
On paper, the discipline consisting in limiting public debts in relation
to the GDP works well because it provides reassurance by placing a
guardrail up against the spending madness of politicians. The very fact
of reassuring the markets allows borrowing at reasonable interest rates
according to a supposed undeniable logic in which state spending is
proportional to taxes. And this is why this concept of deficits reducing
the GDP shows its limits insofar as the country concerned is hit by a
recession needing larges additional expenditure by the state in order to
try to sustain the demand. This is why – in theory and in a perfect world
– the prolonged prosperous periods of growth must be built on in order
to balance out the public accounts, or indeed to gather up excesses.
Meanwhile, it is understandable that deficits accumulate when public
funds are used with the goal of reviving the economy. They are the
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result of a recession but allow us to fight the spiral threatening the
economy’s lifelines. To put it another way, the deficits are acceptable as
long as they allow us to block this slippage in which companies consid-
erably decrease, or indeed totally stop, new employment (when they are
not simply fired), because they forecast a decrease in their production
and services. At the same time, the consumer is led to become with-
drawn because of fear of unemployment and uncertainty. It is there that
the state must intervene in assuming its duty to regain confidence by
injecting stimuli. It is thus in such an economic situation that hollowing
of public deficits in no way constitutes a catastrophe because it allows
the economy to be kept on a drip. The deficit in this ways transforms
into positive energy which benefits all economic actors.
Moreover, deficits form whenever consumption goes beyond pro-
duction capacity of the country in question. This is when we become
dependent on foreign capital to finance a more or less substantial part of
our lifestyle. We immediately think on Chinese capital which inundates
the United States in the hope that in return, it buys Chinese products.
We should also think about the French and German capital that has been
poured into countries such as Greece and Spain since the launch of the
Euro, who in turn bought French and German products. This massive
influx of capital towards the European periphery is reversed as soon as
financiers and investors have been gradually convinced of these coun-
tries’ weak repayment capacity. Likewise, China would be forced to
withdraw from the United States if it one day lost confidence in them.
This type of deficits similarly leads to a negative dynamic which can
only be fixed by re-establishing the production capacities of the country
in question, with an inevitably positive impact on employment. Whatev-
er their nature and origin may be, public deficits must be turned against
the recession that hit the country and they must be considered as a
weapon to revive aggregate demand. Only voluntary policies to intensi-
fy public spending and advisedly reduce taxes will allow this vicious
cycle, fed by half-mast consumption and production and by the escalade
in unemployment, the effect of which in turn is to damage demand, can
be broken. Only state intervention can clean up, revive and regulate
economic activity. The austerity advocated by orthodox believers turns
out to be contrary to nature because the state proves to be essential and
unique in this breath that it breathes into its national economy. The state
mustn’t therefore come across resistance in its path or any limitation to
its stimulation of the economy – its only limit and horizon being the
restoration of employment. After all, it is possible to decree growth!
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Deficits Created by Under-exploited Resources
We thus find ourselves today in a world of reversed values in which
the majority of the specialists prevent the state from undertaking new
spending while at the same time being aware that only these injections
of cash can save the economy. For these champions of budgetary econ-
omies, it is unthinkable to further widen public deficits to save our
economies today whilst at the same time the recession can only be
fought off by stimulating activity by the agency of an increase in public
spending. This is why an almost generalized consensus prevails accord-
ing to which the Western States, already virtually bankrupt, wouldn’t
know how to face any more spending. This is at the same time as the
latter offers the only exit door out of the recession and stagnation. This
tyranny of rigor – this dictum of frugality of public action – further
disguises itself as moralistic with the opinion that future generations
shouldn’t have to pay the price for today’s excesses. Deceitful reasoning
according to which the loans taken out today will mortgage the future,
which is unacceptable for the citizen to live in and for the state to spend
beyond their respective means. And which justifies this collective
suicide by a strange argument according to which the stimuli applied
today would in reality be the loans to pay back tomorrow. However, the
arguments on public spending allow the immediate use of all resources
and all production tools at our disposal. It stands to reason that the
intensive exploitation of resources creates wealth and that the cash
injections from the state generate revenue. The stimuli and public
spending are a self-fulfilling prophecy that mobilizes the economy’s
production capacity whilst allowing new employment. Public spending
exudes therefore wealth and material comfort because it is the utilization
of our production capacities and all of our resources – including human
resources – that galvanizes our economies. The stimuli are not thus a
responsibility that must be assumed by future generations and they do
not steal tomorrow’s jobs. On the contrary, they allow current activity to
develop via the exploitation of resources that couldn’t be built on with-
out this public spending. Public deficits are an authentic instrument to
resurrect the economy which efficiently replaces private investment in
times of crisis. Indeed, public spending also creates wealth and revenue.
And this is why with the only perspective of private companies being
profit, they are completely indifferent to the exploitation of resources
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and to the increase in national wealth. The company and the system
cannot thus bank on a private sector in times of crisis that will certainly
not pay out with the goal of creating revenue for others.
To increase loans today in no way clouds the perspectives of solven-
cy of future generations. In fact, the loans initiated today create the
wealth of tomorrow! The debts taken out today, together with the stimu-
li injected bring back a transfer of resources. It is in effect in the future,
within the framework of repayments, that the debtor clears all or part of
its debt to the creditor. This debt service constitutes therefore an intra-
generational transfer – not intergenerational – of wealth. To take out
new debt today will not clear a net expense and pay all the bills of future
generations. To support this reverse theory – that is to claim that loans
mortgage the future – goes back to implicitly recognize that today’s
production prevents and damages tomorrow’s production. This is evi-
dently not the case as it is not because we produce more vehicles, more
computers or because we modernize such industry or such company
today that we will stop producing or working in this way tomorrow.
According to this same intra-generational transfer logic, the agents that
have to pay our debts will form an integral part of a cycle – by nature a
closed circuit one – where they will be the carriers of a redistribution of
resources in favor of creditors who will be their contemporaries. This
circuit is purely intra-generational therefore, following the example of
the current public deficit which will have to be offset by taxes (and other
payments such as VAT) which the future generations will have to pay
off because of the debts taken out today by the state. These liquid assets
will thus return tomorrow to the state. This analysis of current debt
which does not represent a handicap for the future is moreover implicit-
ly accepted by the traditional economists who recognize that public
debts are not an inextricable problem or even an unbearable burden on
growth. The only proviso rightly issued with public deficits is that they
lead to an increase of interest rates that evidently has repercussions on
the private sector, which in turn decreases or even cancels its invest-
ments.
Whatever it may be, the solution exists in order to keep these interest
rates low, even within the framework of major public deficits. The key
to controlling costs linked to financing debts consists in the optimal
utilization of all resources and an intensification of the production of the
economy’s acting companies. Indeed, it is nonsensical that interest rates
increase – that is that the money’s rent is more expensive or that there is
a scarcity of capital, so long as the situation in which resources are not
exploited lasts, production still hasn’t reached its limits and under-
employment persists. The extent of resources still available, maintaining
unemployment and the amount of services to assure and products to
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manufacture that is still physically possible to pour into the economic
circuits should, on the contrary, mechanically implement tax decreases,
whatever may be the background of the public deficits, which or no
more than an epiphenomenon. In order to corroborate these assertions,
we must try to understand the cause and effect relationship between the
unexploited resources, unemployment and revenue. It is undeniable that
the additional demand in capital (that is, the injection of stimuli or the
acceleration of credit) favors spending which, in turn, stimulates reve-
nue so long as the original shortage in which resources are under-
exploited exists, factories do not operate at full capacity and unemploy-
ment persists. Indeed, so long as the consumer – whatever the commodi-
ty or service required may be – won’t be satisfied, its demand will
automatically create an increase in revenue and savings on the other side
of the chain. Revenues will only cease to be influenced by this law of
offer and demand whenever a balanced situation is established and all
capacities of the economy are built on. It is at this stage that credit will
no longer be necessary or even useful and the revenues will logically be
able to stagnate because the gap between unexploited resources and the
demands of economic actors will have been filled. The variable of
revenues is in this way like mercury that reaches its point of equilibri-
um. It is crucial to understand and accept the fact that these unexploited
resources (which reflect the deficiencies of an economy) must be trans-
lated as an increase in revenues, essential to fill this gap. The equilibri-
um between loans and credits materializes when it is no longer essential
to take out new loans, that is from the moment where all of these re-
sources are taken advantage of and as soon as full employment is estab-
lished. This likewise signifies that it is not the interest rates that must
increase when the situation is unbalanced and that the economy shows
malfunctions as it is at this point that it most needs capital.
Rather, it is the salaries and revenues that must be increased in order
to play their domino effect on the economy, in the knowledge that,
additionally, the rent of the money benefits only a miniscule number of
actors. Let us inform our Finance Ministers and CEOs that the salary
variable is fundamental in relative strength of the economies. Our
lessors (who of course are keen to lend at a higher rate) must accept that
our economic activity – and thus our public deficits – will greatly im-
prove by increasing the salaries variable rather than the incidental
interest rates variable. It is wrong to think that interest rates increase
because of an increased demand in loans and capital. Indeed, more
credits lead to more spending and thus to more revenues and more
savings. It is consequently this new savings that becomes new finances.
These new available liquid assets will meet the new needs of creditors,
in such a way as an increase in interest rates will not be necessary given
that it is the initial credit that in part feeds the savings, which in turn
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becomes new loans. Furthering the knowledge that the proportion of
credit not turned into savings profits the economy by having a positive
influence on revenue through the famous multiplier effect anyway, this
great benefactor of economic activity single-handedly justifies the
spending and credit. It is in this way that 100 Euros spent in Shop A
accordingly increases the revenue of A knowing that this process is
quickly stopped if A chooses to save all of this sum, which will nonethe-
less be used for new credits and will benefit the system, in any case in
an optimal world and cycle managed entirely to benefit the cycle. If A
only saves 50 Euros and spends 50 Euros in B, it is thus B’s turn to
benefit from an increase of its revenues, which will in turn benefit one
or several others if B decides to thus extend the process. The multiplier
effect continues until all of the initial 100 Euros is placed into savings,
or to put it otherwise, until what no longer becomes spending for one
and savings for the other is completely placed in savings. It should be
noted that, if only this circle is dedicated to the good operation of the
economy, that is provided that all the stakeholders “play the game”, the
credit, the stimuli and the spending benefits either the revenues or the
savings, shall be recycled into credit.
The consequence being that the interest rates variable really is noth-
ing more than an epiphenomenon, a sort of useless parasite that only
benefits those who refuse to ensure the economy’s liquidity, those who
continually increase the stakes for their own personal profit all the while
looking down on the rest. It is this same logic that allows us to conclude
that public deficits – however high they may be – are not prevented
from affecting the interest rate and, moreover, there is no lacking in
examples to illustrate this point. It goes without saying that this lack of
correlation between massive public deficits and the soaring of the fees to
finance this debt by way of punishment by the markets is evident in the
United States – a fine example of great financial clout and an undeniable
government. How do you explain the rise in interest rates since the end
of the nineties to the end of Clinton’s Presidency, at the same time as the
American Federal State’s budget was exceeded for the first time in
decades? And how can we understand their decrease since the accession
of his successor, George W. Bush, given that the latter had to irreparably
increase the deficits? The best example however is that of our current
crisis – strongly marked by debts – and which is nonetheless character-
ized by practically zero American interest rates! Interest rates are not
therefore exuded by high deficits, but they are what results from an
inadequate monetary policy or from investors having unilaterally de-
creed a punitive raid against a country, that is to say and in all cases,
from an arbitrary decision to increase interest rates.
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Public Deficits and Redistribution of Resources
within Society
What is the real impact on the States’ spending deficit and other
stimuli applied in favor of the economy? To put it another way, is one
Euro spent or one Euro of tax deductions one more Euro of extra deficit
for public accounts? After all, the subsidies agreed to by the state lead to
revenue, greasing up the economic wheels, which increase the State’s
tax revenue. This is why the ayatollahs of the deficit, who haven’t
stopped vilifying public spending and condemning the stimulant
measures from the state, are wrong in calling on the burden that they
will make up for future generations. Because the debt taken out today by
the state, that which is injected into the economy and in favor of its
actors, certainly represents a tax to be paid back tomorrow but it like-
wise constitutes a transfer of wealth. By indebting ourselves today, we
understand the wealth of creditors all the while instantly lightening the
burden carried by the debtors. Public debts, of which the object is to
stimulate the economy, to exploit resources and to reduce unemploy-
ment, do not therefore lead to a genuine responsibility for stakeholders
but must rather be considered as a simple transfer of wealth and assets
of the crediting group which is limited to placing its available liquid
assets in the right place and for the biggest benefit of the real economy.
In the same way, this transfer carries with it a redistribution of the future
production to benefit companies who will have been able to get these
investments. In other words, those who flip out over the state taking
control of its economy in times of crisis and those who violently and
persistently critique public deficits are not moved by an altruistic vision
or by a will to instill a tax regime… their vehemence is understandable.
It is this transfer of wealth that is so feared, that deprives the person of
leisure in favor of those who truly profit the economy by their work, by
their inventions and by their aptitudes. Moreover, this concept of debts
being something to be assumed by the people of tomorrow must be
again modified. Indeed, the stimuli injected into the economy will not
fully translate into immediate growth, but will likewise positively affect
long-term growth. Investment, the modernization of out enterprises, the
development of technologies, training for those at all salary levels thus
increases the production potential in the mid-term and short-term with
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naturally favorable consequences to those who, tomorrow, will have to
repay our debts – not to mention the multiplier factor associated with
this type of stimuli which largely surpasses the unit. Investment, the
modernization of out enterprises, the development of technologies,
training for those at all salary levels thus increases the production
potential in the mid-term and short-term with naturally favorable conse-
quences to those who, tomorrow, will have to repay our debts – not to
mention the multiplier factor associated with this type of stimuli which
largely surpasses the unit. This brings us back to say that those invest-
ments, such as those previously stated will translate, for the economy
and stakeholders, into profits and production savings largely exceeding
the amounts injected. And what can we say about future tax collections
from the state that are greatly improved? This is why the public deficit
must be considered as an investment in the future. This is why a given
and well-targeted stimulus of 1 or 100 billion Euros will not lead to a
clear increase of 1 or 100 billion Euros.
These wealth transfers further act to the detriment of this very small
proportion of the population having the chance to save and which thus
benefit from high revenues. Moreover, let us not forget that the propor-
tion of men and women who live off their work in our Western nations
decreases little by little compared to persons of independent means and
pensioners. The state must thus issue national loans, mainly aimed at
well-off citizens, with the aim of actively and intentionally carrying out
a redistribution that will affect the best-off. Apart from the fact that this
loan will not be confiscatory – given that it will be remunerative and
must be paid back in time – the economic revival will clearly benefit
these privileged classes, which will be largely made up for in their
solidarity. The state must thus issue national loans, mainly aimed at
well-off citizens, with the aim of actively and intentionally carrying out
a redistribution that will affect the best-off. Apart from the fact that this
loan will not be confiscatory – given that it will be remunerative and
must be paid back in time – the economic revival will clearly benefit
these privileged classes, which will be largely made up for in their
solidarity. The reasoning is identical in relation to the tax increases
which will today affect the well-off and wealthy classes, who will
benefit at the start of the economic activity reboot. After, won’t these
stimuli be injected into the economic cycles in which these privileged
actors play a specified role? Indeed, the state has the advantage of
operating a progressive taxation scheme which will allow a better
stimulation of the economy. Because it makes no sense whatsoever to
impose more heavily upon the poor and middle class because of their
relative low incomes. As they are unable to save, they spend the product
of their wages, and this product would be more useful to the economy if
it were used for consumption instead of taxes. Whereas the progressive
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and significant increase of taxes on the well-off class – which is able to
save – is economically beneficial because these amounts collected by
the state (and which otherwise would be hoarded) flow back into the
cycle to benefit a larger number. Given that the wealthy consume a large
amount less as a percentage of their income, the increase in their tax rate
thus allows a stimulation of economic activity which would not have
been able to otherwise profit their savings. Whilst taxing the poor and
middle classes doesn’t unduly benefit the economy because these
amounts will be recycled into the consumption cycle anyway, this
withdraw from the wealthy turns out to be highly beneficial to the mass
as it injects amounts aimed at saving into the economy. In times of
crisis, it is thus recommended to establish a relatively strong progressive
taxation in order to better divide out the wealth, to reduce inequalities
and, finally, to avoid depression. The ultimate objective is obviously to
redistribute the wealth at the top of the pyramid down to the bottom in
order to stimulate the consumption of those who live from the product
of their work. It is thus an inversed “tax shield” in the sense that it is
imperative to put a limit to the tax rate of the middles classes and the
poor with the aim of maintaining their purchasing power. It goes with-
out saying that this tax system – which must be stressed on the well-off
classes in times of crisis – must be lightened at the start of the economic
revival or in times of inflation. We must therefore reverse the logic and
the prevailing arguments and realize that the presence of unexploited
and neglected resources, combined with an unemployment, the main
reason of which being the often gaps in employee training, necessitate
the implementation of wide-scale programs that allow this vitality to
return to our economy. Society as a whole will moreover only be able to
benefit from stimuli that allow unemployment to decisively step back,
all the while improving all incomes. Consequently, the concerns, or
indeed the anguish, in relation to our public deficits are very clearly
exaggerated and force us to superfluous restrictions because of deceitful
or self-serving reasons. After all, wasn’t it Hyman Minsky (1919-1996)





National Currency – The Supreme Weapon
against Deficits
All public debts are not worth the same. In this respect, it is crucial
to have a clear distinction according to the monetary system adopted by
the country with which we analyze public debt. Indeed, a country bene-
fitting from a fluctuating exchange rate, that is one in which the curren-
cy isn’t able to be exchanged into another currency over a certain period
of time at a fixed rate, or indeed into a precious metal as was the case
with gold standard, never risks going into bankruptcy. A sovereign
country that freely issues currency-denominated loans does not have to
face the potential consequences or usual measures of market retaliation
or pressure whenever they engage in spending that greatly exceeds their
budgetary capacities. To jump into programs allowing it to stimulate its
economy and to guarantee its citizens their social benefits, this country –
which enjoys the absolute monopoly in the issuance of its national
currency – avails of a solution that allows it not to increase taxation and
stop sinking amidst the mass of markets to be financed. Indeed, it is
sufficient to credit bank accounts with the currency that it alone has the
power to issue. Contrary to a country having abdicated its monetary
sovereignty by indexing its currency to another one and which is thus
naturally limited in its capacities to print, and even more so, to spend its
own currency. The example of countries having correlated their national
currency to the American Dollar shows beyond a doubt that they can
only issue their currency in amounts that allow them to maintain the
level or the fluctuation range defined in relation to the dollar. Their
freedom to print their own currency is also restricted by the compatibil-
ity with this indexation, which instantly renders their currency non-
sovereign and extremely subjected to market waves that do not hesitate
to launch into speculative attacks against a currency that would have
been issued in too large of amounts and forced to leave this indexation –
in other words, default payment. Their freedom to print their own
currency is also restricted by the compatibility with this indexation,
which instantly renders their currency non-sovereign and extremely
subjected to market waves that do not hesitate to launch into speculative
attacks against a currency that would have been issued in too large of
amounts and forced to leave this indexation – in other words, default
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payment. Their freedom to print their own currency is also restricted by
the compatibility with this indexation, which instantly renders their
currency non-sovereign and extremely subjected to market waves that
do not hesitate to launch into speculative attacks against a currency that
would have been issued in too large of amounts and forced to leave this
indexation – in other words, default payment. Drawing up public debt in
a foreign currency – an option chosen by certain companies – also
represents a potential danger that cannot be ignored because this very
same public debt can represent a threat for the state in question, which is
unable to print this foreign currency in order to fulfill its obligations.
The only source of foreign currencies being that of exports which, in
times of global financial crisis, or loss of competitiveness of companies
of the debtor the country are likely to fall and thus have a disastrous
impact on the inflows of foreign currencies. Not to mention the risk of a
sharp appreciation of the foreign currency in which the state borrows
which, combined with a fall in exports, could expand losses and extol
deficits. A state which borrows in a foreign currency, believed to be
reliable and safe for its creditors, thus leads to the opposite effect to
what was initially sought.
Let’s digress a little to note also the known risk that the private sec-
tor takes by borrowing in a currency other than its own, thereby placing
it in an extremely fragile situation, for the same reasons as those likely
to affect its own state. This brings to mind the acute crisis of certain
Eastern European countries (such as the Czech Republic or Latvia)
whose households and businesses had borrowed in Swiss Francs prior to
the 2007 crisis, persuaded by their banker that the interest rates of that
currency would remain low, with promised savings on their substantial
financing costs vis-à-vis their own currency or that of the Euro. Logic
pushed so far that the private sector of certain emerging European
nations had even borrowed up to 90% in foreign currencies, the regional
European average being 50% of private credit arrangements contracted
in foreign currencies, of which 20% on average only in the Swiss Franc.
If the interest rates of the Swiss Franc were indeed maintained at insig-
nificant levels as the bankers of these emerging Eastern European
nations had thought, its safe haven status had to, however, catapult it to
more than 30%! The consequences proved catastrophic for those debtors
who did not normally have any revenue in Swiss Francs and nonetheless
were forced to make repayments of 30% higher on their debt. Let’s also
think about the number of French municipalities and towns which had,
under the impetus of a (sadly famous) European bank, decided to index
their borrowings to the exchange rate of this same Swiss Franc, con-
vinced by their banker that they would maintain their financing costs
under pressure with respect to the “high stability” of this currency.
French towns which today find themselves in an inextricable situation,
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near bankruptcy, since this massive appreciation of the Swiss Franc
forced them (by the series of ratchets under their contracts) to have to
pay interest rates of almost 25% per annum on their debts! In conclu-
sion, no one – neither state nor the private sector – should venture into
debt in a currency that is not its own without risking default if a single
parameter goes wrong.
In addition, the decision for a country to correlate its currency – or
even abandon it altogether – in favor of another therefore amounts to
giving up fully its monetary policy, and sometimes tax, which provides
yet an immense privilege. In these times of European turbulence, we
think obviously about the members of the EU handing over the reins of
this privilege to the supranational institution known as the European
Central Bank. As these countries only use, and not issue, Euros, they are
able to finance their lifestyle with tax levers and bond issues. From this
point of view, an emerging country that has a sovereign currency clearly
has more flexibility in determining its public policies than Germany!
Hyperinflation is certainly a threat – it remains the only one! – able to
limit the enthusiasm of those nations which are still fully sovereign in
their ability to print their currency in virtually unlimited quantities to
fulfill their duty to their citizens. Of course, we think about the textbook
case of Zimbabwe or Weimar… However, a country that was even a
few years ago the second most important economic power in the world,
and today is the third, strongly credits bank accounts and prints money
en masse – Japan –, without any hyperinflation and even without incur-
ring the slightest surge in its financing costs. It is precisely because
Japan has a monopoly on issuing yens and its public debt is denominat-
ed in this currency that it does not suffer the fate of Greece despite a
reduced ratio of debt to GDP even less enviable than that of this same
Greece. And the argument of a few according to which the Japanese
public debt is only quasi held by its citizens is not welcome. A sover-
eign country remedies its sovereign debt and honors its creditors by
crediting their accounts, that its public debt be held by strangers or by its
own citizens.
Hence the reason for a fundamental ingredient which is always at
fault with the Euro, which is far from being a “sovereign” currency
unlike, for example, a country like the U.S. which has its own sovereign
currency. In fact, for the members of the Euro zone, everything happens
as if they had opted for a foreign currency, somewhat like how certain
“dollarized” countries indexed their currency to a standard. Indeed,
certain mechanisms of assistance to members in need are already acting
as shock absorbers and even the presence of the ECB instills some
flexibility. Nevertheless, the countries united under the Euro banner are
not recipients of considerable advantages that are conferred on nations
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issuing a sovereign currency. In this regard, the Greek creditors unveil
this structural weakness intrinsic to European nations which use a de
facto non-sovereign currency. In fact, a country which issues its own
sovereign and freely convertible currency can never go bankrupt since
there are no limits as to how much of its own money it can print in order
to settle its debts and operating expenses. There are no restrictions
stopping it from borrowing on markets and, in absolute terms, it can
issue its currency in sufficient quantities to pay interest and its debts so
as to finance its multiple deficits… Thus, this country is not, in theory,
subjected to any spending limitations since it benefits from the sover-
eign privilege of crediting several bank accounts in its own national
currency without worrying about the surge of interest rates on its bonds.
Indeed, it does not issue its borrowings under the restriction knowing
that, whatever happens, it can pay the interest by printing even more of
its national currency… This is precisely why a country such as Japan,
whose debt ratio/GDP is double that of the PIIGS, pays modest interest
on its Treasury bonds: it issues a sovereign currency. However, a coun-
try which borrows in a currency that is not its own or whose national
currency is indexed to a foreign currency (or to gold) risks defaulting on
payment in case of a grave financial crisis. That is why certain European
nations must be faced with an increased spiral on the financing of their
debts even when their ratios are less spectacular than those of Japan, or
even the U.S. From the point of view of member nations of the Europe-
an Union, the Euro remains somewhat like a foreign currency. It is little
like if the member nations had indexed their former national currency –
even underlying – to the European currency, and a little as if they had
permanently incurred debt in a foreign currency where they do not
benefit from the privilege of issuing it as it would seem proper for them.
Thus, the different central banks of countries which adopted the Euro
and all have accounts with the ECB – only to issue these same Euros –
benefit only from limited monetary reserves: the funds provided to these
nations by the ECB are effectively proportional to their Treasury bills
subscribed by the markets and investors. A country like Spain is there-
fore restricted in this arena and forced to borrow at impossible rates
since it does not have the advantage of printing its own bills or the
possibility of unlimited support from the ECB. Today, European leaders
are still ignoring this weakness in the system. Indeed, they act as though
they do not understand the concept of monetary sovereignty whereas the
implementation of the Euro presented since its introduction a “congeni-
tal” defect?
In such a context where the Euro presents this original sin heavy to
assume, it is strictly impossible for a number of these member nations to
reboot via a massive depreciation of their national currency. Incapable
of reestablishing their captivity in favor of boosting their exports, these
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countries thus find themselves in a catch-22 system of deflation and
buried under the weight of their ever worsening indebted situation. As
their citizens are only – after all – human beings, who for the most part
have very largely punctured their threshold of tolerance, default pay-
ment remains therefore the only honorable solution. With, at the helm,
financial and economic chaos This is why we in Europe are currently
living an authentic revolution of mentalities which are forcing us to
mourn an illusion that comfortably cradled us. With, at the helm, finan-
cial and economic chaos. This is why we in Europe are currently living
an authentic revolution of mentalities which are forcing us to mourn an
illusion that comfortably cradled us. The myth of the state as protector
and ultimate refuge has officially given up the ghost, since we know
now that our – non sovereign – state can go bankrupt. The myth of the
state as protector and ultimate refuge has officially given up the ghost,
since we know now that our – non sovereign – state can go bankrupt.
Well before the creation of the Euro, the Canadian, Robert Mundell
(born in 1932) specified the conditions for a successful monetary union.
These works garnered him the Nobel Prize in 1999, i.e. precisely the
year in which the single currency was launched. According to Mundell,
a shared currency by a geographic region would only be viable in the
case of mobility of capital and labor, flexibility in salaries and prices,
similar economic cycles and tax transfers within the zone. In other
words, money and workers should be able (and want) to travel and
establish themselves in different parts of the EU. Prices should even
decrease if necessary and not only increase. The members of this Union
should benefit both from economic expansion or suffer economic con-
traction together. Finally, a solidarity (ideally automated) should allow
some regions in turmoil receive financial support from an agency creat-
ed for this purpose or by a federal government. Today, the European
Union does not have any of these advantages, making it an unsustaina-
ble Union, at least according to the Mundell criteria, unlike the United
States whose structure allows it to absorb economic shocks. Of course,
an unemployed person in South Carolina can move to Texas where he
has just found work while a Greek would find it very difficult to estab-
lish himself in Sweden and vice versa. Apart from the language barrier
and mindset, a European country, devastated from, or undergoing, a
sharp economic slowdown would, in addition, receive no subsidy from
its central administration allowing it to stay the course and successfully
fight the recession. Thus, the union in effect in the U.S. only functions
because its workforce can move freely from state to state, where con-
stant interzonal capital flows and institutionalized automatic mecha-
nisms cushion financial shocks. Indeed, not content with these congeni-
tal defects, the European Union turns out to be even a machine
producing bubbles – that is to say, imbalances – due to a single interest
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rate divided by regions and nations which are thus subject to actual
divergent exchange rates between them. In the actual European context,
the Euro actually acts as a gold standard, whereby the adjustments and
essential readjustments – which cannot be achieved through the relief
valve of appreciation and devaluation – are done exclusively by the
transmission belt of prices and salaries. The Euro clearly cannot be
converted into gold, but – in the absence of the characteristics described
by Mundell and in the presence of a uniform rate of interest for all
members – it compresses economies and produces recession. Since the
prevailing gold standard is reflected in adjustments to support systemat-
ically weak economies and currencies while sparing the strong coun-
tries. Is this not the peripheral Europe which suffered and cashed in all
imbalances within the framework of the actual European crisis? Re-
member the purpose of the gold standard which exerted a downward
pressure on some fragile currencies of nations undergoing economic
contraction and therefore high unemployment, unable to make the
necessary domestic adjustments. The Euro – as the gold standard –
makes the situation worse for countries in recession by creating defla-
tion. Let us never forget that maintaining the gold standard which
effectively had to hinder fighting – even prevent – the Great Depression.
Let us also remember that it is the countries which were not members –
or which quickly exited it at the time – which first reestablished them-
selves or pulled themselves out of it with limited damage. It is more or
less understood that speculation and the financial world were launched
with heads lowered, since the beginning of the 1990s, into the delightful
game of playing Greek, Italian or Portuguese interest rates against
German rates. Thus, giddy profits were recorded by investing in periph-
eral nations or the Southern countries which were not supposed to go
bankrupt thanks to the umbrella of the Euro. As such, the financial
system neglected a fundamental point, i.e. in the absence of a currency
that may be devaluated if necessary, this devaluation thus takes another
form: default payment… Therefore, the actual European disappoint-
ments – which are not the result of fiscal indiscipline – are amplified by
this single currency which is not used as a lever to lessen the pain of
economic and social recovery for Europeans.
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Currency War or Attempts at Reflation?
Lenin asserted almost a century ago that “the surest way to destroy a
nation was to circumvent its currency”. The Weekly Standard of Febru-
ary 9, 2013 published an article about him where Irwin Seltzer ha-
rangued that “Lenin would welcome the [current] currency war”, in that
it would (according to him) help destroy capitalism… Would we have
spent a century for nothing? Have we therefore not learned anything in a
hundred years? Because it is vital to overcome the stifling orthodoxy of
today, as of this unique mind-numbing thought, which never tires from
teaching us that the policy of quantitative rate cuts undertaken by some
central banks lead straight to universal monetary conflict. In addition,
without being able to explain to us this alleged relation of cause and
effect between the expansionist policy of a central bank and the weaken-
ing of its national currency. But it is true that those who use this warlike
terminology still do not understand the process of money creation put at
the service of an economy that they stubbornly refer to as “manipula-
tion” or “hazardous experimentation” undertaken by the central bank.
Whereas it should instead be leaning toward the dynamism and innova-
tive spirit of some central banks whose efforts are entirely oriented
towards restoring economic activity and reducing unemployment. For
example, how not to endorse wholeheartedly the second wave of quanti-
tative rate cuts (QE2) of $600 billion set up in November 2010 by the
U.S. Federal Reserve? Let us remember this very troubled period of a
stagnant U.S. economy despite excessively low short-term interest rates
accompanied by an intense fragility in the European banking system.
Did the Fed not wisely then turned on its printing press to compress its
long-term rates, critical to any recovery, while providing valuable
support to European banks? It was, however, largely taxed at the time of
seeking to weaken its currency (by printing generously) through lever-
aging monetary creation, that thus would allow a recovery by exports.
For the advocates of neo-liberalism (and a shrinking state), the Federal
Reserve openly plotted with the clear intention to devalue the dollar and
unfairly boost its economy. Does the drop in the green back negatively
affect the unemployment rate in Brazil or the backlog of orders of
Chinese companies, as the leaders of these countries continue to claim?
All this makes it possible to relativize considerably the fluctuations in
interest rates, the success of issuing bonds, the identity of those which
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hold the Treasury bills and even the threats of insolvency. Is the
strengthening of the currency of these countries not simply the result of
their accession to the status of industrial and commercial power? So
why all this anxiety and fuss around these issues of public deficits that
are really not so? Why not consider the effect of currency appreciation
at the same time as the cause and the consequence of the enrichment of a
nation? Probably because economists and leaders confuse their pockets
with that of the state! All mechanisms ignored by almost all analysts –
as leaders – opting instead for a vocabulary and a cataclysmic descrip-
tion while monetary creation reduces unemployment in the “integrated”
savings while accelerating industrialization of the emerging countries. In
fact, a country’s debt differs altogether from private debt. In this regard,
there is debt and debt and it would be completely counter-productive not
to distinguish them since, by doing so, we contribute actively to penaliz-
ing the state, therefore ourselves. Do the United States and Japan have
warlike intentions when they try to reverse their unemployment and
fight deflation through monetary creation? First, let’s note that when it
generates deficit, that is to say, when it creates money, the state issues
simultaneously an asset in favor of the private sector but without the
latter having to offset this debt by a bond or constraint of any kind.
Since, far from being the sought after goal, the depreciation of their
respective currencies is only the collateral effect of their expansionist
policy. Thus, public debt represents a net gain for the private sector and
therefore for the economy. Contrary to the Chinese position which used
and abused monetary manipulation, the policies put in place in the U.S.
and Japan can effectively provoke a devaluation of their currency but
not similar in any way to manipulation, much less so to any “war”. And
this, contrary to the private sector which, not having the ability to print
money, and not being capable of crediting accounts at will, cannot be
indebted beyond a certain threshold. Unlike war, which is obviously a
negative sum game (I destroy you, you destroy me), an expansionist
monetary policy is a “win-win” process, most often followed by benefits
for the country which puts it into place, and by extension to its trading
partners. The private sector can thus easily switch to a Ponzi scheme.
Must the British decision to leave the gold standard in 1931, gradually
followed by the United States and France, not precede the restoration of
their growth? This term is, on the other hand, not found in the vocabu-
lary of a state which has its own sovereign currency, and therefore
which is not obliged to borrow. Is it not by abandoning gold and its
corollary, namely the expansion of the monetary base, which finally
turned the page of the Great Depression? As a result, the obligation of
governments – and which markets impose on them – to balance their
budgets and public accounts can be revisited under another perspective.
And those looking to rewrite history must review their copy because it is
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not the German hyper inflation of the early 1920s which ascended Hitler
to power, but the deflationary Brüning policy a decade later. It becomes
obsolete. Within this same Germany which today dictates austerity and
contraction throughout Europe, as if – it neither – retained the teachings
of the past… After all, the first use of currency is not so much to buy
other currencies than, especially, to use it in the exchange of goods and
products! Indeed, as we have seen before, however little a country has
an independent monetary scheme, the mass of its debts and the limits of
its deficits as the pace of issuing its bonds fall within its own decision,
because no one would in theory be able to impose them on it. That is
why the loss in value of any given currency encourages the consumer to
acquire more durables, and the company to invest in its equipment and
production. Contrary to the gold standard regime and the indexation of a
national currency to another referenced currency, the floating exchange
rate system therefore gives a nation latitude and freedom to act poten-
tially fully and completely. Isn’t the depreciation of a currency reflected
in the value of these goods and products which become mechanically
more expensive? Is this not peculiar to a sovereign nation? The increase
in prices and tariff – and in other words: inflation! An extremely tough
and generally widespread urban legend demands, however, that the state
be “respectable and responsible” by balancing its budget – or at the very
least that it gets close to balancing it – with the objective of not exhaust-
ing its national resources and not “spiraling” out of control. Does it not
motivate companies to produce more goods for sale at the best price,
and consumers to buy today in anticipation of a further increase in these
prices? That is why the expansionist policy of the industrialized coun-
tries in integrated economies can have a widespread ripple effect on all
their exports. He sees this as an exemplary value for the whole of socie-
ty which should not let its expenses spiral out of control. Some nations
are certainly not in a position to improve substantially their foreign
trade. According to him, the state should be present to lead citizens to
the way to discipline to get them back on track… If this is the case, it is
necessary to note that today we are witnessing a radical shift in para-
digm since it is the turn of modern and evolved but extremely deficit
States who need to get back on track! The fact remains that the overall
level of world exports will improve vastly since Japan will sell more
cars, the U.S. more aircraft, the European Union more machines… In
short, the creation of money and the consecutive loss in value of certain
major currencies will lead to falling unemployment and higher incomes.
That does not matter: that this logic of reversal of values is pushed
further and therefore we use to dismantle the myth of the frugal state. In
what amounts to a much more globalized economic recovery than a war.
In fact, the state – with a monopoly on printing money – is able to credit
accounts, including those of its creditors. Competitive devaluations are
Capitalism without Conscience
54
not a zero-sum game which allows the country that practices them to
boost its exports at the expense of those who have decided (for reasons
of aberrant principle) not to enter into the arena of this monetary multi-
plication. As such, it does not have to leave it to the markets to deter-
mine its financial costs, and even less its public policies. Instead, they
are a great tool for economic resurrection, especially if the country in
question falls within its objectives in terms of inflation, due to imported
goods necessarily made more expensive by the loss in value of its
national currency. Ceding to market pressure by having to publicly
borrow thanks to the bond instrument is therefore strictly voluntary for a
state. You can actually only remain appreciative of the explicit target of
2% inflation set by the Japanese government, which will be launched
through multiple acquisitions of securities and other assets to provide
the means to achieve doubling its monetary base over the same period!
This state believes in playing the game. Quantitative rate cuts are there-
fore amplified and expanded. In reality, it only plays the game of inves-
tors whose sole preoccupation is to grow their savings. Emphasis will be
placed at the same time on the quantity and quality of these interven-
tions which will take place at an annual rate of 60-70 trillion yen, i.e.
about $600 to $700 billion, which represents the accumulated “QE1”
and “QE2” programs in the United States. That is why a country such as
Spain, which abdicated its monetary policy (to the EDB), has today been
reduced to borrowing from the markets at astoundingly high interest
rates to finance itself. Like the U.S. Federal Reserve in its “QE2” pro-
gram, the Bank of Japan will purchase long-term Treasury bonds, but it
will buy also shares on the stock market and real estate properties. The
Greek or Spanish cataclysmic experience further demonstrates the
cruelty of markets and rating agencies which have completely taken
control. The stated and ultimate purpose is to instill valuable reflation,
only able to fight and defeat the rampant depression that has plagued
this country for many years. Public deficits will continue to persist so
long as the growth rate remains lower than the rate of return on the
State’s bonds. Make no mistake: this new Japanese “experience” is
certainly the most important business – and worthwhile – from a central
bank, which, since the days of Paul Volcker in the U.S. and the large
means put in place to fight against inflation in the late 1970s and early
1980s! In this regard, it is necessary to understand that the European
Union is not really confronted with a debt crisis, but with a problem of
sluggish growth, the effects of which naturally spill over into its public
deficits. If the Bank of Japan manages to revive subdued inflationary
pressures, it will manage to lessen the debt burden of the country while
presiding over a return to job-creating growth. Weren’t the rates of
refinancing Spain’s debt consistently between 5.4 and 5.9% between
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January 2000 through May 2002 without anyone worrying about it or
predicting cataclysm?
To this end, the recent example of Japan – which is to create money
and promote inflation – is clearly to be followed and replicated within
the so indecisive European Union. Robust growth would in fact allow
the State to offset this charge while providing opportunities and confi-
dence to financial players. Far from being a zero-sum game, competitive
devaluation supported by an inflationary ambition is there an irreplacea-
ble lever in reviving an anemic, even deflationary, economic activity.
This is precisely why it is now vital to focus exclusively on the growth
rate of our economies, while relegating this obsession with deficit
reduction to the background having the perverse effect of stopping the
activity. Besides, the Nikkei is not the only stock exchange to have
applauded the tough decisions of the new Japanese government, since
all global financial markets have understood the benefits of such a
monetary creation on global recovery. Finally, as it is strange to note
today that they are the same ones who did not see the financial crisis
coming who persist on the path of austerity, orthodoxy and who set
themselves up as great defenders of the public purse and large deficit
slayers. At a time when the “core” European countries begin to falter:
France with 1997 industrial production levels and its German counter-
part to 2007 levels and retail sales at an unprecedented decline of 4.7%
for the same country. Now when Indeed, they were the same one who
yesterday indulged in – and with – the financial markets fully delivered
to themselves, and who often drew juicy profits, which have now –
against all expectations – become fanatical, even fetish, about limiting
public spending. The European Central Bank should be proactive and
deign, in turn, to get its “hands dirty” from its printing press, instead of,
like the European leaders, continuing to whine and stigmatize the Japa-
nese initiative. While it and many nations within the heart of Europe are
obsessed with the financing costs of their sovereign debt, they seem still
unable to grasp that a country issuing its own floating currency does not
have to undergo the retaliatory measures of financial markets. In this
regard, the case of Japan which is financed by abysmally low rates
despite tremendous public debt is once again illuminating. It suffices
that the last-resort lender, i.e. the central bank, transfers cash into the
Treasury’s account knowing that the other side of the coin is inflation. A
sovereign nation with a sovereign currency can therefore be fiscally
irresponsible without the soaring cost of financing its public debt en-
cumbering its growth. But have the ECB, Germany and the other exem-
plary nations of the EU only understood that the cost of financing their
public debt close to zero – or zero – is precisely the best reflection of
stagnant economies, even on the edge of the precipice? As higher fi-
nancing costs of the public debt can also be a signal for a state to redi-
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rect its liquidity in favor of future investments and at high added value,
and to interrupt its “Keynesian” expenses in view of the recovery ahead.
Therefore, that Germany (or Switzerland) derive no pride in their nega-
tive rates because it really is not the ability to obtain financing at low
prices that will advance their economic recovery. Therefore it is only
when the economy is working at full capacity that extra public spending
– but also businesses and households – induces inflation. In the same
vein, the austerity policies and contraction necessarily and inevitably
lead to… more economic contraction. Under this assumption of full
capacity, inflation can be further avoided by a gradual reduction in
public spending which would, at any rate, be counterbalanced by in-
creased investment by the private sector within a framework of a boom-
ing economy. Because only an activist policy mixing monetary creation
and pressure on their currencies will enable European citizens to see the
light at the end of the tunnel. The acceleration in public spending is
therefore not likely to generate inflationary pressures by causing a run
on consumption and aggregate demand in the context of an activity that
is slowing down, no more so than it would threaten (as was seen above)
the solvency of the sovereign state in question. It is then that the cost of
financing the European sovereign debt will increase: a clear signal of the
great return to economic growth. Let’s therefore stop pretending that the
creation of money and the monetization of debt lead to insolvency and
inflation. When will Europeans finally understand that there is nothing
to fear than fear itself? Rather let’s try to qualify and put into perspec-
tive by understanding that a given economic context is able to “cash in”
extremely liquidity injections and support a widening of its deficits




Reflection of a Sovereign Nation
Therefore, we do not understand – or at any rate very little – what
public debt really is. A sovereign nation as described above does not
have any obligation to create bonds and other Treasury bills to finance
itself. Do countries which ask markets and investors for money, at
sometimes prohibitive interest rates, know or are they aware that such a
transaction is entirely voluntary? Indeed, it is a strategy – questionable
or definable according to the circumstances – which means that the state
in question decree that credit accounts deposited into its central bank
would turn into revenue by converting them into bonds and other in-
struments of credit. Therefore, deliberate choice, on the part of a country
which grants investors, private funds or other countries outright a say in
its monetary policy and public spending. Entering the arena of financial
markets for a country seeking funding amounts in effect to accepting –
even promoting – a transfer of wealth, but also of power to and in favor
of its creditors. This is why a state should identify those who purchase
its Treasury bills, when it should simply not be selected prior to their
issuance. This is an essential issue, even existential, for an independent
country eager to maintain its sovereignty. The contemporary example
that immediately comes to mind is the dependence of the United States
vis-à-vis their first bondholder, namely China. After all, and this has
already been seen since the European crisis with Western and modern
countries, markets are very capable of paralyzing an economy, not when
a country fails to meet its commitments, but simply whether markets are
no longer convinced of its financial virtue. Issuing bonds is therefore a
voluntary process on the part of a state which could just as easily have
the same liquidities by requesting its central bank to credit its account
and those of its service providers. Money has no smell or color, eco-
nomic actors are very indifferent toward whether their stimuli, tax cuts,
income and social benefits come from international investors or printing
money. All this makes it possible to relativize considerably the fluctua-
tions in interest rates, the success of issuing bonds, the identity of those
which hold the Treasury bills and even the threats of insolvency.
So why all this anxiety and fuss around these issues of public deficits
that are really not so? Probably because economists and leaders confuse
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their pockets with that of the state! In fact, a country’s debt differs
altogether from private debt In this regard, there is debt and debt and it
would be completely counter-productive not to distinguish them since,
by doing so, we contribute actively to penalizing the state, therefore
ourselves. In fact, a country’s debt differs altogether from private debt
In this regard, there is debt and debt and it would be completely counter-
productive not to distinguish them since, by doing so, we contribute
actively to penalizing the state, therefore ourselves. First, let’s note that
when it generates deficit, that is to say, when it creates money, the state
issues simultaneously an asset in favor of the private sector but without
the latter having to offset this debt by a bond or constraint of any kind.
Thus, public debt represents a net gain for the private sector and there-
fore for the economy. And this, contrary to the private sector which, not
having the ability to print money, and not being capable of crediting
accounts at will, cannot be indebted beyond a certain threshold. The
private sector can thus easily switch to a Ponzi scheme. This term is, on
the other hand, not found in the vocabulary of a state which has its own
sovereign currency, and therefore which is not obliged to borrow. As a
result, the obligation of governments – and which markets impose on
them – to balance their budgets and public accounts can be revisited
under another perspective. It becomes obsolete. Indeed, as we have seen
before, however little a country has an independent monetary scheme,
the mass of its debts and the limits of its deficits as the pace of issuing
its bonds fall within its own decision, because no one would in theory be
able to impose them on it. Contrary to the gold standard regime and the
indexation of a national currency to another referenced currency, the
floating exchange rate system therefore gives a nation latitude and
freedom to act potentially fully and completely. Is this not peculiar to a
sovereign nation? An extremely tough and generally widespread urban
legend demands, however, that the state be “respectable and responsi-
ble” by balancing its budget – or at the very least that it gets close to
balancing it – with the objective of not exhausting its national resources
and not “spiraling” out of control. Paul Samuelson, born in 1915 and
recipient of the Nobel Economics Prize in 1970, goes even further by
calling this rule “superstitious” – foolish but globally a dogma – to
maintain national budgets close to balanced accounts. He sees this as an
exemplary value for the whole of society which should not let its ex-
penses spiral out of control. According to him, the state should be
present to lead citizens to the way to discipline to get them back on
track… If this is the case, it is necessary to note that today we are wit-
nessing a radical shift in paradigm since it is the turn of modern and
evolved but extremely deficit States who need to get back on track! That
does not matter: that this logic of reversal of values is pushed further
and therefore we use to dismantle the myth of the frugal state. In fact,
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the state – with a monopoly on printing money – is able to credit ac-
counts, including those of its creditors. As such, it does not have to
leave it to the markets to determine its financial costs, and even less its
public policies. Ceding to market pressure by having to publicly borrow
thanks to the bond instrument is therefore strictly voluntary for a state.
This state believes in playing the game. In reality, it only plays the game
of investors whose sole preoccupation is to grow their savings. That is
why a country such as Spain, which abdicated its monetary policy (to
the EDB), has today been reduced to borrowing from the markets at
astoundingly high interest rates to finance itself. The Greek or Spanish
cataclysmic experience further demonstrates the cruelty of markets and
rating agencies which have completely taken control. Public deficits will
continue to persist so long as the growth rate remains lower than the rate
of return on the State’s bonds. In this regard, it is necessary to under-
stand that the European Union is not really confronted with a debt crisis,
but with a problem of sluggish growth, the effects of which naturally
spill over into its public deficits. Weren’t the rates of refinancing
Spain’s debt consistently between 5.4 and 5.9% between January 2000
through May 2002 without anyone worrying about it or predicting
cataclysm? Robust growth would in fact allow the State to offset this
charge while providing opportunities and confidence to financial play-
ers. This is precisely why it is now vital to focus exclusively on the
growth rate of our economies, while relegating this obsession with
deficit reduction to the background having the perverse effect of stop-
ping the activity. Finally, as it is strange to note today that they are the
same ones who did not see the financial crisis coming who persist on the
path of austerity, orthodoxy and who set themselves up as great defend-
ers of the public purse and large deficit slayers. Indeed, they were the
same one who yesterday indulged in – and with – the financial markets
fully delivered to themselves, and who often drew juicy profits, which
have now – against all expectations – become fanatical, even fetish,
about limiting public spending.
It suffices that the last-resort lender, i.e. the central bank, transfers
cash into the Treasury’s account knowing that the other side of the coin
is inflation. But is inflation really dangerous or, rather, when does
inflation become dangerous? Almost all economists fear in fact – and
with legitimate reasons – that that excessive money creation results in a
surge in inflationary pressures. However, a State’s stimuli in favor of its
economic actors, the reduction income tax and other increases in public
spending never risk incurring inflation if the economy performs well
below its abilities and as long as the government exercises price control.
Therefore it is only when the economy is working at full capacity that
extra public spending – but also businesses and households – induces
inflation. Under this assumption of full capacity, inflation can be further
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avoided by a gradual reduction in public spending which would, at any
rate, be counterbalanced by increased investment by the private sector
within a framework of a booming economy. The acceleration in public
spending is therefore not likely to generate inflationary pressures by
causing a run on consumption and aggregate demand in the context of
an activity that is slowing down, no more so than it would threaten (as
was seen above) the solvency of the sovereign state in question. Let’s
therefore stop pretending that the creation of money and the monetiza-
tion of debt lead to insolvency and inflation. Rather let’s try to qualify
and put into perspective by understanding that a given economic context
is able to “cash in” extremely liquidity injections and support a widen-
ing of its deficits while being able to bounce back. And let’s moderate
our obsession with the ratios of our debts vis-à-vis our GDP which are
only very reliable and worthy of interest in a system of fixed exchange
rates or indexed to a metal. Indeed, these ratios and measures are from
providing irremovable benchmarks within our globalized economies.
Informed governments, advised by informed experts, would be better to
analyze dynamically since there is no level of debts or deficits which
would automatically or mechanically set off crises and which would
reduce growth. The budget of a modern state with the so-called “inte-
grated” economy is the result of inherently endogenous variables. It is
narrowly related to the performance of the private sector, since it be-
comes deficit in nature when households decide not to spend and busi-
nesses increase their imports. If there are indeed limits to which a
country can spend, they must not in any case be defined in terms of
solvency. These limitations are rather functions of resources that the
state intends to mobilize since deficits would be logically much more
massive that the state commits to exploiting the abilities of its economy
and putting its citizens to work.
Deficits and economic activity on the one hand, jobs and savings on
the other hand, are the two facets of the same puzzle. Thus persistent
unemployment (as it has been for decades in our Western countries)
means that our deficits are too low and that the state should increase its
spending or lower taxes! Stimuli would gradually be withdrawn in case
of sustainable regression of unemployment or if the economy was no
longer able to absorb investments, which would therefore lead to infla-
tion. In other words, the only limit on public spending is not the lack of
funding or the overflow of debts which would be too massive vis-à-vis
GDP. The only obstacle to public spending is inflation. But therefore:
Would Germany be correct in opposing all its forces to more stimuli to
help peripheral Europe? The big problem with its approach is that it
lacks total inventiveness, flexibility and that the Germans are barricaded
behind a full theoretical and academic argument. The ridiculously low
returns on the German Treasury bills indeed indicate that this country
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inspires total confidence and therefore benefits from a massive influx of
liquidities which compresses its rates. But they also mean that the least
inflationary threat is to be totally excluded. Germany should therefore
never fear the 1923 hyperinflationary nightmare of Weimar (against
which our central banks today have the tools to defend themselves) but
rather the cataclysmic scenario of 1932 when the U.S. unemployment
rates was over 30% of the U.S. population… Germany’s absolute priori-
ty – as the economic engine and Europe’s poster child – and good
governance by the ECB should therefore lead to rebalancing the capital
flows in the Union for better distribution. The misfortunes of Greece,
Spain and the other fragile countries come from a scarcity in cash at
their disposal while Germany, for its part, abounds in it, as reflected
through the insignificant, or even negative, return on its treasury bills. It
should therefore reduce its surplus, stimulate its consumption, and
encourage a minimum level of inflationary pressure so as to induce an
inverse movement with peripheral European countries. German deficits
– or at least the reduction in surplus – would mechanically translate
within the same monetary Union into a significant reabsorbance of the
deficits of needy countries.
Let’s therefore once and for all get rid of these prejudices which sur-
round us – even stifle us – and which raises a precondition to economic
recovery to reduce deficits. The reality is totally different since the
public purse can resuscitate – or at least invigorate – the private sector
by boosting its revenues and savings. In time of crises, on the state is
able – and has the duty – to protect the weakest and most needy and to
make society prosper by guaranteeing it its social assistance and by
making employment for all a priority. So long as there is unemploy-
ment, so long as our economy is not modernized, so long as our plants
do not operate at full capacity, so long as our businesses cannot compete
and citizens do not produce, a sovereign state can and must continue to
stimulate the economy and create money. Letting deficits slip thus
remains the only means of recovery for the private sector during a
recession while helping to restore savings. Thus it is only thanks to the
massive stimulus packages injected successively by the Bush and
Obama administrations (respectively) that the U.S. economy did not
plunge into depression despite a totally infected financial system and a
crisis almost as severe as the Great Depression. It is also the massive
program implemented by China in 2009 which maintained its growth
rate despite the collapse of global economic activity which severely
undermined its exports. Austerity and budgetary economies devastated
European growth and plunged it into recession since the third quarter of
2011. For those who vilify money creation by invoking the aspect of
“artificial” recovery it creates, my response is that if there is recovery, a
reduction in unemployment and recovery of purchase power, the objec-
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tive has been achieved. If printing money reestablishes confidence – and
it does! –, I can hardly ask for more. There is therefore proof that, as
long as the state is sovereign and it prints a floating currency, it is
possible to build growth – and therefore ensure the comfort of citizens –
with credit, when turbulent and instable periods depress the private
sector It is up to the state to support these stimuli by implementing
essential measures and regulations aimed at stabilizing the private sector
and forcing it to settle its debts. There is therefore proof that, as long as
the state is sovereign and it prints a floating currency, it is possible to
build growth – and therefore ensure the comfort of citizens – with credit,
when turbulent and instable periods depress the private sector It is up to
the state to support these stimuli by implementing essential measures
and regulations aimed at stabilizing the private sector and forcing it to
settle its debts. It is up to the state to regulate activity to avoid specula-
tive bubbles and excesses. However, its single and only limitation in
terms of deficits is able to absorb its own economy, for injected money
must only be considered as a tool to reestablish purchasing power and
investment. Continuing to shrink deficits during times of crisis is tanta-
mount to accepting high unemployment and a notorious decrease in the
standard of living of all citizens, including those who kept their jobs.
Let’s not sacralize money which is only a vehicle to move our economy
forward more leniently and for our ship to arrive safely. It is not actually
the means of transport which count, but the passengers. In the same
vein, let us trivialize the action of raising or lowering interest rates,
which is nothing sacred or difficult to understand or comprehend.
Indeed, the central bank simply buys bonds in the markets (with the
money it has already created) when it decides to lower its rates. It
performs the reverse operation since it must go back, that is to say, it
sells Treasury bills and removes the money received in return… In other
words, as money is not a value, let’s use it sparingly and scrupulously




the Ultimate Safeguards against Depression
A cash crisis is the worst scenario for the banking system. Without
the “last-resort lender”, without the ultimate support of a central bank
that is able to guarantee savers’ deposits, this is the flight of capital from
this weakened bank and from the entire system which restricts financial
establishments from selling their assets to pay panicked depositors. An
insidious spiral of falling asset prices occurs when banks come under
pressure and attempt to recover cash to honor their commitments. This
downward spiral is likely to reach the critical stage when banks need
more than what is still carried as an asset on their balance sheet, and so a
cash crisis turns into a solvency crisis. It is also at this point that deposi-
tors realize that their intuition and fear were after all justified… Such a
rush would not, however, take place if a credible central bank guaran-
teed bank deposits and if these investors were confident of recovering
their assets. Hence the crucial role – at least psychologically – of the
central bank, guardian angel or last line of defense which assumes this
vital role of purveyor of cash to the banking network. Did it not raise its
interest rates in July 2008 during the subprime turmoil, i.e. a few weeks
after Bear Stearns declared bankruptcy and a few weeks before Leh-
man’s own demise? Its mere presence in the background is to simply
reassure and prevents banks from failing in a domino effect. This is a
similar process that reaches the bond debt of a member country of a
monetary union in case of a grave crisis. Fears about the solvency of a
country (such as Greece) leads investors (markets, as they are generical-
ly referred to) to divest themselves of their Treasury bills of some other
member nations of the union for fear of a cash crisis that would spread.
Unless a solid central bank, worthy of this name intervenes to reassure
investors who, after all, are only human beings! Without the determined
presence – and determining – of a lender of the last resort, the cash crisis
naturally degenerates into a solvency crisis, and the country in the
spotlight then has to pay always more (interest) to persuade these inves-
tors to continue lending it. If the central bank is not on the radar, this
country does not have any other cash source than that provided by the
markets, which will make it pay dearly to fight without the benefit of
support from a central bank. These hyperbolic financing costs contami-
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nate the rest and soon enough, the other member nations of this union
which assist will be powerless to withdraw cash from their Treasury
bills and should in turn raise the stakes (interest rates) to continue to
glean cash.
This escalade in financing costs obviously exerts perverse effects on
the budget of the country and, in this regard, no country – not even
Germany – is able to keep up with interest rates growing steadily on
financing its public debt. Each country faces its breaking point at some
stage – the one where servicing its debt leads it directly to insolvency.
Except if a central bank – whose only presence has the effect of a scare-
crow – lowers tension by several notches. Tension which, in reality,
would not even have been raised to such extreme levels if this central
bank had clearly shown its intention to support this country’s bond
market. The European Central Bank would have been able to save
Greece, Ireland, Spain and the European banking system from so much
misery if it had only shown strong support and a willingness to provide
these failing players with a cash injection. Because we must realize that
this severe European crisis is only a game of cat and mouse that has
turned out badly for a Europe that now threatens to sink from the mere
fact of the absence of a lender of last resort. Investors seeking all natu-
rally to preserve their assets in the bond debts of these member nations,
the only vigorous affirmation on the part of the ECB showing its deter-
mination to flood these weakened countries with liquidity would have
avoided such an escalation in the costs of debt financing and also ban-
ished the specter of the chain reaction bank failures. The slow pace of
the ECB and the inertia of European leaders – unless it was their total
ignorance of financial mechanisms? – were thus balanced by a devastat-
ing escalade in the debt charge of a number of European countries.
Finally an indisputable surcharge for the ECB itself which, after much
procrastination, is still committed to assisting the European banking
system. “Lost battles are summed up in two words”, asserted General
MacArthur, “… too late”. Indeed, the commitments of the important
banks being clearly more massive than those of the states, it would have
been less costly (for everyone) that the ECB support early states –
crowned with popular legitimacy – than belatedly banks in private
hands. Besides the symbolic, yet essential relief paid timely by the ECB
to a European state. Does it not make sense that such assistance would
otherwise be less onerous since the average public European debt vis-à-
vis the GDP average of the Union is 80% when the debt of European
banks is nearly 25% of GDP of the European Union? And the arguments
according to which such bond purchases by the ECB would exacerbate
inflation do not hold since, as Milton Friedman himself says however
little suspected of collusion with Keynesian practices (as seen later), an
argument of monetary mass does not systematically lead to inflation. On
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the contrary, as Anna Schwartz and himself, in their monumental work
titled “A Monetary History of the U.S.”, attribute the intensity of the
Great Depression to the U.S. Federal Reserve at the time, having utterly
failed to fulfill its duty as lender of last resort. Moreover, isn’t it Fried-
man in person to whom we owe the famous quip that encourages the
monetary authorities of a country in deflation to drop bundles of bank-
notes, if necessary “by helicopter”? The guarantee and certainty of
support by a central bank are certainly likely to encourage risk attitudes,
even all kinds of abuses, among banks, financial players and even
country leaders. Under its budgetary management, a government may
indeed be tempted to go the route of public spending for purely dema-
gogic reasons if it knows it is covered by cash from its central bank…
However, a central bank that would not intervene on behalf of a state for
fear of encouraging this “moral hazard” would be committing an unpar-
donable error. Moreover, why would you feel obliged to come to the
assistance of private financial establishments – except to push them into
the arms of risky behavior – and hesitate to support a state, and therefore
populations? The obligation of a central bank is therefore to inject
liquidity, whenever necessary, into both banks and countries, knowing
that rules may be enacted in return for assisting states, as conditions are
imposed on financial establishments drawing on public funds. Indeed, it
is much healthier to make a clear separation between the intervention of
a central bank (which responds to urgent needs of liquidity) and regula-
tions for needy states and banks in peril. Thus there must be an organi-
zation designed specifically for this purpose upon which the monitoring
the financial governance of European States (and their banks) should
rest whereas the appeal for liquidity must be the only and singular
preoccupation of their central bank, which must not in any way be
incumbent upon moral considerations. Why would an approach similar
to the one in effect for banks (which benefit from ECB support and
which are accountable to a regulatory body) not are implemented for
states? So it is the ECB which would assume its responsibilities of
lender of last resort and great stabilizer of bond markets while a Pan
European organization would be in charge of monitoring and regulating
the issue of bonds of each member country.
Moreover, a number of orthodox experts assert that, if a state is
forced to seek assistance when it is faced with a liquidity crisis, the
central bank must abstain when the crisis becomes a solvency problem.
The reasoning is the same for banks. However, how do you make a clear
and unequivocal distinction between a liquidity crisis and that of sol-
vency? If today – and rare are those who question it – Greece is de facto
insolvent, are Spain and Ireland also insolvent or can their woes be
simply attributed to liquidity problems? How would markets (basic,
primitive, impulsive, short-term) be able to assess the financial situation
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of a state – and therefore to lend at a more or less high rate – when our
best economists are incapable of clearly diagnosing the creditworthiness
of an European state against undeniable transparency yet replete with
abundant economic statistics? In reality, a sovereign debt crisis affecting
one or several member states of a monetary union is characterized by an
inextricable mix of problems implying both their solvency and their
immense difficulties in sourcing cash. While the cash crisis is translated
into escalating financing costs for a State to conclude logically that a
crisis is affecting its solvency, this State exacerbates its liquidity worries
with a key intensification of threats on its insolvency. In practice, it is
extremely complicated to distinguish whether a nation’s problems are
linked to its solvency or its liquidity. A central bank must therefore be
generous and not skimp on infusing cash with a view to restoring its
liquidity to quash any inclination to see it as insolvent.
A central bank cannot thus afford to indulge in its cozy isolation,
since it must constantly “do its job”, i.e. confront the ever changing or
steadily deteriorating realities on the ground. And contrary to what
Friedman claimed (which will be analyzed later), a central bank’s
monetary policy should not be disconnected from the budgetary and
fiscal realities of the countries or regions which are its responsibility.
Although decisive, the definition of interest rates must not be the only
reason why central banks exist, which, despite wanting to pass for elders
and characters beyond the reach of political power, end up performing
their measurement work of the business cycle mechanically. This shock,
brutal but predictable, is forced to question the supposed independence
or neutrality of central banks which is perceived – and rightly so – as
goodwill vis-à-vis the financial markets. If at least one piece of evidence
is revealed in favor of this crisis, it is that the central banker can no
longer adorn itself with its well accommodating garb of independence
vis-à-vis political power, since its acts are fundamentally and intrinsical-
ly clad with political connotations, and even its refusal to take action!
That it prevents a financial institution going bankrupt or that, on the
other hand, it does not lift its little finger to prevent another from col-
lapsing. That it issues its caution in favor of commitments undertaken
by such a sector of economic activity. That it fights hard against any
inflationary pressure or, on the contrary, tolerates a certain degree of it,
favoring or penalizing either the holders of Treasury bills or the debtors.
A central banker, whose every decision is highly political – who is up to
his neck in the ring –, cannot continue to pride himself on this inde-
pendence which is only a myth. Moreover, as it is no longer plausible to
leave such power in the hands of individuals not elected by the people,
one of the major battles which to be delivered out of this crisis will lie in
redefining the job of the central banker, his powers his duty of account-
ability and the possibility of removing him, if and when applicable. The
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framework in effect since the 1990s until 2007 of low inflation and
almost uninterrupted growth should not actually be misleading. If
central bankers ascribe merit to it, they must in turn be responsible for
the creation of multiple speculative bubbles, who poorly understood the
risks of a sprawling financial sector and who completely missed out on
monitoring and regulating gargantuan inequalities in cross-border and
continental capital flows.
They seem as paralyzed by ideological prejudices according to which
financial markets always end up regaining their stability and according
to which international movements of capital generate an optimal distri-
bution of wealth. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of our central
bankers belong to the generation of economists blinded by the teachings
of Milton Friedman, who espoused that the Great Depression and the
speculative boom of the 1920s which preceded it had no correlation.
Our monetary managers have indeed only contempt for economic
unorthodox economic theories as difficult to equate. In this troubled and
constant imbalanced world, the job of the central banker requires,
however, continuous finesse and anticipation. That’s why; the lack of a
true central bank worthy of this name, the actual European architecture
irrevocably transforms solvent countries into insolvent countries. It is
important to realize that its absolutist quest for a hardline orthodoxy led
the ECB – and, as such, European economies – straight into the wall.
Did it not raise its interest rates in July 2008 during the subprime tur-
moil, i.e. a few weeks after Bear Stearns declared bankruptcy and a few
weeks before Lehman’s own demise? Did it not raise its rates twice – so
unlikely – during the European tempest, in 2011? That is also why – to
borrow from Martin Wolf – the ECB will be remembered as the “mag-
nificently orthodox central bank of a failed currency union”.
When will we finally understand that the current European woes are
in no way due to public debts? Why do orthodoxy, mainstream thinking,
the overwhelming majority of economists and political leaders (who do
not understand much), persist in considering this crisis as that of Euro-
pean “sovereign debts”? A little history is illuminating in this regard.
And that it is regrettable for all of us that they do not look back to 1931
– tragic for all – from which to draw parallels and precious information
for today… From the bankruptcy of the very large Austrian bank,
Österiechishe Kredit Anstalt, over-exposed in East and Central Europe.
On the History of France in this case because it is a French law in the
early 1970s that would focus this financial orthodoxy – and write in
stone the sacrosanct independence of the central bank – responsible for
the current devastation of European Union! To the general financial
instability of Europe under threat from currency implosion due to un-
paid German reparations. On January 3, 1973 the new status of the
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Banque de France were indeed adopted that would revolutionize the job
of a central banker, turning it into a sort of “teflon” character – totally
non-stick – not having to be accountable to the executive of the country
or its citizens. To the U.S. intervention in the sense of debt restructuring
for a Germany that was tied to a gold standard, yet one of the main
reasons for the Great Depression. It’s actually to 1973 and to French law
that we can trace the beginning of the irresponsibility of the central
banks, particularly in its Article 25 which states that “the Treasury
cannot be the nominator of its own effects at the discount of the Bank of
France”. Only countries which abandon the first gold standards (Great
Britain followed by the Scandinavian countries) are the first to pull
themselves out of this terrible crisis without incurring too much damage.
Therefore turning crucial in the management of public finances of
Western nations which followed in the footsteps of France. The unex-
pected rise in U.S. interest rates in 1928 was certainly the first sign of
this crisis. States being henceforth – and de facto – permanently at the
mercy of the banking system, since their Treasury no longer had the
right to borrow from its central bank. As well, the deflationary global
calamity, linked to a global economic contraction, is rooted in the gold
standard, particularly due to the attitude… of France, presented by a
number of experts as mainly responsible for the intensification of the
Great Depression! Historic step on the path to international financial
liberalization, crossed and initiated by France, which now prohibited
recourse to the printing of money of its central bank if needed. It is
actually the substantial increase in France’s gold reserves (from 7 to
27% between 1927 and 1932!), which, in creating scarcity for this
metal, would undoubtedly contribute to an enormous deflationary spiral
for all developed nations at that time. A burning topical issue in the
European context today! With deflation as the distinctive sign of the
Great Depression, it could have been avoided if the central banks at that
time (and the French one in the first place) had maintained their 1928
gold bearing ratios… Indeed, it is this frenetic accumulation of the
yellow metal by eminent central banks which fueled global deflationary
pressure. Moreover, the adoption of this law left nothing to chance at a
time when France was headed by a former banker, namely Georges
Pompidou. However, maintaining gold reserves at their levels prior to
the Great Depression would not have altered the historical correlation
between consumer and production pricing and the quantities of gold
held by central banks. The dollar was no longer convertible into gold
which was part of the decision of U.S. President Nixon in 1971 to
suspend all purchases and sales of gold. It was Léon Blum, Prime
Minister, who finally took France out of the gold standard in 1936, but
the damage was done. And in an atmosphere of international financial
stress where the U.S. hoped to prosper, illustrated by the famous repar-
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tee of the Treasury Secretary John Connally at the time: “The dollar is
our currency but your problem”! Isn’t the parallel obvious in today’s
Europe where austerity is the new gold standard? In short, the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system established in 1944 (under the influence of
Keynes) ushered in a new era where the risks were expected to be borne
by investors, now facing the vagaries of currency fluctuations. What a
pity that policies are not a little like historians since the conjuncture of
the 1930s strangely resemble our situation today, except that at that time
it was only Germany which was in the same situation as peripheral
Europe finds itself today. The abandonment of this convertibility also
had a fundamental impact on the financial actors who obviously did not
fail to seize the opportunities offered by speculation on the volatility of
emerging market currencies. Entirely dependent on foreign capital, it
had been steam rolled by unrealistic reparations stipulated in the Treaty
of Versailles within a general framework of grossly under-capitalized
national banks. Deregulation and liberalization of the financial sector
was therefore the essential prerequisite that would allow its players to
take advantage of these new market fluctuations. Indeed, this is the
whole problem relative to the reparations imposed on Germany, and
their disastrous consequences, which have today been removed from the
debate to make room for deficit obsession. It is in this environment from
which emerged the concept of central banks independence whose objec-
tive was to sterilize monetary policy. The ardent defenders of austerity
actually impose an absolute diktat on the media, opinions, public policy
and academia by imbuing a climate of disaster where only hyperinfla-
tionary trauma seems worthy of interest. And to avoid any interference
from politicians too often inclined to use it for economic recovery, at the
risk of fueling inflation. It is as if the disaster from the reparations
imposed on Germany had been waned before the imaginary disease of
deficits. Is it because Germans are perfectly aware of the multiple
Treaties of Versailles that they dictate today to Greece, Spain, Portugal
and other nations forced to pay much more than their abilities and
means allow? It turned into a sort of cardinal – or gray eminence –
immured in a permanent conclave and quick to distil the black smoke to
prevent any attempt to monetize its debt by the executive of its country.
Indeed, this is violent and unprecedented austerity that Germany had to
implement at the beginning of the 1930s in favor of the drying up its
international funding, which resulted in an unemployment rate that at
one time was higher than 35% France – which at that time was the
Germany of today – was doing well. Here is the central banker – report-
ing to no one – who therefore had the power to sanction vis-à-vis the
elected. It was one of the most prosperous and solid economies in the
world at that time. As a result, monetary policy – i.e., the crucial defini-
tion of interest rates – was becoming passive. It was content to pass on
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and echo the wishes and dictates of high finance. In a position to trans-
form itself into a financial engine for the rest of Europe from the end of
the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, instead, France preferred to
withdraw behind a wall of selfishness by refusing to adopt a conciliatory
and expansionist monetary and economic policy, opting instead to
ignore the plight of its neighbors. This French law of 1973 was subse-
quently repealed… only to be replaced in 1992 by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht and in 2009 by that of Lisbon jealously defending the same ortho-
doxy. The financial collapse of Europe owes a lot to this navel gazing
by France at that time. Namely to prevent any overdraft facility or credit
granted by the European Central Bank to governments, regions or local
communities members of the Union. Just as the peripheral European
nations can today, with reason, blame German intransigence for their
intolerable end that they reached. As our states could no longer call on
their central bank to finance their accounts and public spending should
they needed to, therefore we have all become dependent on the commer-
cial banking system which, itself, was indeed able to create liquidity
privately from nothing to lend to our states through interests. From what
remains, France could not escape this crisis which had rudely contami-
nated it since 1932. Practice initiated in 1973 by France but almost
everywhere since an IMF study actually reveals that two-thirds of the
152 central banks around the globe restrict considerably – when they do
not prevent a short – all ready or make central banks available to their
government. How is it that we fail to recognize that the France of so
many years ago is today’s Germany, mired in missteps and which revels
in mistakes that it will end up by paying – it also – a heavy price? On
behalf of the venerable and untouchable “price stability”. Since if there
is one country which, amongst all, is worried about retaining the teach-
ings of the past, that country is Germany. So, in defiance of macroeco-
nomic stability. why do we accord so much importance to the 1923
hyperinflation when we should instead be deeply concerned about
avoiding 1933, the year which saw the extinction of democracy? And
too bad if the cost of financing their debt by our states attain untenable
sums, and for public finances, growth and the purchashing power of the
citizen… This essential German shift will, however only see the light
when this country recognizes its financial debt toward the European
Union that it will clearly never leave. In an environment of absolute
European depression weathered with the collapse in tax revenues,
shrinking welfare and soaring unemployment. Since such a possibility
would immediately translate into a strengthening of the rediscovered
national currency – the Deutsche Mark – and an inevitable deterioration
of the standard of living of its citizens in favor of a dramatic decrease in
its exports. With states to finance their lifestyle – so we did! Indeed it is
the advent of the single currency which allowed Germany to more than
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double its exports from 469 billion Euros in 1999 to more than one
trillion Euros in 2010, during which its economy grew twice faster than
the European average during the same period. This impressive rise in
German exports is undoubtedly inseparable from the quality of its
manufactured products. Simply because it is impossible for us to be
financed by our central bankers who wrap themselves in their robes of
independence. There remains no doubt that its competitiveness was
undeniably favored by a relatively weak currency. Independence which
in reality is only a smoke screen intended to mask their allegiance to the
banking system. So this country benefits on several levels from the woes




Europe: How many Divisions?
The introduction of the single currency was at the origin of major
distortions since capital flows could thus move from one member nation
of the EU to another without regulation or control. It goes without
saying that these liquidities seeking attractive returns gradually left the
nations of the North with limited potential (Benelux, Germany and also
France) to take up residence in the booming nations of the South and
therefore thirsty for capital. Investors therefore did join in the auction
and the returns in the economies of Southern Europe transformed into
whirlpool projects under which these incessant capital flows would have
been, in different circumstances, moderated by readjustments to the
national currencies of these nations. However, the exchange rate could
not play its essential role as regulator since all these countries shared a
single currency. The masses of liquidities could therefore leave the rich
countries to colonize the “emerging” member nations of the EU without
the parity of the Euro being lowered for countries that invested or
increased for those who benefited from these capital flows. These
distortions also led to notorious inflation in the booming nations of the
South which was royally ignored by Germany (only to cite it) which
was thus happy to be able to invest in, and export to, these countries
with great potential. As disastrous as these disparities in the inflation
rate within the same zone were in the medium-term, they were not,
however, fought since interest rates (like currency) were the same
throughout this zone. These interest rates were maintained at an artifi-
cially low level for several years so as to support a lackluster German
economy at the beginning of the 2000s with, for immediate and inevita-
ble consequences, an overheating of peripheral economies. Indeed, these
booming nations – that should have been contained by higher interest
rates – were dropped as fodder for speculators who helped to inflate all
kinds of bubbles which could have been partially avoided or lessened by
an adapted monetary policy.
The famous excess of the PIIGS are therefore largely due to lax Eu-
ropean interest rates sanctioned by the ECB and imposed by a Germany
which then needed it! It was therefore Germany which dictated this
policy to the ECB and not Greece, Portugal, Ireland or Spain… So many
countries that were abandoned to their fate, and to their multiple specu-
lative bubbles, as soon as these funds dried up in the aftermath of the
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financial crisis. After largely investing in, and benefiting from, specula-
tive development in peripheral Europe, Northern Europe thus did a
turnabout and began to accuse the “grasshoppers”, yet once generously
maintained by the Northern ants. It is certainly not a question of exoner-
ating the irresponsible behavior of the national leaders of Ireland or
Spain who closed their eyes to the excess of their countries, as it is
important to condemn the Greek messengers. Just as it should deplore
the guilty refusals or delays of the successive governments of these
countries in vitally reforming their taxation systems and labor market.
For all that, the lure of profit from businesses and finance from the
northern countries, the tolerance of their authorities in the face of unjus-
tified interest rates and their convenience vis-à-vis a circulation in
capital which flooded the countries to the South were so many factors
which helped to rush the PIIGS into the abyss.
The German position – which now pushes toward diametrically op-
posed excess consisting of imposing blind austerity on these highly
affected countries – is even less understandable that budget deficits are
not the roots of the financial crisis. Indeed, it is the advent of this crisis
that breathed deficits into budgets of the states and not the reverse: Were
not Spain and Ireland in surplus prior to the crisis? It makes sense also
that all countries – a fortiori of a single currency group – cannot simul-
taneously benefit from surplus budgets. As it is evident that funds could
not be invested in a balanced way among the members of the European
Union. One of the priority EU projects should thus consist of monitoring
and regulating capital flows among its members, a notorious sauce for
imbalances in the balance of payments of each member within a frame-
work of a common currency for all these nations. The collapse of
Greece (citing only this country) is therefore entirely due to inconsisten-
cies and gaps in the European construction. The members certainly
benefited from a precious stabilization of their exchange rate in favor of
introducing the Euro. In the same way they benefited greatly from the
convergence of real interest rates (for cheap financing) which tended
more and more toward those in Germany. They nevertheless forever lost
the ability to define their monetary policy, that is to say, fixing their key
interest rates. As such, they no longer have the privilege of a flexible
currency which they could have possibly appreciated or devalued ac-
cording to actual needs.
Today, these same peripheral European nations, which formerly
masked their poor competitiveness and their high levels of public spend-
ing thanks to modest financing costs (due to this convergence which
now firmly belongs in the past), are faced with an austerity which will
certainly not allow their productive apparatus to recover. The increase in
this competitiveness would of course likely bring them growth with the
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key being a gradual repayment of their debts. Nevertheless, as measures
aimed at improving this competitiveness are only effective in the long-
term, only investment is immediately likely to feed growth. Austerity is
therefore not an adequate solution when a country is hit by a financial
crisis and that its private sector is depressed by debt, a fortiori if its
banking sector is hyper weakened by the implosion of a property bubble
as in Spain. The interdependence of European countries contributes
further to exacerbating the depression, sentenced to spreading like wild
fire due to this integration. The prerequisite for recovery – and of course
to any lull – is introducing new common credible and realistic regula-
tions, a sine qua non condition for rebooting the private sector. That is
why the myth according to which a formula proven to work in one
country would necessarily work in another – all the more reason in
several others – will end up running through the EU. It is therefore
necessary to diagnose separately each member country so as to imple-
ment different remedies to each one, or the same remedy according to a
different degree. It is in this spirit of nuance, yet necessary if the goal is
to significantly reduce deficits and reboot growth, which is sorely
needed.
Since the German example is not easy to reproduce, despite the scorn
of the German Chancellor Merkel deploring the “mediocrity” which had
become the Euro “standard”! However, Germany could boost exports to
such an extent only because it has depleted its poor ones! In any case it
is what the employees in the Euro of the hour and the workers who earn
EUR400 a month scream very loudly about… With its top priority of a
long-term austerity policy, Germany can of course boast of unquestion-
able results in terms of putting its finances back in order. It would
indeed react with determination in the face of its colossal reunification
cost and in the wake of the very poor competitiveness of the factories in
the former East Germany. As such, it followed Keynesian concepts and
implemented a sound counter-cyclical measure, namely increasing VAT
from 16 to 19% in 2007, i.e. after three prosperous economic years. If
the collection of these new revenues necessarily paved the way for
rehabilitating its finances, it is evidently much easier to undertake fiscal
consolidation at a time of prosperity than during an economic and
financial crisis. This increase in VAT was of course one of the mile-
stones of a voluntary domestic devaluation policy whose most obvious
manifestation was strict austerity in wages. The trade surpluses were
somehow the natural secretion of this German that also resulted in a
sharp surplus in the balance of payments. Indeed, impressed by these
performances and always in search of solid investments, global inves-
tors rushed toward German Treasury bills, which mechanically contrib-
uted to establishing extremely low real interest rates in the country in a
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general way – and permanently – without any impact whatsoever in
favor of an increased in domestic consumption.
It remains no less than the ultimate example to follow was there: the
country in difficulty had to prescribe strictly to a regime of halved
wages and unemployment contributions, accompanied by substantially
higher indirect fiscal pressure. Such was the magic formula that the
peripheral European countries had to implement to boost their exports
by adopting a recovery model of export-led growth. All in an effort to
emulate the German model that was the poster child of perfection, not
unreasonably as seen from the first European exporter. If only a coun-
try’s surpluses are simply for the deficits of others and the German
dynamic was successful – by achieving substantial trade surpluses – due
to European (and global) consumption of Germany’s manufactured
products. German prosperity is actually wholly constructed on the
economic activities of importing countries. So Germany feeds its own
growth from the growth of other countries, somewhat parasitically.
Therefore this serves nothing, and it would even be completely counter-
productive if all European nations adopt these austere measures all at
once to boost productivity in order to reboot their economies through
exports. The one and only condition for success of such a business
would be that Europe ceases consumption and that the rest of the world
rushes to consume European products, which is hardly likely. In sum-
mary, how and why is Germany persuaded that its model can be imple-
mented by all of its European partners which are ordered, in other
words, to no longer buy its own goods? Germany, whose exports within
the EU amount to 60% of its overall figure in 2011? Is it really con-
vinced that the European Union will morph under its influence into a
briskly gigantic export machine to the rest of the world? If a country
alone can – of the same size and importance of Germany – implement
domestic devaluations with a view to improving its competitiveness, an
umbrella economy like the European Union having the largest GDP in
the world, could not undertake such a revolution in its consumer and
export habits without provoking a global disaster. This German attitude
of imposing its standardized model of rebuilding reserves and inflating
surpluses thanks to exports is therefore aberrant… and also totally
unrealistic (in another registry of course) that unbearable reparations had
been dictated to it after the First World War.
It is a pity that policies are not a little bit like historians! And that it
is regrettable for all of us that they do not look back to 1931 – tragic for
all – from which to draw parallels and precious information for today…
From the bankruptcy of the very large Austrian bank, Österiechishe
Kredit Anstalt, over-exposed in East and Central Europe. To the general
financial instability of Europe under threat from currency implosion due
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to unpaid German reparations. To the U.S. intervention in the sense of
debt restructuring for a Germany that was tied to a gold standard, yet
one of the main reasons for the Great Depression. Only countries which
abandon the first gold standards (Great Britain followed by the Scandi-
navian countries) are the first to pull themselves out of this terrible crisis
without incurring too much damage. The unexpected rise in U.S. interest
rates in 1928 was certainly the first sign of this crisis. As well, the
deflationary global calamity, linked to a global economic contraction, is
rooted in the gold standard, particularly due to the attitude… of France,
presented by a number of experts as mainly responsible for the intensifi-
cation of the Great Depression! It is actually the substantial increase in
France’s gold reserves (from 7 to 27% between 1927 and 1932!), which,
in creating scarcity for this metal, would undoubtedly contribute to an
enormous deflationary spiral for all developed nations at that time. It is
actually the substantial increase in France’s gold reserves (from 7 to
27% between 1927 and 1932!), which, in creating scarcity for this
metal, would undoubtedly contribute to an enormous deflationary spiral
for all developed nations at that time. With deflation as the distinctive
sign of the Great Depression, it could have been avoided if the central
banks at that time (and the French one in the first place) had maintained
their 1928 gold bearing ratios… Indeed, it is this frenetic accumulation
of the yellow metal by eminent central banks which fueled global
deflationary pressure. However, maintaining gold reserves at their levels
prior to the Great Depression would not have altered the historical
correlation between consumer and production pricing and the quantities
of gold held by central banks. It was Léon Blum, Prime Minister, who
finally took France out of the gold standard in 1936, but the damage was
done. Isn’t the parallel obvious in today’s Europe where austerity is the
new gold standard? What a pity that policies are not a little like histori-
ans since the conjuncture of the 1930s strangely resemble our situation
today, except that at that time it was only Germany which was in the
same situation as peripheral Europe finds itself today. Entirely depend-
ent on foreign capital, it had been steam rolled by unrealistic reparations
stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles within a general framework of
grossly under-capitalized national banks. Indeed, this is the whole
problem relative to the reparations imposed on Germany, and their
disastrous consequences, which have today been removed from the
debate to make room for deficit obsession. The ardent defenders of
austerity actually impose an absolute diktat on the media, opinions,
public policy and academia by imbuing a climate of disaster where only
hyperinflationary trauma seems worthy of interest. It is as if the disaster
from the reparations imposed on Germany had been waned before the
imaginary disease of deficits. Is it because Germans are perfectly aware
of the multiple Treaties of Versailles that they dictate today to Greece,
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Spain, Portugal and other nations forced to pay much more than their
abilities and means allow?
Indeed, this is violent and unprecedented austerity that Germany had
to implement at the beginning of the 1930s in favor of the drying up its
international funding, which resulted in an unemployment rate that at
one time was higher than 35% France – which at that time was the
Germany of today – was doing well. Indeed, this is violent and unprece-
dented austerity that Germany had to implement at the beginning of the
1930s in favor of the drying up its international funding, which resulted
in an unemployment rate that at one time was higher than 35% France –
which at that time was the Germany of today – was doing well. It was
one of the most prosperous and solid economies in the world at that
time. It navigated these troubled waters by maintaining a single digit
unemployment rate and enviable accounting surpluses. In a position to
transform itself into a financial engine for the rest of Europe from the
end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, instead, France preferred
to withdraw behind a wall of selfishness by refusing to adopt a concilia-
tory and expansionist monetary and economic policy, opting instead to
ignore the plight of its neighbors. The financial collapse of Europe owes
a lot to this navel gazing by France at that time. Just as the peripheral
European nations can today, with reason, blame German intransigence
for their intolerable end that they reached. From what remains, France
could not escape this crisis which had rudely contaminated it since
1932. How is it that we fail to recognize that the France of so many
years ago is today’s Germany, mired in missteps and which revels in
mistakes that it will end up by paying – it also – a heavy price? Since if
there is one country which, amongst all, is worried about retaining the
teachings of the past, that country is Germany. So, why do we accord so
much importance to the 1923 hyperinflation when we should instead be
deeply concerned about avoiding 1933, the year which saw the extinc-
tion of democracy? That German leaders therefore return to school to
relearn how a European bank crisis that set off in 1933 propelled their
country – and Europe – into the horrors of 1933. It is no longer tolerable
that leaders from this country declare (as the spokesperson for the
German Ministry of Finance did in April 2010): “Just because we have
extinguishers it doesn’t mean that we’ll use them to put out fires”.
Gailbraith had understood well that “there are few areas where history
counts so little as in the world of finance”… That is why it is no longer
tolerable that political leaders declare (as the spokesperson for the
German Ministry of Finance did in April 2010): “Just because we have
extinguishers it doesn’t mean that we’ll use them to put out fires”.
Identical instinct – or fears – which are at work in the face of its fear vis-
à-vis inflation. The big – even single – European problem and the huge
chip in its armor is the dichotomy between congenital monetary power
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and budgetary authority of the respective members. For indeed only
those who save – and who, therefore, fear or dread the future – is haunt-
ed by inflation, which has the effect of reducing the value of their
savings. Each of these countries abdicated its monetary sovereignty (in
favor of the ECB) while it could retain the power to levy taxes… with-
out being in a position to stimulate its economy in the traditional way,
like the U.S. did.
This essential German shift will, however only see the light when
this country recognizes its financial debt toward the European Union
that it will clearly never leave. Since such a possibility would immedi-
ately translate into a strengthening of the rediscovered national currency
– the Deutsche Mark – and an inevitable deterioration of the standard of
living of its citizens in favor of a dramatic decrease in its exports. Indeed
it is the advent of the single currency which allowed Germany to more
than double its exports from 469 billion Euros in 1999 to more than one
trillion Euros in 2010, during which its economy grew twice faster than
the European average during the same period. This impressive rise in
German exports is undoubtedly inseparable from the quality of its
manufactured products. There remains no doubt that its competitiveness
was undeniably favored by a relatively weak currency. So this country
benefits on several levels from the woes of hyper weak nations of the
EU. By exporting more to these other member countries which, suffer-
ing from an endemic decline in their own competitiveness, end up with
German imports less expensive than their own national products! By
exporting more, of course, to the rest of the world due to a weakened
Euro because it comprises nations like Greece, Portugal, Italy or
Spain… Germany does not need to manipulate its currency to make its
exports attractive: it is simply a bystander watching the fire engulf
peripheral Europe and the South. In this regard, an interesting and
revealing study from the Swiss bank, UBS, concluded that an exit from
the Euro would cost Germany between 20 to 25% of its GDP, i.e. be-
tween EUR6,000 and EUR8,000 per capita the first year, which should
reduce to EUR3,000 to EUR4,000 the following years. The same study
indicating that the German citizen should only have to pay EUR1,000 in
total if the European Union were to integrate half of the debts of Greece,
Ireland and Portugal… the only reason for the much higher price to pay
when exiting or breaking the EU is to be sought in its currency, which
would suffer a simultaneous and lasting appreciation penalizing its
exports. The ING Group estimates that a scission in the European Union
would result in the Germany’s GDP falling by 9.2% with unemployment
at around 9.3%, the price to pay for the surge in tis regained currency
which would translate into a substantial collapse of the German export
engine. In a sense, the German leaders are today faced with a tough
choice since it would mean having to support financially an integrated
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Europe by pooling the debts of member countries. The alternative,
hardly more appealing, is to assume the potentially devastating social
and financial costs of exiting the EU to which the massive recapitaliza-
tion of German banks will be linked, heavily involved in the sovereign
debt of the peripheral nations. In other words, the Germans are com-
pletely interested in remaining in the Euro zone, as they have everything
to gain if the Euro remains at current levels. As a last resort, they will
therefore do whatever is necessary to support “weak” nations like




Intensive fiscal consolidation implemented in peripheral Europe and
France actually acts as a scorched earth in the sense that it literally
smothers the tiny growth prospects still alive. Knowing that, in addition,
the economic recovery will be more painful than the downturn will have
lasted a long time… It will only do so thanks to a re-balancing from
within even the Union and will necessarily be substantial. The nations
which must now undergo austerity will indeed have to intensify their
exports to the EU countries whose growth is (more or less) intact. In
fact, this re-balancing is already underway, but remains largely inade-
quate. If German imports certainly increased by 2% between July 2011
and July 2012, the trade surplus of the country has also increased,
making sure to neutralize this stronger domestic demand… Moreover,
why do Greece, Portugal and Spain continue to suffer huge trade deficits
despite rising exports combined with a deceleration in imports? The
answer is to be sought in the German labor costs which have experi-
enced a nominal drop of 18% between 2000 and 2009 compared to the
European average income. It is actually to a real killing game that
Germany was delivered and particularly toward the peripheral European
countries which, themselves, saw their wages rise significantly over the
same period. Eurostat statistics show us that income gaps have widened
by more than 40% in less than ten years between Germany and countries
like Greece and Spain. Obviously totally to the detriment of Greek and
Spanish companies which have suffered a de facto forfeiture of their
competitiveness vis-à-vis a competitor who also has qualitatively supe-
rior products. Today, the situation is gradually changing in favor of the
improvement of Greek competitiveness (for example) because the
employees in this country have seen their income reduced by 19% since
2009. However, the slowness of this intra-European re-balancing – and
the continued suffering of the Greek people – are entirely attributable to
the timidity of Germans who have raised their wages by 2% between
2009 and 2012. The Euro zone would love to address these acute prob-
lems in differences in competitiveness within Europe by exporting more
to the United States, to China and to emerging markets. It knows, how-
ever, that it cannot build on this hope of salvation in a context where the
U.S. is struggling to recover their own business by dint of cash injec-
tions, and while China – which seems to be slowing – tries to satisfy
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their consumers with products manufactured domestically to limit the
bill of its imports. Therefore, the solution will necessarily come from
within the EU, and it is unique because it is summed up in higher Ger-
man (and Nordic) consumption. In other words, it is vital for the entire
Union that this intra-European competitiveness “gap” be quickly filled
by peripheral European nations increasing their exports. Therefore,
Germany will have to stimulate its growth, probably (but not only) by
reducing taxation, to actively participate in this intra-European re-
balancing. The entire Euro zone desperately needs to revive its domestic
consumption. And this will necessarily entail a rebound in German
consumption. If the Germans assume that no country can live beyond its
means, the same logic should also dictate that no country should live
below its means! The radical change in German wage policy is an
integral part of the solution to European woes.
The advent of the single European currency has exacerbated the de-
pendence of EU economies on exports while denying them any means to
protect themselves against default in payment. The introduction of the
euro in its current form operated indeed a clear distinction between the
monetary sovereignty and the fiscal policy of each member nation. The
dichotomy to restrict the public deficits of each member and to curb
near-natural inclinations of politicians to spend. Moreover, everyone
was perfectly aware that fiscal indiscipline and the lack of fiscal rigor
would be sanctioned by the markets, which would question – until their
solvency – any potential “short-sightedness”… Thus, this congenital
defect – the lack of monetary sovereignty – undermined the entire
European construction by propelling to the issue the forefront, yet
relatively, benign public deficits It is as if the entire immune system of
the Union was suddenly switched off. In the absence of a central bank
free to inject cash into the public finances of needy members and in the
absence of a federal budget on the back of the firepower of the European
Central Bank. The European debt crisis and fiscal woes of peripheral
countries must therefore be put into context… that shows us that the
narrative according to which it is the spendthrift and lax nations which
are allegedly responsible is clearly wrong. This sophistication with
financial tools is being knowingly developed by a financial sector
concerned with evading the law. Let us well understand that, in the
globalized financial world, fraud is not an anomaly: it is an integral part
of the system, it is one of its undisputable components. Suffice it to say
that we need only look at the jargon being used in the mid-2000s to
understand – thanks to vocabulary! – that the financial stakeholders
knew perfectly well that they were distributing suspect and unsavory
financial products. They were “neutron credits” intended to crumble
without causing their downfall in the housing market. They were “ninja
credits” whose poor beneficiaries had no income, no job or assets (No
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Income, No Job or Assets). Moreover, the currency sovereignty of
members of the EU would have allowed them to deal with the crisis as
an emerging economy would have. However, short of having the ad-
vantages granted by a fund transfer institution or a central bank worthy
of this name, the affected European peripheral nations were subjected to
attacks on their sovereign bonds whose yields soared. The markets made
them pay dearly that they found themselves boxed in – even bastardly –
where their solvency was suddenly called into question. A textbook
example, Ireland saw its consumption and growth record lightning
levels and growth as a result of the sentiment of wealth induced by the
expansion of its real estate market through the transmission belt of
credit. Powered by the euphoria of the real estate loans, did the Irish
banking system not swell – like the frog of La Fontaine – to reach a
volume five times the country’s economy, and the Irish foreign debt
400% of the GDP in 2010? Did not the crisis imported as a result of the
United States and Great Britain end in a panic on the Irish banking
system whose rescue cost 20 points of GDP to little Ireland, whose
budget deficit would widen to 32% of GDP in 2010? Untenable pressure
exerted on a country which since then suffered capital flight, due to a
lack of a intra-European compensation mechanism. Another case in
point, namely Spain, whose banking system was overrun by a storm and
not being able to devalue its currency on the foreign exchange market…
due to there being no market to quote the Spanish currency that no
longer existed. Thus, unlike the Asian financial crisis, the European
financial crisis could not benefit from the currency valve supposed to
offset (at least partially) the terrible internal devaluations.
In short, the EU founders certainly imposed very specific safeguards
to reduce the extreme risk of default of a member nation. The funda-
mental objective of the Stability and Growth Agreement is certainly to
confine the excessive accumulation of public debt. Yet – and very
probably obsessed by the German obsession with deficits – the founding
fathers of Maastricht also neglected the existential threat of an overflow
of private debt. This explains why and how the total lack of monetary
sovereignty of the member countries of the Euro zone is the very foun-
dations of the crisis. And also that is why austerity which weighs on
public budgets is ineffective. Because unlike the forecasts of orthodox
economists (i.e., almost all of the profession!), reductions in public
spending in Spain, Greece and elsewhere have certainly not been offset
by an increase in investment by the private sector. In fact, the private
sector – still heavily indebted – began instead to save through fear
(justified) of a further decline in economic activity, which would be
naturally induced by fiscal discipline. An IMF study (dating from the
very beginning of 2013) shows that a dollar reduction in public spending
does not remove 50 cents from an economy, as the current dominant
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thought and economic research imagined it would, but rather…$1.70!
This crisis would have no place in the European Union if it was a genu-
ine monetary union like the United States, operating fiscal transfers
between their states if needed when it comes to offsetting the adverse
cyclical effects on the budget of one of their 50 stars. The European
episode is therefore not a history of public indebtedness, or balance of
payments deficit, and therefore requires no solution using fiscal austeri-
ty or sobriety on its members. It is this statutory schizophrenia estab-
lished between fiscal policy and currency on the one hand and the
absence of other intra-EU transfer mechanisms to reduce the imbalances
that have shaped an unnecessary and completely avoidable crisis.
The European Union still has an arsenal of stopgap measures at its
disposal to easily out the fire which ravages its weakest members. As
they have accounts with the ECB, why would the ECB not provide
Greece with enough credit so that it can, not embark on a spending
spree, but only borrow three quarters of the sums due after its forthcom-
ing bond deadline? European authorities would naturally implement
adequate monitoring measures so as to protect their collective interest,
and this country would continue its measures of financial restructuring
and rationalization. It should be simple enough to borrow an amount
progressively lower than 25% vis-à-vis its needs by the grace of the
European printing press. Suddenly, the markets would demand lower
interest rates on residual financing agreed to by Greece, bolstered firstly
because its debt would have been reduced by 25% and reassured sec-
ondly because this intervention would attest to European cohesion. The
benefits of this injection – purely technical – of liquidities would gradu-
ally be felt on the Greek economy since tension would drop significantly
because a state would be less dependent on market severity. As such,
and as growth is restored in Greece which would be mechanically
reflected in its tax revenues, the ECB would slowly recoup its loans,
either by debiting Greece’s account or by another more inventive means
crafted by our sound central bankers.
Since this is only this condition – namely, solidarity – capable of re-
turning Europe to prosperity. Indeed it is against nature that such shock-
ing differences in the compensation of their respective Treasury bills
prevail among married couples, having vowed to remain together for
better or worse. How can the wealthier European nations themselves
and, a fortiori, this supranational pseudo-institution that is the ECB,
accept that Greece, Portugal or a country like Spain pay 3, 4 or 10 times
more for their debt than Germany or Luxembourg? Is it acceptable, as
pointed out on August 1, 2012 by the German daily Bild, that “Germany
earns money thanks to the Euro crisis?” According to Bild, the country
would have saved EUR60 billion in the last thirty months in refinancing
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its debt. It is that simple, and Bild trumpets it: “Germany even earns
money while being in debt”!
Forgiveness would have been possible if the pitfalls had been insur-
mountable. As it happens, the cure for this great evil which ravages
Europe is childlike simplicity since it suffices that the ECB credit
certain accounts, of course subject to safeguards. Does the actual Euro-
pean strategy – imposed by Germany and its central bank – not remind
us of the U.S. bombardment of Vietnam which destroyed a rebel village
while claiming to save it? Did Germany, the Bundesbank (the German
central bank) and the ECB not destroy the European Union which
believing it was saving it? A possible decision of total and unlimited
support by the ECB would obviously be highly political, but politics in
Europe is, as we know all too well, is slow and complex. The European
construction was however carried out since the beginning thanks to a
prominently political objective which was to make Europe forget the
war and to erase dictators, communism and therefore rifts from Europe.
It is regrettable that it is this radical shift, toward a Europe entirely
based on trade and finance, which made it lose its political horizon, and
which is now on the verge of damnation. In the same vein of ideas, how
do we accept that the necessary fiscal and social harmonization in the
EU brings unanimity? For intra-European fiscal and social competition
– i.e. within the same Europe – is even harsher than vis-à-vis the out-
side, and under the pressure of Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism in its purest
version it has been introduced into the EU! Today, the sole issue re-
mains the economic government of the EU with the qualified majority,
at the risk of seeing Great Britain depart. The tendency should be toward
solid federal governance (with fiscal and social coordination) rather than
punitive governance currently in place. Europe will therefore turn into a
vacuum, coming to a complete stop – totally exhausted – if it does not
take the bull by the horns for a total sharing of resources. The ultimate
instrument for sharing its wealth is its central bank. It is obviously not
the only one and there are several other ways of showing solidarity, but
the quickest way to appease the present woes of the European popula-
tion is to outdo the markets and restore growth. Moreover, is there
anything to question when our jobs, our standard of living, our social
peace and our comfort are threatened? Is this only because of their bad
management and speculative bubbles that certain European nations are
living through an existential crisis? For the construction of the EU
deprived them of their financial sovereignty by placing them in a posi-
tion of absolute dependence vis-à-vis the ECB, while making them
singularly and solely responsible for their growth. Greece, Portugal and
even Germany are thus comparable to the U.S. states without even the
benefit of a federal government which spends (and borrows) to stimulate
their economy. For, we are under no illusions, only public spending
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reestablishes growth when everything else has been lost or suspended.
The only honorable solution for Europe is a formal federation which
would suddenly provide each of its member countries with its currency
sovereignty and replace the EU as a club of countries benefiting from
the privilege of printing money at will, if need be, so as to lend assis-
tance to its states in need. Beyond that, we are actually witnessing a
pitiful tragedy where the ECB and the rich countries wallow in their
autism while other members of the family are slowly dying. Only rais-
ing the problem and resolving it at a federal level are likely to save the
European Union. Such a happy event would see creditors “line up” to
lend Greece which would no longer, in the absolute, need them since it
benefits from the ultimate assistance of the ECB (which would therefore
deserve its name of “lender of last resort”) or other European mecha-
nisms. The risk of a European country defaulting in payment would
immediately evaporate.
Beyond that, Germany and the other countries in its bosom are con-
stantly bemoaning the lack of competitiveness among the peripheral
European nations where labor costs would be too high in comparison to
the frugal Northern “ants”, disciplined and controlling as though it is
owed the costs associated with their payroll. This permanent stigmatiza-
tion passes, however, under the silence of a phenomenon that specifical-
ly allowed the salaries of the PIIGS to gradually increase since the
1980s to join the current salary levels of industrialized nations, well
integrated in the North. It is therefore due to this “convergence” that the
labor cost increased in Spain, Portugal and in the countries to the South,
and not following the bad habits of their employees presented as lazy
and yet demanding… It is now difficult to deny that the salaries of
workers in the South do not differ markedly from those in the North per
unit of goods produced. German, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Irish
workers indeed earn their living equivalently to similar product or equal
service. In reality, the workers in the South are even generally less well
paid than their Northern counterparts since they produce goods and
ensure services either in lesser quantities or of inferior quality. In this
regard, competitiveness, labor cost and even the mentality are definitely
not the central problems of the PIIGS. There are several and daily
examples of workers from the South who migrated to the North reveal-
ing their talents, skills, discipline and diligence. The deficiencies of the
nations to the South are instead to be found in the level of public and
private investment in key sectors as their infrastructure, equipment and
governance.
Therefore, it is not only the level of wages in these countries that
must be questioned but also the paltry allocation of their assets which
clearly makes them incapable of being competitive – in quantity and
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quality of the goods produced – with their neighbors to the North.
Indeed, the wages perceived by the workers to the South vis-à-vis their
production only makes them lower. In other words, the sharp increase in
the prices of their goods does not reflect only their revenues, which are
little appreciated, but also the harmonization of the tariffs of their goods
and commodities vis-à-vis those of the North. For the PIIGS, the Euro-
pean convergence is transformed into a sizable increase in prices in the
face of relatively stagnant wages. These accusations according to which
the Mediterranean worker would have abused the influx of capital in his
country by always demanding a higher salary, obliterating the competi-
tiveness of its economy, are therefore only stuff of urban legend. Indeed,
labor costs per unit or service produced has hardly increased proportion-
ally with the selling price of that same product that the Southern worker
received less pay per unit in 2007 than in 1980! Labor costs therefore
converged between the Centre, the North and the periphery of the
European Union due only to the convergence of prices between these
regions, and through no fault of employees to the South who would have
won a larger share. The real reasons for the lack of competitiveness of
the PIIGs may therefore be found elsewhere, namely in the high com-
pensation of huge masses of capital which were invested there at that
time. The investors actually demanded always increasing returns on
capital as the price for their cash investments. So much money which
was therefore cruelly lacking that was needed for the vital structural
improvements to bring them in line with that of the North. These south-






and Completely Avoidable in Europe
In conclusion, the days of the Euro are today threatened, not through
the fault of abysmal deficits of certain European states, but simply
because of the European policy skids leading to a cacophony of unac-
ceptable dithering. European leaders do not always consider that it is the
dissolution of the Union – in any case as is already known for more than
a decade – which is on the menu if they finally decide to address seri-
ously the issue of fiscal union! A European Treasury should thus be
created, a logical conclusion to fiscal harmonization for all members of
the EU, which will act as a shock absorber necessarily produced by
nations with often divergent business cycles and essential diagnoses. To
even raise funds through the issuance of bonds, this European Ministry
of Finance will, at the same time, function as an agency for transfer
payments from the wealthiest nations to the least wealthy. For, without a
good and solid fiscal union, the European massive and endemic imbal-
ances will eventually be due to the Euro zone. Either by the gradual and
inevitable exit of its weakest members, or by the comprehensive and
sudden implosion of its entire structure! It would be much more advan-
tageous for all EU member states to pass through the necessary “fiscal
union” case/box than to have to endure the throes of a broken currency
which would accompany bank failures, default payments of sovereign
debt, even the reestablishment of exchange control and freezing bond
markets… Political decision – in the noble sense of the term – through
excellence, this fiscal union seems, however, impossible to realize in the
current prevalent political landscape in the various EU countries. In-
deed, it is not only Germany which will veto, it is not exclusively the
voter and the taxpayer of this country who will refuse to participate
financially in saving the European project… As a “fiscal union” is
necessarily accompanied by extra sacrifices, the weaker countries
themselves will also use their veto because their citizens have become
completely disenchanted – even disgusted – with what was once for
them the European “dream”.
The failure of the European Concept – according to which a country
in difficulty can appeal to the monetary policy or benefit from budget
transfers to settle its domestic problems – is therefore likely to lead to a
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major, economic and, indeed, financial, but also political crisis, since
these nations realize that they receive no support in exchange for giving
up their sovereignty. It goes without saying though that only mecha-
nisms of cash transfers toward these fragile nations are likely to over-
come their loss of solvency, while reversing the unemployment and
income curves which change unfavorably and indeed inversely. Even
worse since the attempts by these weakened countries to reboot their
domestic consumption were sharply swept a backhander by “exemplary”
countries. These righteous nations systematically imposed stringency
everywhere causing these affected economies to dry up. An elementary
reminder of fundamental differences between sovereign countries and
nations which, abdicating all control over their currency policy, would
have otherwise avoided the European implosion. The insolvency of
peripheral European countries would never have actually been chal-
lenged if they had been clearly supported by an ECB which has the
privilege of printing money at will that it is able to inject into its needy
members. A group of countries benefiting from this option to create a
currency, covering such a geographic zone and reflecting such clout can
never go bankrupt, except of its own doing as the recent U.S. episode
demonstrates where Congress balked at raising the debt ceiling. In
reality, there is no European debt crisis. There is, however, a Euro crisis.
The debt is simply a symptom of the single currency crisis and a defec-
tive central bank which, furthermore, takes pleasure in navigating in
troubled waters. A more important start-up in the world history of
investment funds of up to $1 trillion, does not LTCM count among its
prestigious staff two future Nobel Economics Prize winners? It is there-
fore the Euro in its present form which creates the conditions for the
crisis lined with bad choices. Austerity being one of these bad choices.
Since economic recovery is well worth, after all, the temporary worsen-
ing of deficits… Indeed, given that EU members cannot print their
tickets, as the refusal by the ECB and European institutions to flood
them with cash, transforms each European nation… into a bank! Spain,
Italy or Greece have therefore become banks and are subject – exactly
how a bank would be subject to it – to flights of capital and massive
cash withdrawals, until the final collapse.
The big – even single – European problem and the huge chip in its
armor is the dichotomy between congenital monetary power and budg-
etary authority of the respective members. Each of these countries
abdicated its monetary sovereignty (in favor of the ECB) while it could
retain the power to levy taxes… without being in a position to stimulate
its economy in the traditional way, like the U.S. did. This very restric-
tive mobility of EU members in rebooting their economic activity and
encouraging their growth comes from two flaws. First, the inability to
print their own currency and therefore to inject liquidities into their
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economy. Second, the Maastricht criteria strictly governing public
deficits considerably restrain states in their maneuvers to consent to an
attractive tax system, as well as to public spending (to hire bureaucrats
or to initiate substantial public works projects. It should be noted that
the European structure did not give priority to jobs which were sacri-
ficed on the altar of economic orthodoxy and stringency. For the fathers
of Maastricht, it was, in fact, better to restrain spending public spending
and focus only on growth to reduce unemployment… that is if the
employment was part of their concerns. It is this congenital defect that is
responsible for triggering the crisis suffered by the Union for three
years. And it is this European superstructure, tax and fiscally decentral-
ized, which is the source of its amplification. As the peripheral Europe-
an nations are deprived of the monopoly of issuing currency with which
they go into debt, lenders consider when they borrow in a foreign cur-
rency. In addition, this lack of fiscal and budgetary integration of mem-
bers of the Union exacerbates financial strains since setbacks from
national banks permanently contaminate their trusteeship country.
Indeed, the financial system and states interact very differently depend-
ing on whether monetary union is centralized or based on some sort of
federal system. Indeed, the financial system and states interact very
differently depending on whether monetary union is centralized or based
on some sort of federal system. The solvency of a member state of the
United States of America is never called into question by the failure of a
bank incorporated and domiciled in the State in question. However, for
those who argue (correctly), the United States was not made in a day.
And others, such as Germany and the Nordic ants, try to bring to the
Southern cicadas the culture of rigor and discipline, essential prerequi-
sites for the European fiscal and budgetary integration. It is necessary to
oppose even the chronology of the formation of the European Union.
The sequence requiring balanced budgets and debt limit and deficit was
in fact the starting point from which all should flow. This is the form
that was privileged at the expense of substance and contempt of solidari-
ty. In doing so, this decentralized structure grossly underestimated the
vulnerability of countries with a natural inclination to deficits, or simply
faced with specific difficulties. Countries particularly dependent on the
influx of private capital, in a context where they had no latitude to beat
their currencies. In other words, the original sin was to establish the
Euro before the federal union and in the absence of duly formed organi-
cally integrated institutions. How did the founders of the single currency
hope to hold a fragile building together whose foundation consisted of
economically, politically and institutionally nations so divergent for
which there existed no mechanism for compensation and support?
Solely by virtue of a balanced budget? Indeed, by giving up this pre-
cious flexibility granted by a sovereign currency (and therefore free to
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print), by abdicating their currency policy (i.e., the definition of their
interest rates), by forcing the convergence of economies into notoriously
dissimilar competitiveness. The Euro weakened core European coun-
tries. And it brought about the inevitability of speculative bubbles in the
peripheral countries, that could only now count on these bubbles to
maintain and sustain their economic activity. In reality, the financial
turmoil of the EU is only the deep symptom of endemic evil of Europe-
an integration overshadowing growth and employment.
However, growth is not challenged by social assistance programs.
Indeed, nowhere was it proven that there was the direct and systematic
correlation between public spending in favor of its citizens and a regres-
sion/decrease in growth. In other words, let us not sacrifice wellbeing,
safety and harmonious expansion of the population on the pretext that
economic growth would win here since this is not true. Indeed, only
poorly targeted social programs affect growth, insofar as monetary
policy or inappropriate taxes. For it is not European nations which spend
more on their citizens which today find themselves on the brink, as, on
the contrary, public spending on social programs by the peripheral
European countries did not weaken them. For it is not European nations
which spend more on their citizens which today find themselves on the
brink, as, on the contrary, public spending on social programs by the
peripheral European countries did not weaken them. In reality, the
spending by the PIIGS on social programs are less than that by the so-
called “Northern” European countries such as Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, Belgium or Finland, which can be more generous thanks to
their ability to borrow from the markets at negligible costs. The same
can be said for non EU European countries (such as Switzerland and the
Scandinavian countries) which – benefiting from the huge asset of very
low cost financing, even negative – which also spend a lot more on
social programs than European countries such as Italy or Spain. In what
kind of world would we like to live? In a world where certain countries
may provide largesse to their population because they benefit from zero
percent interest rates on loans from the financial markets? While others,
who carry large deficit accounts, are victims of punitive means from
“investors” who, suddenly, exert unacceptable and outrageous blackmail
on vulnerable people. In so doing, Europe is floundering in an authentic
“liquidity trap” described by Keynes, although of a new and modern
kind. These negative rates paid by certain privileged nations on their
bond debt are in fact a veritable liquidity trap, in the sense where they
are captured by the wealthy countries and thus subtracted from the
affected countries that yet need them greatly. A fractured line therefore
divides Europe, a sort of financial iron curtain which operates a method-
ical triage between the club of countries with negative rates and others.
Obviously no one has an interest in maintaining or fueling this polariza-
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tion, but are the rich countries in surplus even aware of this? Will the
European Union – this piece of work by Monnet, Schuman and Adenau-
er –, this economic and financial powerhouse with the world’s highest
GDP, passively adapt to seeing certain of its members finance freely
their standard of living while others must borrow at 5 or 7%, when it is
not even more…? Is it not amazing, for example, to hear the Portuguese
Prime Minister urge (in August 2012) the youth of his country to leave
to seek work elsewhere? It is actually our youth who are the first to pay
the price for this crisis. More than half of those under 25 years old are
unemployed in Greece and Spain, knowing that youth unemployment is
also higher than 50% in certain regions of Southern Italy! Indeed, under
the pretext of conforming to orthodoxy, how can we tolerate sacrificing
our youth at the altar of liberalism? How do we remain unmoved in the
face of intergenerational conflict which is occurring inside our Union,
where those in charge seem obsessed by stock market fluctuations and
by the verdict of rating agencies? How do we tolerate hundreds of
millions of European citizens – today, in the second decade of the 2000s
– still being kept hostage to financial markets which freely possess the
powerful tool to reward or otherwise sack? Does the European civiliza-
tion not deserve better than to be summed up in terms such as “returns”
or “state bonds”? It is imperative to redirect radically Europe’s construc-
tion, when Milton Friedman asserted that it would not last more than
fifteen years!
Dogmas – like prejudices – wreak havoc on society and, one might
add, on economies. Are not austerity and fiscal orthodoxy considered
like truths unveiled by the same ones who depart from the – untouchable
– principle according to which recessions and high unemployment are
the price to be paid for achieving the sacrosanct balanced public ac-
counts? Comforted by the great majority of economists and the small
academic world, almost all our political and economic leaders only have
eyes for this neo-liberal doctrine. And have nothing but contempt for the
neo-Keynesians and other progressives who clearly distinguish between
the budget of a sovereign state… and the purse strings of a household.
Applied stupidly and to the letter, dogmas are often cruel and destruc-
tive. That does not matter: our politicians, like our intellectual elites,
impose rigor with the same lightness that apothecaries of yore practiced
bloodletting. O tempora, O mores: our new charlatans continue to
prescribe today more austerity for citizens already stifled by the reces-
sion! It is all the more remarkable that these fanatics have consolidated
more their grip on our system, whereas it is their neo-liberal belief that
precipitated our economies into the abyss. While devoting corruption
and unbridled capitalism to the rank of deities. Is not it sad that even
those who supported, yesterday, growth and employment are driven
today as ardent defenders of “blood and tears”? From the creed of the
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golden rule, tirelessly and religiously recited by the current “socialist”
executive. To the dramatic consequences of the reductions in budget
expenditures on the French economy inevitably doomed to contract.
Through the act of contrition, pathetic servility, agreed to the govern-
ment (“It is our duty to reverse the trend”, according to Pierre Moscovi-
ci, French Minister of Economy and Finance, referring to, on December
27, 2012 in the German Handelsblatt, the French commitment to reduce
the deficit to 3% in 2013). The brainwashing done by the neo-liberal
cult has proven successful – globally – as even the French left followed
suit. Since even the most powerful man on the planet – the U.S. presi-
dent – caves in to its demands: he gradually ceded nearly all of his
positions to the Republicans in the resolution of the fiscal cliff. Haven’t
President Obama and his administration now been reduced to finding
insane tricks to fund social programs? Thus the U.S. Treasury has
discussed putting nearly $1,000 billion in platinum coins into circula-
tion, which would allow to legally circumvent the U.S. debt ceiling! As
such, today, everything has been accomplished. Indeed, like religious
fanatics, neo-liberals refuse categorically to submit to the evidence that
a sovereign nation, which issues a sovereign currency (i.e., freely ex-
changeable in markets), is in no way subject to creditors that would up
the ante on its financing costs. A sovereign nation and so-called leaders
can – and must – spend more than their income allow for, if their objec-
tive is to stamp out the recession. The battered citizen only knows that a
central bank could simply press a button to credit accounts, create
money, and this, with the dual aim of reviving the economy and protect-
ing its people from the throes of financial markets. Who took the trouble
to explain to the unemployed at the end of the day that a country which
has a sovereign currency can maintain budget deficits over extremely
long periods of time without the negative impact on economic growth?
The employee struggling daily to provide for his family would be
outraged to learn that austerity (he is the first to suffer) only exacerbated
the economic downturn. A nation and a household must apply diametri-
cally opposed strategies when their incomes collapse: while the decrease
in spending of the individual has a negligible effect on the economy of
the country, reducing the lifestyle of the public sector has a disastrous
impact on both the private sector and consumption. Any other strategy is
doomed to failure, despite the imprinted statements of pity from the neo-
liberal theorists who argue that the economy of the European Union
worsens for not having opted for more rigor and for not having pre-
scribed it early enough! So two worldviews clash: bleed a more or less
moribund patient even more or send the neo-liberals away who show an
almost morbid obstinacy to want to balance the budget of a country. No:
the U.S., Great Britain and Japan – which have a currency that they can
print when and how they feel like it – did not suffer from escalating cost
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of financing public debt. No: the unemployment level in the U.S., which
implemented several stimulus packages, did not quite reach the average
catastrophic levels of the EU. Yes: the U.S. economic recovery and
unemployment reduction would have been more dramatic if these
stimuli had been more generous, as advocated by the neo-Keynesians.
And finally yes: in spite of these cash injections and despite the massive
amounts of money that were printed (with the QE1, QE2 and QE3
programs combined with operation “Twist”), the U.S. fiscal deficit was
reduced over these past three years at an unprecedented rate since the
end of the Second World War! The budgetary savings signed by Presi-
dent Obama will drastically reduce the U.S. federal debt which is ex-
pected to fall to 83% of GDP by 2022! After swelling multiple specula-
tive bubbles since the mid-1980s, the neo-liberal ideology so ravaged
Europe today, imposing across the continent the fire of austerity and
destructive madness of balanced budgets. We must reject all these
senseless net savings programs, as it is imperative to oppose any cuts in
social spending, the effectiveness of which is systematically denied by
reality. Because the state should instead be generous and invest in the
economy – ie increase its deficits! – so long as this recessionary envi-
ronment persists. In fact, behind this technical debate, hides a much
more significant battle: a real societal choice. The economy must be-
come a social system serving the citizen. And money a simple tool made
available to the system, must be measured out for collective prosperity,
that being its only concern. That is why, today, neo-liberalism is nothing




Cyprus, or the Supreme Contradictions
of Neoliberalism
The Cypriot adventures ended up demonstrating the new reality pre-
vailing in the European Union. Namely, in this world dominated by
national egoism, careerism and the Brussels technocracy, nothing ad-
vances and it is strictly impossible to progress without crisis. Bureaucra-
cy and European inertia, coupled with petty calculations of the respec-
tive leaders of each member country can indeed only be moved under
the ax of financial markets and under intense media pressure. Never
mind that unnecessary crises may have to be created. As everyone now
knows, the EU will not be dismembered and it will be preserved, the
main actors (i.e., Germany) skillfully exploit these structural defects
while using the lever of threat – or blackmail – to achieve their ends.
Hence the categorical refusal to support small Cyprus without confisca-
tion of bank deposits. Indeed only the spectra of a rise in power of the
financial crisis with its lot of market liquefaction, bank failures and at
the end of it all, the worsening of an already unsustainable unemploy-
ment, are proving quite effective. Because only these threats can be
conveyed to the affected populations as the very bitter pill of austerity.
In this respect, the Cypriot narrative perfectly illustrates this operation.
This storytelling masks a hardly blameless reality for European citizens.
However, the official history of blood and tears, the announced implo-
sion of markets where we are told that it ravaged the real economy, the
cataclysmic demise of the single currency, gradually badly hide the all-
powerful lobby of nations which pull the strings and is obviously led by
Germany. And that we stop hearing the eternal refrain of the “clash of
two European models”. From this Mediterranean Europe which con-
sumed endlessly (including German products) to Northern Europe
which is ageing and which therefore is logically obsessed with preserv-
ing their savings. No! The continent is moving now to the Wagnerian
score that seeks to transform us into global export machine. Which
steamroller – whose ultimate goal is to unify Europe – can only move
forward decisively under the pressure of dramatic events. That’s why a
turn of events in the smaller European countries (representing less than
1% of EU GDP) turns into melodrama rocking the very foundations of
the Euro. Which explains why a molehill becomes a mountain. If I were
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the European Minister of finances, I would for sure jump on the band-
wagon of this psychodrama and declare invariably serious events if you
do not persevere with the rigor that is our only way out. After Cyprus,
isn’t there… Slovenia which is likely to sweep us away? We owe the
unprecedented intensity of “sovereign debt crises” like its past and
future relics to the “Made in Germany” factory of crises. It is thanks to it
that the poorly-named European Central Bank looks away while unem-
ployment affects more than one in two young people in some of the
“Club Med” countries, which are inadvertently inspired by the cicada.
By stifling solidarity and stoking egos, German imperium lays the
groundwork for social and identity conflagrations in Europe.
How was the European Union able to tolerate in its midst – or at its
level – nations which favored such banking and financial growths? And
why did it not seek to contain – when there was still time – this devel-
opment, all the more morbid as the relevant countries were tiny in size?
Indeed, Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus owed their meteoric prosperity to
the sprawling development of their banking “refuge”, which would
make so much profit that it eventually became incommensurate with
respect to the size of the economy that housed it. Too massive to be
saved or “too big to save”… Thus the bank deposits in the Icelandic
financial institutions culminated in 980% of this small island’s GDP,
i.e., proportionally ten times the bank loans in the United States. While
Ireland had a large banking system, 440% of its GDP and Cyprus 800%!
Iceland, however, was able to pull out of it more honorably than Ireland
who suffers always from having its citizens absorb the losses of its
banking system. Having actually declared default toward its foreign
depositors and on its offshore accounts, Iceland was also able to benefit
from a flexible currency whose fall led to the devaluation of the deposits
of its investors. It is therefore only due to a financial repression in good
and due form – coupled with a temporary control on capital – that
Iceland was able to recover. Knowing that losses on deposits in Iceland
were much more substantial than those that would be imposed on the
Cypriot bank accounts, which would receive more lenient treatment. Yet
Cyprus found itself at a crossroads, faced with a fundamental choice.
Look fully and finally to Europe, or continue to maintain a banking
system sheltering very questionable fortunes. If its past banking excess-
es – and its some 20 billion Euros in Russian funds deposited in its
banks – enabled it up until then to tax its citizens at lower rates and
avoid investing in a sustainable economy. It now became intolerable –
after soon six years of financial crises – that a nation leaves its banks to
metastasize, without being able to support them in case of need, let
alone correct their abuse. But let’s not only stigmatize small Cyprus.
Doesn’t asset under management in Singapore attain 7.7 times its GDP?
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Did only the balance sheets of UBS and Credit Suisse rise to three times
the Swiss GDP, whose bank balances are 6.8 times GDP?
So many statistics indicated that there was decidedly something rot-
ten in the kingdom of the global financial architecture. Did not the
absolute freedom of movement of capital, established in the 1970s,
began at the same time an era of repeated financial crises and specula-
tive bubbles? Are the successive crises in Latin America and Asia –
which were the prelude to the big implosion of Western countries which
started in 2007 – not directly attributable to an abuse of leverage as a
result of the free movement of capital? Both made possible due to poor
banking and financial regulation? While it is clear today that the reestab-
lishment – at least in some form – of control of international capital
flows would only be effective if adopted on a global scale, or at least by
the G20 countries to start. The Cypriot episode confronts a reality that
should finally allow the right questions to be asked: should not the full
liberalization of movement of capital be amended? If globalization was
– in theory – full of hope and prosperity for some nations and regions of
the world, it has also proved disastrous for the countries unable to
regulate a sprawling and uncontrollable banking system designed to
make profits worldwide. Ditto for the European construction: great
project and ideal on the verge of sinking due to no centralization, com-
mon banking regulator and shared taxes. Birth defects with immediate
consequence that a Cypriot Euro is not worth a Luxembourg Euro,
because of no common deposit insurance, which cannot be agreed to
without a common regulatory banking authority. As each member of the
European Union has, in reality, a qualitatively different currency, de-
spite a cosmetic or synthetic Euro which no longer deceives anyone.
This European monetary union meant to stabilize material comforts to
promote harmony among peoples has now been transformed into a
precarious factory. Hope, however, does not seem lost, and in this
respect, to pay depositors – creditors – is a giant step and a notorious
intellectual effort in the right direction. If it is fundamentally unfair and
unacceptable to help small savers. If it is absurd to implement such a tax
for the sole purpose of balancing public accounts in order to sink your
teeth into a stupid orthodoxy. To tax the wealthy – or to collect a certain
portion of it – gives states an alternative that they cannot afford to
overlook in a European context where the ECB refuses to use its print-
ing press. By the end of 2011, the very influential Boston Consulting
Group had predicted that nearly 30% of global wealth would gradually
be absorbed by the states themselves under pressure to absorb their
losses by the financial markets and the orthodoxy requiring the balance
of public accounts. According to the institute, it is indeed no less than
$21 trillion in debt that our Western countries should absorb by monop-
Capitalism without Conscience
100
olizing 28.7% of the wealth of the affluent western classes, which
amount to $74 trillion!
All countries will obviously not be housed in the same boat. The
Handelsblatt cites the case of Italy where the average private wealth is
164,000 Euros, compared to Austria where it is 76,000, to deduce
therefrom that – on paper – this country suffers from no debt crisis.
Indeed, while the Italian individual assets (again according to the BBG)
reach 173% of the GDP of this country (compared to 124% in Germa-
ny), would not it be tempting (and understandable) for the Italian au-
thorities to take 15% of this wealth to get their public debt below the
level of 100% of GDP? In an environment where austerity and lack of
endemic competitiveness cripple the majority of European countries.
While it is very difficult to restructure debts due to a fragile banking
sector. And as it is impossible to convince Germany and the ECB to
reduce further real interest rates through quantitative rate cuts. The only
lifeline available to states, the only path allowing them to invest in their
economies and increase their money supply to boost inflation expecta-
tions – and thus promote growth – will be confiscated, or taken by force,
available cash in bank accounts. Whatever the outcome, the Cypriot case
in this regard is a clear signal of this paradigm shift induced by the
dominance of neo-liberalism. Thus it is tripping over its own contradic-
tions: it is indeed a flat rejection of printing money, it is also its stub-
bornness to establish rigor mainly for ideological reasons that are forc-
ing states to take money from where it is, i.e., from the wealthy. At the




Is Financial Innovation a Curse?
This omnipotent finance achieved its absolute domination from
computers which prevail today on stock market fluctuations, and there-
fore on the capitalization of our businesses. How else can one explain
that large cap securities such as Société Générale or the Italian bank,
Intesa Sanpaolo (and several other well-known institutions) can sell
15% in a single session? What is behind the collapse of Bank of Ameri-
ca’s shares by 20% in a single day? Or behind a Dow Jones index which
can fluctuate by more than 400 points upward and then downward over
the course of several days? They are in reality robots which, with the
assistance of algorithms, issue buy and sell indications since 55% of the
volumes dealt with today (as opposed to 20% in 2005) on all U.S.
financial markets are the sole responsibility of machines! Everywhere,
grey matter seems to have disappeared since everyone – banks, specula-
tive funds and even pension funds – is now addicted to this “trading
algorithm” which makes the Dow Jones lose 1,000 points in the space of
a few minutes (the famous “flash crash” on May 6, 2010). The econo-
mist Heilbroner (1919-2005) maliciously said at the end of his life that
mathematics had breathed stringency into economic science before
killing it! These algorithms that control this “high frequency trading”
further allow their instigators to reap huge profits daily. Or losses when
the system catches a cold, such as Knights Capital losing $440 million
in 45 minutes in the summer of 2012! In reality, this algorithm trading
enables its originator to intervene prosaically between a buyer and a
seller to pocket a small margin… except that it is about a commission
charged on thousands – even on millions – of transaction. It is the entire
profession which must now recognize that it erred in its assessment of a
highly complex system… that it did not always understand it! Indeed,
these flagrant technological advances are exploited by the financial
world precisely with the objective to go around – even breach – regula-
tions. As John K. Galbraith (1908-2006) suggested, it is vital to gauge
and dissect financial technology within a legal framework so as to
understand the most complex instruments. This sophistication with
financial tools is being knowingly developed by a financial sector
concerned with evading the law. Let us well understand that, in the
globalized financial world, fraud is not an anomaly: it is an integral part
of the system, it is one of its undisputable components. Suffice it to say
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that we need only look at the jargon being used in the mid-2000s to
understand – thanks to vocabulary! – that the financial stakeholders
knew perfectly well that they were distributing suspect and unsavory
financial products. They were “neutron credits” intended to crumble
without causing their downfall in the housing market. They were “ninja
credits” whose poor beneficiaries had no income, no job or assets (No
Income, No Job or Assets). They were “liars’ loans” since everyone
knew that the person applying for credit had lied on his application… So
many instruments directly led to the “subprime” disaster and showed
that the financial world was perfectly aware of the explosive matter that
it manipulated.
Will economic “science” one day have the same fate as anthropology
and phrenology? In other words, will economic science ever become a
fossil science, vaguely respected for what it will have brought but
completely out of date? Leverage, derivatives, derivatives, also known
as “exotic” products, options, knock-out, knock-in, one touch, futures,
futures markets, securitizations… Must we destruct all these financial
innovations? Should financial science be regarded with suspicion when
it innovates? It is indeed impossible to tolerate more sophisticated –
even decadent – financial products whose only objective is very often to
enrich a certain class. Does it make sense to devote much public con-
tempt to all financial inventions which bring marked improvement to
our standard of living? After all, no one thinks to condemn the Internet,
the basis of the collapse of the bubble of the technology stocks? Fur-
thermore, had not the principle of a limited company and stock market
capitalization been confronted with great distrust during the 19th Century
by those who were persuaded that it would allow it would allow the
emergence of entrepreneurs eager to shirk their obligations? Unlimited
personal liability was in place at that era. Can you imagine today’s
economic and business world functioning without limited liability
companies and the stock markets? As well, excessive credit is certainly
the origin of the property frenzy whose decay (since 2007 with the
crumbling of sub-primes) led to today’s crisis, but did credit expansion
systematically degenerate into a speculative bubble?
Instead, is it not from the moment when a security is converted into a
security of securities and is cut into tranches to be resold to several
stakeholders that from that point the banker believes himself invincible
and that all hope begins to be vain? Indeed, all financial innovations do
not apply: easy and traditional access to credit undeniably makes society
advance when it is used to purchase one’s home or finance one’s stud-
ies. However, this same credit spent on refined products becomes disas-
trous if used for market speculation or to adopt irrational behavior and
devoid of any economic justification. Thus, while finance can actually
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make our world better whereby our huge middle class as well as the
most needy can legitimately improve their standard of living, it can
become a weapon of mass destruction when a few among us use it for
unsavory purposes. Therefore, is this financial innovation or its specific
applications, at the behest of greed and immorality of a business minori-
ty, which are harmful to the system and society? Sub-question: what is
the overall balance sheet of the value of financial innovation on the real
economy? If financial techniques only marginally benefit society during
good times, its ability to harm is, however, disastrous when the train
derails! It is therefore imperative that we – even – this world of finance
which saw spectacular expansion and whose contribution to the GDP of
our developed countries steadily climbed for 150 years. What, therefore,
is really the added value of finance and how does it benefit economic
productivity? Should we, after Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank and advisor to the Obama administration, assert
that the only tangible asset of finance is the automatic distributor of
bank bills?
The answer is still pending and doubts are allowed since yesterday’s
prosperity was the pretext for all sorts of predatory behavior on the part
of individuals and entities that ruined the system, with the blessing of
our politicians. So, it had been explained to us that profit should be the
only horizon, that it was legitimate that this sole purpose – “worthy of
respect” – underpin and feed our energy and thirst for success. It is clear
today that this quest for profit destroys our lives and our planet. Worse
yet, that it threaten our individual freedoms! The devotion of the Anglo-
Saxon social model, having excessively boosted trade and consolidated
all types of businesses into massive conglomerates, proved to be a
failure for long-term growth and harmful to society. This philosophy
turned us into psychotics (“sociopaths” in the words of Nassim Taleb),
which vie with imagination to destroy value and – even more serious –
values. This dogmatic eagerness to “laissez-faire” finally resulted in
tyranny, when it was, however, so much healthier to have the largest
number participate in leading business and businesses. The markets
accelerated the advent of macro-management – that is to say, oligarchy
– whereas only micro-management leads to stability and production of
individuals. The academic world, that of business such as our economic
authorities all depart from the principle that it is better to promote large
organizations and banks when (and even if) they are known to have lost
almost all sense of collective responsibility. In so doing, these cartels
and concentrations of power, which instill foul air on all economic
activity, slowly kills private initiative while compromising our individu-
al rights. That is why it serves no purpose to believe today in the illu-
sions of those who pretend to “reinvent” capitalism since – and it is
Marx himself who recognized it – capitalism is always reinventing
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itself. Indeed, constantly changing, it is eternally in search of new
artifices, new techniques and sophistication, sometimes extreme, with
the single objective of optimizing its profits and satisfying the instinct of
accumulation. Moreover, each stage of its metamorphosis throughout its




The Moral of History or Immoral History?
The name of protagonists, the signs of financial establishments as the
dates are followed and certainly do not resemble each other. The story
told, however, is always the same, punctuated by personal interests,
greed, accidents on the financial markets described as “unpredictable”…
so many episodes that marked the life of the past twenty-five years as
“the more things change the more they stay the same”, as the Anglo-
Saxons would say. A list – which does not claim to be exhaustive – of
the scams and fraud of the world of finance and revealed only during a
part of 2012 would indeed be eloquent. Let us begin with a case which
lasted just as long as the Madoff scam, namely that committed by the
owner of “Peregrine Financial Group”, who stole altogether the assets of
his depositors. To build offices for $18 million or to pay fines handed
down by regulatory authorities… whereby only $5 million remained in
the accounts of his clients, which were supposed to amount to $200
million! A scam comparable with the best of them, made public in the
Fall 2011, called “MF Global”, except that it was some $1,600 billion
that went missing. Now let us talk about the illegitimate losses of $9
billion deposited during this period of 2012 by a JP Morgan Chase
trader nicknamed “London Whale”… Or the shocking example of one
of the premier banking institutions in the world, HSBC, which had to
disclose that it was a repeat offender of money laundering. Indeed,
despite the steps taken in 2003 and 2007 by U.S. authorities, this bank
continued its relationships with drug traffickers and businesses suspect-
ed of having links with terrorists. Until the U.S. Congress marked the
end of the festivities in the summer of 2012. Let us not forget to mention
also the program of spring of 2012 the scam by the credit card company
Capital One, forced to reimburse $210 million for having abusively
distributed its products to U.S. consumers.
Let us round off this list by the mother of all manipulations, called
the “Libor”. Indeed, threatened by legal proceedings by the both the
Justice Departments in Great Britain and the U.S. for falsifying the
reference interest rate called the “London Interbank Offered Rate”,
Barclays Bank had to pay in July 2012 close to $500 million to these
two countries in settlement of this litigation. Despite this arrangement,
let us make no mistake here, this wrongdoing is not just another act of
embezzlement along the already very tortuous paths of finance. As one
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of the most important rate indicators in the world, the Libor influences
actually the interest rates of the majority of key currencies since almost
all of the loans granted to businesses around the world is indexed to it.
The (presumed) fraud focused on mortgages, credit card loans and other
transactions agreed to in favor of businesses and private individuals for
a total amount including between $500,000 and $800,00 billion! The
amounts involved by this wrongdoing are astonishing since all credit
agreed to – from mortgages to student loans or that granted to business-
es through credit card overdraft – are more or less related to this Libor.
Thus, according to the Federal Reserve Bank in Cleveland, more than
half of the mortgages at variable rates in the U.S. are affected by Libor
fluctuations. As well, and despite mass resignations of the highest level
executives at Barclays, the scandal does not stop there since these
manipulations were discovered at two levels. Barclays knowingly
disclosed a wrong rate to its regulatory authority which itself used to
borrow on the markets with dual first: first, to realize profits on deriva-
tives and second, improve its public image by showing that it managed
to borrow at attractive rates. In doing so, this bank – in cahoots with
other satellite offices – masked the reality of its financial situation with
its regulatory agencies, its clients and its creditors by posting falsely
attractive rates on its own borrowings. The chain of manipulation of this
interest rate would have infected some forty financial companies and
more traditional businesses, dozens of traders, more or less involved at
various levels in this new financial scam unmasked in the summer of
2012.
How do you continue to have confidence in a banking and financial
system engulfed in so many scandals, scams and concealments? Bankers
– who can only blame themselves for their total loss of credibility – are
responsible for the entire capitalist financial system running a great risk
which relies wholly on trust. Indeed, without this precious trust, the
entire edifice will crumble, money in circulation (or “fiduciary” curren-
cy) loses all its value and all financial instruments will be auctioned off.
How is it possible – and even less tolerated – that one of the key finan-
cial institutions for many years manipulated the most determining
interest rate on financial markets? Indeed, without this precious trust,
the entire edifice will crumble, money in circulation (or “fiduciary”
currency) loses all its value and all financial instruments will be auc-
tioned off. How is it possible – and even less tolerated – that one of the
key financial institutions for many years manipulated the most determin-
ing interest rate on financial markets? How can we not be outraged by
these three international banks – JP Morgan, Barclays and HSBC –
having survived the tough crisis of 2008 by the grace of tax contribu-
tions, nonetheless persevere in their wrongdoings with the objective of
taking more from this same citizen who uses their services? How can an
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institution like Goldman Sachs justify using the most important leverage
in all of its history in full turmoil in 2009? The year when, according to
the Wall Street Journal, Wall Street salaries and bonuses reached
amounts comparable to those of 2004 and 2005, i.e. at the height of the
speculative bubble… In reality, those from the financial institutions who
survived the 2007-2009 crisis are today even more powerful than prior
to the collapse of the subprime bubble. Slight competition due to a
certain number of banks which were absorbed or went bankrupt, but
also to weakened states in debt – therefore the striking force lessened –
are today transformed by a world of finance that it is very difficult to
fight.
Another step – massive and which concerns us all – is, itself also,
“likely from manipulation or distortion”, according to a recent G20
report, namely that of oil tariffs. At the height of the Libor scandal, it
would seem that the integrity of companies is challenged within a
context where the setting of their price depends (such as the Libor)
voluntary declarations from a certain number of institutions, funds and
traders who disclose the prices paid on their acquisitions. Oil tariffs –
which are therefore the result or the weighting of the system based on
trust – would themselves also be subjected to attempts of manipulation
from operators seeking to make money from knowingly induced distor-
tions. All in a market of thousands of billions of dollars and which very
closely affects our daily life and our purchasing power. This financial
universe has now become so imbued with its prerogatives and its power
on our lives that it measures its success only in terms of profits. Per-
suaded actually that more it inflates its profits and more its public utility
is comforted, it is mired in a before schizophrenic escape, whose only
advantage is that it leads directly to self-destruction. That is why scan-
dals and scams – even widen – five years after the setting off of the most
acute financial crisis in a century. As such, trickery and deviant behavior
are now so much part of normal life that no one is any longer surprise or
outraged when another fraud is discovered. That is why advertising the
Libor scandal – however major – only attracted a shrug from observers
who had reason… A survey conducted in 2012 by a U.S. law firm,
Labaton Sucahrow, at 500 banks and financial companies in the U.S.
and Great Britain, was amazing/astounding/staggering. As such, 24% of
those in charge who were questioned admit the existence of fraud as a
condition for success. As well, 70% of the people surveyed estimate that
the regulatory authorities are totally incompetent. In other words, there
would be several reasons for not committing fraud. The fear of “getting
caught” would not, however, be sufficient reason for not lying or not
stealing, since punishment is almost nonexistent.
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However, this latest scandal with the Libor seems sadly familiar, as it
has now become routine for financial establishments to try to manipu-
late rates or profit from unethical situations. Financial abuses have now
become part of our morals. Indeed, honest bankers and financiers are no
longer big enough to compete with their fraudster colleagues. So a bank
which does not hide its losses, or sells rotten assets, or launders money,
or influence the rate of a derivative or another instrument… would no
longer be competitive and would eventually go bankrupt, or suffer a
severe drop in its stock price. In real life as in nature, the Darwinian
selection teaches us that on the strongest survive. In the financial uni-
verse – which unfortunately rubbed off on our daily lives –, it is the
dishonest ones who remain, even prosper, while those who play by the
rules are damned. This steamroller of scams and wrongdoings has a
name, the “Gresham” dynamic, which was described by George Aker-
lof, born in 1940 and Nobel Prize Winner for Economics in 2001.
“Dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. The
cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the
purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from
driving legitimate business out of existence”. This Gresham dynamic –
dominant in today’s financial markets – there causes volatility in ethics
for the benefit of fraud which is becoming more endemic. Those who
respect the law and morality are therefore becoming scarce whereas
their unscrupulous rivals remain thanks to the tricks and manipulations
which compromise their costs, or inflate their profits. In other words, it
is becoming “too expensive” to be honest these days.
Would justice – or rather the lack thereof – be on the verge of desta-
bilizing the economic and financial system? Have you not noticed how
managers of small businesses are relentlessly pursued – sometimes even
harassed – while the criminal justice system struggles to find justifica-
tions and legal grounds, since it must deal with the case of “too big to
fail”? This is, however, not the qualifications required by our lawyers,
analysts and other experts that are lacking. The French Financial Mar-
kets Authority and specialists of the Monetary and Financial Code in
France, like the “United States Attorney’s Office” in the U.S. have
indeed often husked, unraveled and successfully investigated many
complex cases when it is about crucifying the “small fry”. A certainty,
an observation: we are not all equal in the eyes of the law, and public
authorities do not treat us all alike. Enough to discourage future entre-
preneurs and other small investors as a biased – even arbitrary – legal
system fundamentally harm the economy. The cement of our society,
equality before the law is nevertheless a prerequisite for a healthy and
balanced economic and financial environment. Once the prison is re-
served only for small fish and for those who, well, have “bad luck”,
when the causal link between crime and punishment is broken or even
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weakened, evil and vice are raised to the level of standards. Why be
honest and why prescribe the rules of the game if the chances of being
sidelined are dwindling? Is it not understandable – or simply human –
that those who are tempted by crime take this route if the penalty is not
always the appointment? With devastating consequences for those who
prescribe to the law are clearly disadvantaged and weakened in an
economy where fierce competition prevails. Is it any wonder that in
such a context stakeholders and actors in the system gradually change
their behavior because of the shift of the “risk-reward” ratio? Is this
imbalance of justice not a boon for those who violate the rules are still
yearning for moral justification? Society as a whole must therefore adapt
to this new paradigm that teaches that it is “acceptable” to break the law.
According to the same compelling logic, the “too big to fail” are consid-
ered “too big to jail” or too important to be jailed… Does this very
disturbing constant that undermines confidence in the system not also
demonstrate – hollow – that the protection of money and interests comes
before the protection of citizens and society? Real exhortation launched
towards institutions (financial and other) and from their directions to
form cartels, manipulate share prices and prices, and defraud, in defi-
ance of the stability of our economies. Even if this clemency is often
invoked precisely on behalf of this economic and financial stability, as
our leaders are haunted by the possible consequences that the bankrupt-
cy of a bank could have, or the court appearance of a prominent (eco-
nomic or political) individual. What good is it to obey the laws and
regulations if only the weakest and least protected are tried? When
crime is legitimized, it is the state that naturally loses all legitimacy.
And it becomes impossible to reconstruct the financial system on the





In fact, political leaders and regulatory authorities have given in to
all the demands of the financial world regarding deregulation in all
directions, under the pretext of establishing universal prosperity. Thus,
the advisor to President Reagan and end analyst of his environment,
Francis Fukuyama was surprised at the incestuous relationship between
the largest financial institutions and partisan economists of efficient
markets. He noted the collusion of this beautiful world with the world of
power: “Wall Street seduced the economics profession not through overt
corruption, but by aligning the incentives of economists with its own. It
very easy for academic economists to moved from universities to central
banks to hedge funds – a tightly knit world in which everyone shared the
same views about the self-regulating and beneficial effects of open
capital markets. It very easy for academic economists to moved from
universities to central banks to hedge funds – a tightly knit world in
which everyone shared the same views about the self-regulating and
beneficial effects of open capital markets. The alliance was enormously
profitable for everyone: The academics got big consulting fees, and
Wall Street got legitimacy”. It is therefore understandable that no one
has stumbled upon the 1998 collapse of the funds of Long Term Capital
Management (“LTCM”), the dress rehearsal for the 2007 subprime
mortgages. A more important start-up in the world history of investment
funds of up to $1 trillion, does not LTCM count among its prestigious
staff two future Nobel Economics Prize winners? The interconnection
between an institution such as Goldman Sachs and two Treasury Secre-
taries (Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson) was only the final proof –
indeed, anecdotal – but in addition to this policy which was nothing
more than ex-financial growth, too content to render service at the
slightest opportunity. The closeness between regulators, politicians and
economists completed the compromise of a few for the benefit of fi-
nance which then occupied the public forum. Lobbying thousands of
politicians by the financial world was no longer necessary since the
eagerness for deregulation was unanimously shared between these two
worlds. The policy officially attained the Stockholm Syndrome status: it
was in love with finance which had gradually deprived it of most of its
powers. With the essential firewall between politics and finance having
been deliberately disabled, is it no wonder that certain blatant types of
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deregulation directly led to these crises, such as compensation of rating
agencies by banking establishments or the hiring by banks of former
regulatory agency bureaucrats…, unless it was the reverse? The rest,
like Mario Draghi and Mario Monti, respectively presidents of the
European Central Bank and the Italian Council, are they not the prod-
ucts of Goldman Sachs where they held responsible positions? As noted,
the “Sachs government” is in no way restricted in the Anglo-Saxon
world. In summary, if it is true that collusion between governments and
oligarchies is ongoing which leads to a systematic confiscation of profits
and a sharing of losses, our democratic western nations borrowed from
the banana republics and accommodated very well the systematic de-
fense and preservation of certain private interests with public funds.
Strengthened by deposits amounting to approximately $800 billion,
Citibank reigned supreme and almost absolute before the crisis. Robert
Rubin, the U.S. Treasury Secretary from 1955 to 1999, had stifled a bill
from his own Democratic administration which was to divide and
clearly distinguish commercial financial institutions from investment
banks. Citibank could then proceed legally at a juncture to combine
traditional commercial banking with massive speculation on Wall Street
and global financial markets. In reality, this firm was not only one “too
big to fail”, it was also a much too massive business to be sanely and
rationally managed. Its size made it ungovernable and uncontrollable. In
fact and from 2002, Citigroup was embroiled in all the financial scan-
dals, from Enron to Worldcom through insider trading and other con-
flicts of interest involving some of its managers or analysts… so much
so that it was also one of the financial institutions most affected by the
subprime crisis since it only survived at the price of capital injections of
hundreds of billions of dollars taken from the taxpayers of its country.
Strange derives from a megabank whose management and board of
directors were regularly adored by the press and their alter ego, since
considered one of the most brilliant management teams in the financial
world. Who could forget Chuck Prince, its arrogant chairman of the
board who, however, was dismissed in 2007 due to monumental losses
suffered by his establishment. Or the inevitable Robert Rubin, former
Treasury Secretary, appointed member of the board of directors and
executive director until shown the door in 2009, under pressure from
critics and the quasi-collapse of his bank? Prominent figures who,
interviewed by the committee of U.S. Congress charged with investigat-
ing the reasons for the subprime crisis, asserted, “like a great many
others”, not having “anticipated the unprecedented collapse of the
market” (according to Prince) despite structured products and systematic
securitizations of toxic assets held in commercial quantities for their
balance sheets. “C’est l’ensemble de la profession qui n’a pas perçu le
potentiel négatif de cette crise”, as Robert Rubin would say to this
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committee by completely ignoring his responsibilities vis-à-vis the
staggering failures of this once top bank in the world that he co-
managed. He, who was supposed to monitor risk management due to his
leading position as president of Goldman Sachs which he held before
becoming the U.S. Treasury Secretary…!
Goldman Sachs – iconic group among all –, which, in 206, distribut-
ed subprime shares to its clients while it anticipated the debacle of the
U.S. property market on which it speculated downward for its own
equity. Goldman had understood all too well since, far from leaving
itself open risk on one-directional bets like Lehman, Bear Stearns,
Merrill Lynch or Citigroup –, this institution played with velvet gloves
on and earned on both fronts. That of commissions on sales (for its
clients) of putrid assets while making off with the placing on markets
which gradually realized the excess in property valuations. Thus, while
almost all the Wall Street institutions persisted in ignoring the warning
signs of the subprime disaster, Goldman Sachs – inducted/crowned the
most profitable institution in U.S. financial history – created and distrib-
uted CDOs (collateralized debt obligations), financial derivatives linked
to real estate, to its main clients… while one of its most important
managers (Paulson & Co) was betting on the collapse of these assets,
and one of its executives (the Frenchman Fabrice Tourre) acknowledged
in February 2007 in an e-mail to a friend that “the business of CDO had
died”! Such are therefore the record profits recorded by the collapse of
the subprime and the success of Lloyd Blankfein, Chairman of Goldman
Sachs, who, having replaced Henry Paulson in 2006, himself called
nominated to be Treasury Secretary by Bush, earned in 2007 – the year
the U.S. property market collapsed – the largest bonus in the history of
U.S. finance, i.e. $70 million! According to Blankfein, interviewed by a
London newspaper, Golman performed more or less “God’s work”. In
other words and in the words of Fabrice Tourre in the January 2007 e-
mail: “The entire building is about to collapse at any moment now. Only
potential survivor, the fabulous Fab, standing in the middle of all these
complex transactions, highly leveraged, exotic, that it created without
necessarily understanding all the implications of those monstrosities!”
From the megalomaniac boss of Goldman Sachs entrusted with a
mission that he qualified as “divine” to the rest of the sprawling U.S.
financial system which continually relied on its contribution to the
enrichment of society, Wall Street had therefore definitely lost all sense
of reality. The disclosed figures were from the rest vastly out of step
with the daily life of the average citizen: $26 million for the Blanfein’s
apartment, $2 billion, the estimated value of the Goldman Sachs head-
quarters in Manhattan or even $550 million paid by this same institution
in settlement of its litigation with the SEC (Securities and Exchange
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Commission), the U.S. regulator. This number of zeros in a world where
virtual reigns sucked the life out of the real economy without bringing
the slightest added value to society in return. Who could curb or contain
a world of finance in spectacular expansion and whose contribution to
economic activity continued to gain in importance since roughly 150
years? Equivalent increases in salaries in the financial world, since they
were within a range of 60 to 70% above the salaries of the average
employee in the “real” economy. However, how did the dizzying growth
of the finance profit from the long-term productivity and prosperity of
the economy? Paul Volcker – always him – had wished that “some-
one would give (him) one shred of neutral evidence that financial inno-
vation has led to economic growth”.
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Who do the Rating Agencies Work for?
In an ideal world where markets and prices are supposed to reflect all
economic and financial data, countries that have lived beyond their
means – the “cicadas” – are punished for their excesses. Therefore,
markets hold themselves out as the grand moralizers depriving these
countries of their ability, yet sovereign, to finance rates compatible with
maintaining a stable economy. And for good reason: these markets or, as
it is fashionable to say in refined language, “the investors”
brew/brainstorm such amounts that a country, even large and important,
could not overcome their guardianship and free themselves from tyran-
ny. On the world scale, only a group of solid and determined nations
would even dictate the new rules of the game which would free them
from the yoke of this ogre (the market) whose only objective, whose
only justification and whose sole raison d’être were to earn always
more. Therefore, let us start with the postulate according to which
important economic and financial countries would join forces to impose
a new order. This alliance allowed them to regain their autonomy and
establish stable growth in their region, because not related to the vagar-
ies and whims of financial players. Two years of European crisis would
have been enough to teach a basic citizen, not necessarily benefiting
from economic training, how markets punish certain countries deemed
frivolous. They always demand more and more compensation, in ex-
change for funding that they grant to these countries whose insolvency
is ordered almost overnight. In this regard, rating agencies have happily
participated in this system, when they have not thrown oil on fire by
transforming the deficits of certain defenseless countries into psycho-
drama. However, it is not so much the debt of these nations than the
soaring interest which they must pay on this debt which precipitated the
debacle of these defenseless nations faced with sprawling markets. Let
us remember in this regard that Greece’s debt was more than 105.8% of
GDP in 2008 and that of a country such as Italy was 97.6% that same
year, figures not so far from the 90% level considered as unacceptable
by traditionalists (source: Eurostat). And let us compare these figures
with Greece and Italy’s deficits which amount to 165.35 and 120.1%,
respectively, at the end of 2011, due to punitive actions led by markets
and their stooge, the rating agencies. Vigorous growth would have
certainly been able to help decisively curb these deficits, but only how
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do you restore stable and calm growth while escalating interest rates is
pulling the entire economy down? What were the role and responsibili-
ties of these rating agencies in the debacle?
The world financial slump was set off following the U.S. property
crisis referred to as “subprime”, from 2007. This genuine rush toward
U.S. property was in reality and basically a purely financial phenome-
non, because mortgages before the Second World War were a rarely
known instrument. Our grandparents were actually accustomed to
paying cash for their property purchases, hence the small number of
property owners (as compared with today) until the 1950s. Indeed, it is
only the foundation for the U.S. (just before the Second World War) of
agencies whose mission was to buy mortgages held by the local banks
that the property sector gradually becoming more powerful until hitting
its high note in 2000 and its disintegrating in 2007. And for good reason,
since the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association – the
sadly famous “Fannie Mae” – allowed local and national financial
institutions to be flooded with liquidities from the sale of their mortgag-
es and in return offering other mortgages to prospective homebuyers…
This purely financial arrangement contributed to the obvious and deci-
sive expansion of the property market which made significant progress
since 62% of Americans had become homeowners in 1960, in compari-
son with a figure of hardly 40% in 1940. This substantial expansion of
this truly financial engineering exclusively dedicate to real estate was
understandably linked to a need to distinguish solvent debtors from
those who were more likely to default on debt repayments. Thus, the
U.S. authorities naturally turned toward the three agencies which were
active in rating bonds, namely, Moody’s, Standard and Poor and Fitch,
already known at the time for the prestigious AAA or their feared
BBB…
These rating agencies completely failed in their mission of rating
these mortgage securitizations, which were from the outset coated with a
favorable rating since backed because of the “stone”… This labeling
which was practically risk free thus gave financial institutions carte
blanche which gradually provided larger and larger sums to house
mortgages by causing the bubble that we know today. This transfer of
wealth and investments – U.S. and worldwide – into securities classified
as risk free was interrupted by mid-2006 from the moment when, house
prices reached dizzying heights, the market began to decline. Indeed,
soaring default payments on these mortgages forced investors, banks
and regulatory authorities to return to the reality of facts, that is to say to
realize that favorable ratings given to these securities by the all-powerful
agencies were in reality false… Hence the bubble burst and a financial
system which was stuffed with real estate securitizations. U.S. authori-
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ties, nonetheless, are also partially to blame since the U.S. regulator –
the Securities and Exchange Commission or the SEC – had ruled, first,
that banks did not have the right to purchase securities whose rating was
lower than BBB and, second, that the rankings assigned to these securi-
ties had to be the responsibility of competent rating agencies known for
this. In so doing, the SEC was duly promoting a true cartel which con-
tinues to serve today and which – even worse – is not obliged to disclose
its methodology for calculating scores! Having actually intelligently
pleaded its case by explaining to the authorities that its operational
techniques must remain confidential to remain effective, this pressure
group was thus able to navigate in murky waters with impunity where
the lack of transparency was guaranteed by the law. Furthermore, and
just like any cartel, which actively discourages any competition – that is
to say any newcomer likely to cut/limit market share –, this rating
mission proved to be the exclusive domain of a few companies already
in place without, as is the obvious consequence, any corrective mecha-
nism, questions asked or readjustment which could have been the result
of a new company with new methods. Finally, not satisfied with reign-
ing supreme in the world market, these agencies could also wallow at
will in the clear conflict of interest was to be paid… by firms whose
rates they ensured! How can the reliability and impartiality of points
awarded to companies naturally driven to adopt all sorts of charming
offensives to persuade these rating agencies of their financial health be
accepted? So, did the three rating agencies not maintain Enron’s rating
almost to the resounding bitter end in 2001 of what also turned out to be
one of the biggest stock market capitalizations in the U.S.? It is there-
fore the fiasco of these rating agencies was later to be the sources of the
subprime crisis the perverse effects of which we are all still suffering
today. However, these agencies – responsible for the second biggest
crisis in world economic and financial history – have since this tragi-
comedic episode paradoxically benefited from a rise in their power of
influence since their rating of sovereign states are still religiously ad-
hered to. If it is absolutely legitimate to be worried about the long-term
consequences of public deficits, it would also be useful to wonder why
any attention is still being paid to rating agencies. Initially created to
play arbitrator – therefore to prove impartiality and neutrality – between
the seller and the buyer of a security, these agencies have therefore
failed miserably in serving the public, while appropriating considerable





The monetary system defined by Bretton Woods, relying on the val-
ue of key currencies to the green back and correlating that to gold, was
abandoned in 1971-1972 by the U.S. which no longer had the means of
defending this parity. It was ruled that currencies would be floated
against one another, entirely subjected to the law of supply and demand,
in other words, to market forces. A first gaping hole was thus opened,
into which the then ardent supporters of the total freedom of financial
flows were engulfed. The substantial increase in oil tariffs in 1973
further allowed petrodollars to be reinvested through financing which
was launched in the invention of structured products allowing these
funds to be channeled profitably toward western countries in full force.
Very badly managed by central banks, the soaring oil prices infected the
whole economy step by step which was suffering since the mid-1970s
from unprecedented hyperinflation worldwide. Until President Carter
asked Paul Volcker in 1979 to head up the Federal Reserve to engage in
a historic and thankless fight against this hyperinflation. Certainly
successful, but not without plunging the U.S. – and the world – econo-
my into a recession in favor of interest rates having attained 20% in
1980! This hyperinflation and rising unemployment since the mid-1970s
were a bargain for the monetarists – promoters and ultra-promoters of
frenzied liberalism – whose leader and most iconic spokesperson was
Milton Friedman.
This deadly combination of unemployment and hyperinflation was
actually the ideal pretext for Friedman and his acolytes who squarely
blamed lax monetary policy and fiscal and budgetary indiscipline at the
time. According to them, the inflation was entirely due to the expansion
of money supply by central banks. However, they considered that the
supply of cash in circulation had produced another harmful effect, as
harmful as hyperinflation. Friedman actually accused the creation of
money for bloating the state and forcing, mechanically, the private
sector to reduce its investments. As they start from the principle that too
much state intervention kills private initiative, the monetarists therefore
exerted considerable pressure to make governments drastically restrict
their spending. The advent of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and
Ronald Reagan in the U.S. further provided these supporters of “ul-
traliberalism” with the perfect opportunity to implement their theory,
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which was gladly and diligently undertaken by the U.K. and U.S. gov-
ernments. The advent of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald
Reagan in the U.S. further provided these supporters of “ultraliberalism”
with the perfect opportunity to implement their theory, which was gladly
and diligently undertaken by the U.K. and U.S. governments. “Govern-
ment is not the solution to our problem. Government IS the problem”,
Ronald Reagan resolutely declared during his inauguration on January
20, 1981. From that period, economic conservatism and social regres-
sion were thus to reign supreme. How can we forget the devastating
effect (on the U.S. economy) of the Reagan years, which embarked on a
policy scrupulously used to reduce labor’s share in the national revenue
(from 21.5% in 1980 to 12% in 2005), in order to increase that of the
financial services’ (from 15% in 1980 to 22% in 2005)? The void left by
the state was very naturally filled by hyperbolic expansion of the finan-
cial sector said to be efficient, even “perfect”. This finance was actually
called on to provide all services to the economy with the result being the
birth of financial markets! This finance was actually called on to provide
all services to the economy with the result being the birth of financial
markets! Of course, these already existed before the mid-1970s but only
really caught on when a miraculous virtue discovered them, i.e. generat-
ing immense profit, therefore revenue and potentially jobs. The condi-
tions linked to this growth and prosperity meant that the players had to
assume a certain level of risk and the markets deregulated.
The all-knowingness/omniscience of the markets would optimally
explore available resources. Markets would act like a justice of the
peace who would restore order to business and household finances by
imprinting all sectors of the economy with its benevolent efficiency.
From that moment on, financial markets underwent a genuine transfig-
uration: they became “ideal” financial markets. The constant and de-
mocratized flow of information breathed efficiency into the markets in
the sense where their prices reflected at any given moment the state of
health of business, and therefore the economy. The admirers of the
financial market were even persuade that its prices were the result of
rational balance and that employment was in fact only a variable in the
optimization of stock market valuations. It is from this period that the
notion of the “disposable” worker or employee – which certainly goes
back to the end of the 19th Century – was formally acknowledged, and
publicly assumed by the leaders of this ideal market. And for good
reason: any superfluous consideration and any kind of mind/spirit/soul
searching should give way to markets which showed the price – and
therefore the financial situation – of all the players. Everything had and
must have a price, including man. As Eugène Fama said, born in 1939
and one of the founding fathers of this theory: “I take the market effi-
ciency hypothesis to be the simple statement that security prices fully
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reflect all available information”. “Simple” affirmation, accessible to all
and easy to integrate, hence the appearance, among other things, of jobs
where trading, selling and buying sufficed. This famous “efficiency”
was not, however, quantifiable and was not either a verifiable fact
through market research. All the same, this theory sparked general
enthusiasm when it concluded that the benefits and risks involved would
end up merged into one price for such asset at any given moment. What
is the information available to investors and how is it reflected in the
financial markets, are questions that Friedman, Fama and the others
seem not to have dug up. Their postulate was too tempting after all: it
implied that all economic agents behaved rationally and, particularly, it
defined a universal standard – pricing – from which everything could be
planned. It became possible to anticipate future fluctuations and the door
opened to complex financial products which would be designed accord-
ing to all possible and imaginable variations of pricing. But in particular
(and this is what interests us from the point of view of the financial
crisis which commenced in 2007), this model would identify and define
all risks, even control them and curb them with instruments such as
options. This all-powerful heady sentiment – according to which noth-
ing very bad could happen and that, definitively, all risk-taking would
be compensated – was global and was to prevail even with central
bankers, the ultimate guardians of the temple… Nothing seemed likely
to get in the way of infinite growth and uninterrupted appreciation of
financial markets. Finally, the only risk was not daring to take risks!
In fact, let us remind ourselves of this period not so long gone where
almost all the analysts, investors and traders fussed about “reducing
risks to the global economy”, in defiance of Cassandras who showed
mistrust and who recommended prudence vis-à-vis general market,
financial and economic euphoria. This overwhelming majority claimed
therefore that world imbalances were only the natural result of indulgent
globalization. Only a minority – reduced to silence – fearing that the
U.S., which was already experiencing difficulty in attracting sufficient
capital to pay their deficits during this blessed period, found itself in an
inextricable situation during this slowdown and perhaps might have
been reduced to sell whole sectors of their economy to survive! The
theorists of globalization debated to ass whether this widespread decline
in macro-economic volatility was adequately reflected in stock markets.
Actually, in a situation where the previous bubble of technological
securities had been rapidly overcome, where the catastrophe of astro-
nomical U.S. deficits predicted several times by the bad omens had
never materialized and where ever increasing oil prices could not have
interfered with the U.S. economy, the stock markets seemed still and
always under-valued… What risk could there possibly be to borrow
more to make capital more and more profitable? The use of leverage
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was widespread, thus affecting the overall investment climate since the
smallest investor was from now being financed in currencies at law
interest rate (as the Japanese Yen of the Swiss Franc) to invest several
times the amount borrowed in instruments with high returns. What is
more natural than controlled volatility? Leaving cash sitting in an ac-
count meant at that time sacrilege: has financial history not been sys-
tematically written by and for winners?
The deregulation of our economies and money obviously comes di-
rectly from this assumption of the efficient market. No longer any need
for regulation or safeguards if the market is efficient, therefore optimal.
Useless to restrain an animal which is self-regulated by pricing, which
eliminates the weakest – those who made bad decisions – and which
makes the strongest win. Therefore, it is a genuine natural selection on
which omniscient and infallible financial markets function. As self-
regulation unfurls its beneficial effects on to the economy, the task of
the state was therefore to be reduced to its simplest expression, as for
example to try this and that to lower the “natural” level of unemploy-
ment. As such, the state was asked to withdraw its economic and finan-
cial regulatory authorities and only to punish the extreme cases. There-
fore, it is Friedman and his consorts to whom we owe the succession of
financial crises and earthquakes, since the 1987 stock market crash in
1987 to the 2007 subprime crisis by way of the Dot Com Tech Burst in
2000. Indeed it was impossible – even against nature – to have so-called
regulations co-exist with efficient markets. In this best of worlds, em-
bezzlement and fraud were impossible Indeed, as the markets could not
be efficient in the face of fraud, dishonest acts could no longer exist
since the markets were precisely efficient. In this best of worlds, embez-
zlement and fraud were impossible. Indeed, as the markets could not be
efficient in the face of fraud, dishonest acts could no longer exist since
the markets were precisely efficient. This spurious circular argument
was widespread among all the stakeholders, which is to say, among
bankers and economists, of course, but also well entrenched with regula-
tors and central bankers. The all-powerful president of the U.S. Federal
Reserve for almost twenty years, Alan Greenspan thus declined to
investigate presumed embezzlements regarding derivatives, or notorious
abuses of mortgage loans on which colleagues or consumer defenders
asked him to conduct. He sought refuge behind the dogma of efficient
markets which could not, in all “logic”, tolerate suspicious behavior.
U.S. justice itself is today exasperated with the attitude of financers.
“The perception is that no one takes white collar crime seriously” is one
of the symptoms of this annoyance, declared U.S. federal judge Emmet
Sullivan in the summer of 2012. Indeed, he deplored that senior banking
executives on trial “come to trial, plead guilty and are sent home to
watch their favorite programs”… He is not the only judge at this level to
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make this bitter finding. We may remember another federal judge, Jed
Rakoff, who in November 2011 had rejected a settlement of $285
million reached between Citigroup – accused of selling its clients deriv-
atives and “toxic” mortgages – and the U.S. regulator, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). By demanding that a proper trial be held,
Rakoff refused such a “deal” on the run and away from courtrooms. Is it
not, however the SEC itself which made this decision, keen – it would
seem – to protect the top U.S. bank? These secret agreements and other
“guilty pleas” in high finance perhaps give the illusion that justice is
served. They are only carte blanche granted to a world which remains
persuaded that everything can be bought. Conviction which, of the rest,




The Respect of Uncertainty
The fact remains that the economic recovery during the second half
of the 1980s allowed monetarists and uber followers of liberalism to
scream triumphantly of their theories by putting more pressure on the
governments of the day, which let themselves very easily be convinced
to free capital from the suffocating grip of the state. Friedman was quick
to conclude that episodes of hyperinflation and high unemployment
which prevailed in the 1970s were entirely to be blamed on the failure of
state governance which therefore had to give way to markets. Only
markets could, according to him, breathe stability into an economy
which was affected by misplaced government decisions. Always avant-
gardes, the U.S. and Great Britain championed financial deregulation
and the retreat of state influence, supposed keys to a prosperity which it
imposed everywhere. The zenith was reached under President Clinton,
who even went on to declare in his 1995 State of the Union Address that
“the era of big government is finished”! Since then, the all-powerful
U.S. showed itself to be dominated by its financial markets. It goes
without saying that the loss of state influence was accompanied by a
necessary decrease in its spheres of activity, and therefore public budg-
ets which had to be substantially revised downward. Such was the
requirement of a finance sector which demanded sobriety and discipline
from states while it feasted under the weight of mass profit generated
with the hyperbolic expansion of “financial engineering”. The European
Union caught up with this bandwagon since the beginning of the 1990s
with the Maastricht Treaty, which dictated to its members to maintain
their budgetary deficits under 3% of their DGP and their public debt
below 60%. Similarly for the former Iron Curtain countries to which one
was to teach the virtues of the new financial orthodoxy whose admitted
objective was to establish a single neo-liberal model worldwide. To
reign, globalization had to standardize everything in its path. The new
priority was to implant liberally accessible markets everywhere, subject
to state intervention severely restricted to the definition of their interest
rates whose single objective was to control inflation. In fact, the role of
the central banker would be summed as increasing rates if inflation
exceeded the threshold of tolerance and vice versa. There is no mention
of fighting unemployment, improving working conditions or eradicating
poverty. On the contrary, this period was one of spectacular regression
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of the social state from which the means of its solidarity were removed.
It is true that its ultraliberal restructuring yielded revenue by way of
privatizations.
It was impossible in such blur to control cross-border or cross-
continental capital flow which no one wanted to harness or even assess.
Liberalism had therefore enshrined globalization characterized by the
free reign of financial markets – that is to say pricing – since everything
was then given a value. Tsunamis of investments and liquidities thus
flooded economies – even the most reclusive in the world – so much so
that expansion, modernization and even the most basic needs of certain
countries were assured by private capital, nothing altruistic since it was
their profit in sight. It is globalization that China, Latin America – in
short, those that are referred to by the generic name BRICS and which
could include all emerging countries – owe the growth of their exports
and their financial surpluses and reserves. Everywhere where globaliza-
tion passed, nonetheless it required healthy public accounts, a condition
sine qua non to its investment and its provision of funding, even if none
of its experts wanted to explain why and in what it was economically
required to maintain its public finances balanced at all times. Indeed it
has been more than thirty-five years that states have been required to
curb their public deficits for no other reason than the economists and
experts recommend it, even if they cannot explain these requirements!
Still, to abdicate the essential of their financial powers in favor of a
sprawling and sophisticated corporation, our states, unfortunately, no
longer have the same powers over the economy. Deregulation, globali-
zation and financiarization have not always so far – and despite five
years of crisis – surrendered, knowing that the context can be found now
weakened to breaking point by the absolutely huge imbalances between
a small group of exporting countries and a massive group of importers-
consumers-debtors… Globalization – created in the West – has therefore
devoured its parents since it is practiced – and prospers – on the bed of
massive deficits in the U.S. and Europe (except of course in Germany).
This regression of the state characterized by abandoning the disenfran-
chised classes only made the inequalities wider. The tiny wealthy minor-
ity enriched itself more while exploiting the middle class along the way
– those dependent on only their salary – and who suffered stagnation or
a decrease in their real income. Therefore, what is the intangible eco-
nomic law that dictates unequivocally that a state must spend less than
3% of its GDP and that its debts must always be under 60% of its GDP?
This dogma of 3%, which now dictates European economic choices, is,
however, only a fanciful invention of Guy Abeille, a French official in
the Ministry of Budget. Which today recognizes that “3% (were) invent-
ed an hour one evening in June 1981, on a table corner, and not based on
any economic theory”. For its inventor, this “round” figure also made
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you think about the “Trinity”. In this same vein, the ESM (European
Stability Mechanism) explicitly states that the states will have to be
financed only by the financial markets and thus be exposed more to
speculation and financial risks. This mechanism represents an extra gear
to austerity with the consequence of relinquishing the democratic con-
trol of the European Parliament or national states. The unstated goal is
to dismantle the welfare states and conduct internal devaluations which
substitute usefully currency devaluations. Whereas, in reality, only
economic activity, growth and salaries count, and it does not matter –
not at all – that money comes from public funds or private investments.
The liquefaction of fall 2008 is therefore the poison gift of financial
innovation. By making markets more liquid in favor of volumes increas-
ingly more pharaonically traded, globalization led to financialization
and securitization having attracted more and more institutions, business-
es and the private sector which invested without relying on financial
markets. As almost all these liquidities in circulation were invested and
less and less money remained uninvested, markets become more volatile
in favor of stakeholders who bought and sold very frequently. The so-
called “real” economy – narrowly dependent on markets – was naturally
affected – and infected – by their inherent stability through the driving
belts of scholarships and bank loans. Even more serious for economic
activity which was gradually considered as an “investment” exactly like
another, which ended up upsetting traditional economic cycles. This
radical shift in the economic paradigm generated by massive cash flows
– ready to be invested but also all the more ready to be divested – was
obviously transformed by the fall into disuse of whole sectors of the
economy or investment was only profitable in the long-term (as the
industrial sector) and the emergence of sectors of economic activity
(finance and speculation) where the returns on investments were real-
ized in the short-term. Under the complacent watch of central banks
which, loyal to their adherence to monetarist theories, consecrated a
reference instrument – interest rate – as the supreme regulator of the
markets and the economy. In fact, deregulation had left them with only
this leverage which they used, nonetheless, in all directions – and
downward – with the one and only objective being to fight inflation, the
sworn enemy of Friedman & Co. The manipulation of leveraging inter-
est rates therefore conditioned investments directed to the real economy.
In fact, deregulation had left them with only this leverage which they
used, nonetheless, in all directions – and downward – with the one and
only objective being to fight inflation, the sworn enemy of Friedman &
Co. The manipulation of leveraging interest rates therefore conditioned
investments directed to the real economy. Indeed, when interest rates
were low, it was worth taking on some exposure to invest in the econo-
my, but these funds were quickly extracted when compensation offered
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by interest rates proved juicier. Certainly, we know since Keynes that
the volume of investments in the economy is a function of the interest
rate in effect. Central banks have played it nevertheless so – under the
guise of fighting dynamically against inflation – that permanent instabil-
ity reigned among the economic players. During the only decade from
2001 to 2010, the U.S. Federal Reserve thus reduced its rates from 6%
in January 2001 to 1% in June 2003 to raise them to 5.25% in June 2006
and bring them down to absolutely zero since December 2008!
In acting in this way, central banks only gave investors reason a pos-
teriori to favor a very short-term horizon. By raising or lowering their
rates substantially in so little time and by displaying an extreme reactivi-
ty to any inflationary threat, they donned the clothes of speculators who
were recognized in them. And have somehow endorsed their actions.
How can businesses keep employees under such conditions marked by a
volatility in the capital flows available to them when it is impossible to
plan calmly in the medium- and long-term? It is therefore uncertainty
which undermines the workplace and which makes it hesitant to do any
large scale hiring because it cannot permanently rely on the capital
available to it. That is why, if the theory of self-regulating markets is
good for investors, it is, on the other hand, a curse for unstable econo-
mies and for employees who live on tender hooks in fear of losing their
jobs at any given moment. Of the rest, if markets really had the ability to
self-regulate, the effects could have only been beneficial to the real
economy which would have been smoothened by markets always at
their best. Unfortunately for financial markets – and particularly for our
economies – uncertainty causes financial crisis. The slowdown of
investments in favor of the economy and market volatility is effectively
incompatible with a weak forecast of the future, such as defended by the
monetarists.
In other words, this uncertainty which is impossible to control or
quantify imposes on those whose job is to take risks surrounded by all
precautions and all preventions so as to not be swallowed up in the
whirlpool of inherent volatility comprising the full range of investments,
from personal loans to derivatives. As it is obviously impossible to
predict future crises, good governance likely to be dictated by the regu-
lator must naturally tend toward transparency, exhaustive evaluation and
strict monitoring of risk. However, how do you convince the supporters
of the efficient market that risks are not always reflected in the price?
And that operators only have access to fragmented and incomplete
pieces of information on which they base their decision-making? And
that external shocks regularly affect market price? In reality, only the
advent of crises inflicts such lessons on investors and speculator while
making a good number disappear in passing. That we did not listen to
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Keynes – who more than half a century ago – indicated that “our
knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain”! How do
we defend the monetarist argument according to which it is easy to
make “rational” predictions concerning changing markets when the
scientists themselves would like to predict a volcanic eruption or an
earthquake? Nassim Taleb does not tell us anything new with his judi-
cious allegory of the black swan. Markets are not right, they are not
transcendent and history tells us that it is littered with failures, losses,
erratic movements, with all the side effects that we know about in our
daily lives. How can theories about perfect and omniscient markets
claim, as they do, to have a constructive impact on the economy if they
exclude all reliable prediction? Keynes had had this famous saying:
“there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know”. It is his famous “we simply do not
know”, a real call to be more modest than aficionados – to the admirers,
should we say – of the divinity of “markets”.
Let us compare these sayings with the certainties of an economist
like Burton Malkiel, born in 1932 and educated at Princeton and Har-
vard, who assures that “True value (of the markets) will win in the end”
since the stock market is, always according to him, a “long run weighing
mechanism”. Let us therefore be comforted since stock market valua-
tions are expected to achieve a balance even allow our businesses to
generate profits. And too bad if we have to experience strong turbulent
periods: in any event it is what is implicitly admitted in this “long-term”,
indicating the hollow existence of short-term ups and downs which
would severely affect the real economy, which is asked to bear its
troubles patiently until markets arrive at ultimate wisdom. Keynes was
ironically saying that: “on the long run, we will be all dead”… Must we
thus be resigned to support and suffer training and especially the col-
lapse of these bubbles that generate crises, financial desolation and
panic while waiting for some kind of messianic balance of markets?
Since, according to economists like Malkiel, crashes would only be
setbacks which gradually forge this final stage of balance. Except for
these episodes, indeed regrettable but also necessary like childhood
diseases such as measles or mumps, information available to agents –
complete and correct – would allow them to make adequate decisions at
any time for market harmony and the proper functioning of the econo-
my. In doing so, these theorists of “rational decisions” characterizing the
life of markets miss the fundamental psychological component which
affects any investment process, such as trust and reliability that stake-
holders consider when making their decisions. Trust being a highly






Investors have complete confidence in their decisions and in markets
when the boom of real estate and stock assessments continues. Appre-
hension even from risk is clearly modified. Operators multiply actually
speculative investments, even quite frankly dubious, since their level of
optimism is pumped up and their suspicion anesthetized by euphoria.
They even begin to buy securities and carry out all types of investments
thanks to contracted borrowing which logically lead to an acceleration
and intensification of the “boom”. It is the blessed era of profit for the
entire chain of stakeholders. And with good reason, since the markets
are only practically appreciating, knowing that any slide is considered a
“correction” from which one should benefit by charging higher prices.
However, the pinnacle is only attained when certain stakeholders buy
conscientiously very risky assets – putrid – by focusing on the fact that
the virtuous action of markets will assist in “normalizing” them, that is
to say transforming them into so-called assets, while allowing them to
cash in in the meantime a handsome added-value. In short, optimism
and confidence reign supreme, so much so that investors, even the most
reluctant and the least the least likely for losses, end up having their
cake and eating it. Cash starts to flow freely, cash increases endogenous-
ly/internally since each purchased asset is resold with a profit: it is the
characteristic of a bubble. This period is further marked by relatively
low interest rates and by easy credit, fueling exactly all this reckless
risk-taking. This almost uninterrupted soaring valuations and markets
lead to a feeling of intoxicating wealth among the stakeholders since
their portfolios and accounts reflect potentially very substantial profits.
Hence there tolerance to increasingly heightened risk, itself comforted
by an almost invulnerable feeling afforded by sham profits. Was it not
Minsky who was the first to elaborate a theory according to which stable
markets and economic and financial conditions would the source itself
of instability! Exactly as described, speculators and investors in the
financial markets indeed take much more risks that the context in which
their bets are made is calm. In other words, the collapse of the macroe-
conomic volatility encourages risk-taking, knowing that the fall will be
harder! Excessive ambient widespread deregulation and laxity like
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relaxation exert adverse effects in an environment where the protections
and guardrails fall one after the other and while bubbles form and
speculation grows. Hence Minsky’s famous understandable conclusion
that stability is itself generating instability. Even worse because more
the numbing context of stability will have lasted longer and more violent
the subsequent stall will be. Dilemma – or headache – for economic and
financial leaders as for central banks because these repetitive sequences
of “boom and bust”, ie bubbles and collapse of these bubbles, greatly
affect the economic fundamentals. This is what Minsky called the
smoothing action of the state which, through its budget deficits, is able
to neutralize these upheavals by compensating for the interruption of
private investment. This is actually a fundamental psychological com-
ponent. Operators and stakeholders are pumped up by instilled confi-
dence in favor of stable and flourishing conditions which, together with
their lure for profit, always lead ultimately to a crisis situation and
erratic volatility. Safety measures implemented yesterday and today in a
nuclear station and having avoided until now a catastrophe are not
absolute guarantees against an accident tomorrow… it must be
acknowledged that a boom or a bubble is in reality a spiral which feeds
itself: like a tornado sucking up everything in its way since comprised of
loans taken out and granted with the single objective being speculation,
a drastic increase in leveraging, inexistent risk management, a virtual
increase in purchasing power and euphoric stock market appreciations
for all stakeholders, including financial establishments which lend
amounts intended to inflate the bubble further…
The interconnection between financial markets and the real economy
has become such that economic activity, investment, growth, consump-
tion and hiring improve and advance when optimism reigns in the stock
markets. The dependence of the economy on finance makes it benefit
from cash flow and constantly increasing profit margins when stock
market valuations are on the upward trend. It is easy: this boom seems
to start a new era which is, nevertheless, only a headlong rush, since the
economy must be “financially fragile” to borrow from Minsky. Howev-
er, a tiny pebble can – at a fateful moment – seize up the machine.
Indeed, a wave of cash shortage appears due to a spontaneous freeze on
credit or profits which become more complicated to rake in. Suddenly,
investment is increasingly scarce, income falls, corporate profits are
feeling the pinch, stock markets drop, and agents punctuating the whole
food chain suddenly discover that their predictions were too optimis-
tic… and therefore their positions were too high risk. As stock market
valuations had been aligned with levels completed disconnected from
the reality of economic data and the health of corporations, forecasts are
reviewed downward and stock market adjustments begin to occur. Thus
banks stop lending out of fear of default on payments at any time where
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interest rates rise and an inverse spiral starts to feed itself with forced
liquidation of their positions on behalf of those who speculated with
credit. Thus, sales accelerate while under pressure from those who can
no longer hold for having abused important leverage and markets col-
lapse altogether under the weight of good securities which were them-
selves also “balanced” by those which now cannot be liquidated. The
credit crush is thus implemented since banks no longer lend at all, not
even to one another.
Financial crises and, even more serious, economic instability, are
owed entirely to the Friedman school of thought, which concocted a
theory on totally absurd assumptions. In view of regulatory agencies
having done even less homework almost all the economists welcomed
enthusiastically this theory of perfect markets. This notion of risk,
presumably always quantifiable and therefore possible to identify,
replaced the uncertainty cherished by Keynes. Suddenly, financial
institutions could take more risks, with the approval of their regulatory
authorities. Gradually, the system became so complex, financialization
so sophisticate, banks so entangled, never ending sprawling institutions
and regulators so overwhelmed by the events that it became completely
impossible at the dawn of the 2000s to assess – even if only briefly – the
overall risk incurred. In fact, certain financial products had reached such
a degree of complexity (such as collateralized debt obligations or mort-
gage-backed securities, respectively insurance against default payments
of a debtor or a real estate securitization) that it was outright impossible
to deal with them – therefore to buy and sell them – on a regulated
market. As the process consisting of attributing a price to them was
incredibly opaque, these products were negotiated between a buyer and
a seller at a mutually agreeable fixed price. This negotiation, called
“over the counter”, benefited from a steep rise since its volume leapt
from a total of $157 billion in 2004 to half a trillion dollars in 2006 and
2007, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Asso-
ciation! It goes without saying that the total lack of transparency was
good news for banks which could freely multiply their profits thanks to
dealing in OTC (over the counter) products and therefore outside regula-
tory control, even limiting, profit margins. So finance pushed logic so
far from efficient and optimal markets that It even saw fit to do without
it… Whatever the situation, the temptation was strong among bankers to
concoct highly complex products – always more complex – with the
single objective of avoiding all control from obsolete and benign author-
ities. A Financial Times article in September 2010 quoted a U.S. gov-
ernment authority who had disclosed that only two “over the counter”




Acknowledging the shameful and inadmissible fact that the main
regulatory agencies lacked the technical and intellectual ability to
comprehend the inherent risks of the portfolios of the largest banks, the
Bank for International Settlements suggested in 1998 that they delegate
these responsibilities… to banks themselves, more capable, according to
the BIS, of managing their own exposure! Banks were therefore author-
ized to evaluate and reevaluate independently their risks, which in other
words meant leaving them to determine themselves their own capital
quotas which must counterbalance these exposures. Unsurprisingly, they
conducted logically an assessment a minimizing of their risks – what is
more – by using very recent historical data with the objective of predict-
ing future performance. How can we not be shocked by such a lack of
lucidity – and honesty – from these banks which calculated their risk
based on statistics often dating less than a year knowing that, further-
more, the last analyzed period was that of regular appreciation of the
markets? No adverse or negative weighting was effectively introduced
in their risk management since banks were not concerned with taking
into consideration troubling episodes in the life of markets… This
technique of evaluating banking risks was therefore based on the princi-
ple that the risk of default was confined at all times, that volatility would
remain relatively low, that interest rates would be favorable… in short,
that the term “crisis” had simply disappeared from the vocabulary. All
was therefore for the best in the best of worlds for these financial estab-
lishments which delivered their very lucrative “business as usual” under
the lax watch of the regulator. The temptation was therefore immense to
step up the leveraging used and to commit to all types of loans in favor
of all debtors in all sectors. After all, the models backed by general
management identified the maximum risk incurred and, furthermore, the
bonuses were there to encourage profits.
Economic science therefore required absolute surrender of prudence,
weighting and decency – in short, morality – as the price for ensuring
economic growth. The multiplication of productivity and growth and
rise in purchasing power could not actually be deployed without a
decline in traditional morality. The “Love one another” and the “no
coercion in religion” have been abandoned in favor of the golden goose
which is finance and to the cult of stock markets. Ancient religions were
replaced by the efficiencies of the market whose dogma teaches that
everything has a fair price. The invasion of this finance, which gradually
came to occupy public and private spaces, turned us into zombies.
Because we are only concerned, even obsessed, with arbitration – and
the verdict – of the markets. Since financial innovation, derivatives and
securitizations shot and killed prudential rules, by enshrining the advent
and domination of securities. Ancestral morality effectively ceased to
reign when risk disappeared. To commit a mortal sin once ran the risk of
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rushing into hell. Today, all risk is likely to be controlled, “hedged”:
mathematics taught us to manage risk which reduces the degree of







The essence of the capitalist engine is uncertainty which translates
into success for some, economic disappearance for others and more or
less violent crises. It is therefore absolutely unthinkable to adhere to
theories of perfect markets where information is efficient. The myth of
self-regulation, which had once marginalized the state, was destroyed by
the crisis which began in 2007 and has just been buried by European
setbacks. Instability is the very heart of the world of finance: we suffer
the brunt of it since 2007 and had been successively warned by Marx,
Keynes and Minsky. Let us therefore return to reality and integrate
uncertainty within our economic decision-making process and financial
investment. Let us once again become modest and realistic and reduce
our claims. Since the immense work and accomplishment of Keynes can
be summed up in a single word – doubt –, as the monetarists and neolib-
erals are likened to their certainties which stick to them like glue. That it
is healthy to have doubts! Doubt is the key underlying idea on which
Keynes based all his theories. Doubt also leads to managing its risks or
accepting measured losses, as it restrains the disproportionate bait of
gain. The key doubt to all the most essential questions, and it is a sur-
vival instinct as a lesson in modesty, in both economic life and from the
point of view of morality and intellectual honesty. Let us therefore learn
again to respect and fear uncertainty which is an integral part of our
daily lives. It is only having started arrogantly from his doubts that man
multiplied acts with serious consequences.
Experts in economic science must therefore profoundly question
their certainties again in light of today’s collapse since they are woefully
misguided. One thing is for certain: it is essential, in these almost un-
precedented turbulent times to return simplicity to economics, since the
resolution to the crisis lies in basic, even elementary, remedies. Just as,
in the reverse, it is the sophistication of financial instruments and neo-
conservative fallacious reasoning which deliberately made the situation
worse. Macro-economic considerations (employment, income and
production, the role of the state) must therefore take precedence over
micro-economic data where actors are decked out with the “rational”
qualifier and where the market is likely to calmly balance supply and
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demand by using key straightforward mathematical models. During
periods of financial and economic crises and in the face of such imbal-
ances, microeconomics – which cannot stabilize activity – must cede to
the forces of macroeconomics What, of the rest, must even be admitted
by a monetarist of the caliber of Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and
Nobel Economics Laureate in 1974), who himself recognized in 1966
“the domination of macroeconomics and the temporary decline of
microeconomics”. During periods of financial and economic crises and
in the face of such imbalances, microeconomics – which cannot stabilize
activity – must cede to the forces of macroeconomics What, of the rest,
must even be admitted by a monetarist of the caliber of Friedrich Hayek
(1899-1992) and Nobel Economics Laureate in 1974), who himself
recognized in 1966 “the domination of macroeconomics and the tempo-
rary decline of microeconomics”. Or by Friedman in person who, in a
letter to Time Magazine in February 1966, resignedly asserted: “In one
sense we are all Keynesians now; in another, nobody any longer is
a Keynesian…”, meaning by that that, if Keynesian theories face a wall
when they should integrate microeconomic factors, they are systemati-
cally called to the rescue in times of crisis. It is within this same optic
that Friedman was to declare in 1997 about the Japanese crisis: “The
Bank of Japan can buy government bonds on the open market, paying
for them with either currency or deposits at the Bank of Japan, what
economists call high-powered money. There is no limit to the extent to
which the Bank of Japan can increase the money supply if it wishes to
do so. Higher monetary growth will have the same effect as always.
After a year or so, the economy will expand more rapidly; output will
grow, and after another delay, inflation will increase moderately. A
return to the conditions of the late 1980s would rejuvenate Japan and
help shore up the rest of Asia”. Today, Friedman’s prescriptions for
remedying Europe’s woes would be identical, if he were still alive…
Still, Keynesian theories and their enthusiasts were sent to their labora-
tories in favor of the good times of the previous decades for not being
able to integrate the dogma of the perfect market and for doubting the
rationality of economic agents. In doing so, the “neo-cons” strived to
make the state obsolete. However, salvation could only be assured today
by the intervention of this same state. While it had been ironically asked
not to inhibit self-correcting market forces, it is finally realized that only
its action can rebalance the macroeconomic indices during recession.
Since it is macroeconomics which teaches us the fundamental opera-
tion of debt in rebooting economic activity. In other words, it is macroe-
conomics itself which shows that the effects of public spending, invest-
ment by the state and tax reductions are more dramatic episodes where
consumption and producing are on the decline. It is also during times of
crisis that the increase in public spending is the least harmful effect on
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deficits. Despite virulent criticisms from orthodox economists who
ridicule Keynesian principles while accusing them of favoring lax
behaviors, even irresponsible, it is now evident that the solution to the
crisis will be by intervention on the part of the state, a precondition to
restoring investment. Keynesianism is not about spending, recklessness
or some kind of encouragement of “grasshopper” behavior. In this
regard, the neoclassical safeguards vis-à-vis the worsening of public
deficits are outdated to totally silence the automatic – mechanical –
reductions in these deficits upon the return of growth and confidence.
Restoring healthy and robust growth must be the number one priority
knowing that creditors themselves – who never required that austerity be
implemented – are certainly aware that drastic reductions in public
spending will notoriously diminish their changes of being repaid. How
do you deny the proof that a nation’s wealth is the immediate result of
what is produced by its citizens?
Moreover, contrary to microeconomic certainties and claims, the ac-
tivity of the players in our economy are not guided by rationality or by a
wise person and a generous quest for balance, but simply by intuition,
instinct and greed, when it is not by a sense of panic… All this being
said, confidence – which is very far from finding its source or its expla-
nation in rationality – is naturally the cornerstone of this building: its
presence allows for progress as well as growth, whereas its absence
leaves the door open to all contractions. As they are the psychological
and behavioral factors which condition particularly economic activity,
only the soothing, regulating and stabilizing action of the state is likely
to restore balance – and equity – during turbulent times. It is from this
angle, les idyllic but oh so much more prosaic and realistic, that the
economy and investment must be analyzed which, far from responding
to noble aspirations, are the manifestations of our most intimate, yet
sometimes most vile, instincts, appetites, anxieties and obsessions.
Therefore, “Homo economicus” falls from its pedestal: it is its greedi-
ness and lack of scruples which are self-destructive. Debt itself is like a
type of hot potato that everyone tries to pass around in a “game of
musical chairs before the music stops” says Keynes. But, how do we
explain the “irrational exuberance” of markets (the famous expression of
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 1987 to
2006) or how do we understand, in contrast, stock market crashes? The
return of the state will prevail when we admit that our control over the
economy is at a minimum imperfect and limited by our own intellectual
and mental abilities. Since, to borrow again from Keynes, economy “is
one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present
by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future”.
Keynes, who never stopped reminding us that it was impossible to
predict the future or even our future behavior, wished “economists could
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manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a
level with dentists”, adding “that would be splendid”…
Only typical Keynesian measures will save us now. Only govern-
ment stimulus conducive to encouraging investment and job creation
can actually save the economy, in the absence of private initiative and as
part of an anemic demand. And only the determined action of central
banks in the sense of compressing financing costs motivates companies
to invest in the real economy, as long as the banking intermediation
system plays its role. The objective is the famous “euthanasia of annui-
tants” that promotes the channeling of savings into investment and
therefore into employment. As many emergency measures recommend-
ed even by the high priests of monetarism, Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwarz. And even greedily applied in 2001 by the then President of the
Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, and of course by his successor Ben
Bernanke – yet a faithful follower of Friedman – from the intensification
of the crisis in fall 2008. Taking advantage of its multiple quantitative
rate cuts, did he not cause hatred and harsh criticism from the neo-
liberals, who prefer clearly high unemployment to inflationary threats
that challenge their wealth? The Republican candidate in the last U.S.
presidential election, Mitt Romney, did not he hastened to demand the
head of Bernanke? Besides, staying with the Republicans and with the
right-wing people persuaded that tax cuts are a neo-conservative find…
and who seem to ignore that it is Keynes who had first suggested reduc-
ing individual and corporate taxes as a way of boosting a faltering
economy. While the great exponent of the Austrian School, Friedrich
Hayek, was strictly against tax cuts so long as the state does not also
reduce its lifestyle. Yet, is it not precisely the opposite course that was
chosen by the most worthy descendant of the “neo-con” movement –
that President George W. Bush – who, when he became president,
adhered to tax cuts (especially for the more affluent), accompanied by
an unprecedented surge in spending U.S. federal spending? Indeed,
Keynes departed from the principle that large tax reductions should
target the middle class, who would thus be encouraged to spend more,
since it spends almost all its income, whereas the wealthy have a ten-
dency to save. In the same vein, it is government that must take over
when the private sector is no longer able to stimulate the economy. And
why would it not be the “spender” of last resort in the exact same way as
it is the lender of last resort? Indeed, aren’t the U.S. Democrats, like the
U.S. Republicans, unanimous in demanding that the government cut its
spending drastically in order to avoid falling off the fiscal cliff? Isn’t the
very choice of this expression not likely to incur anxiety among a popu-
lation – not necessarily aware of the technical debate – who is led to
believe that the cataclysm is imminent? And that the only answer is
sacrifice – more and more sacrifices – while the financial elite feasts and
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the 1% become wealthier… The fact is that integrating the proposals
discussed above – healthy state intervention against a backdrop of a
devastated economy, maintaining low interest rates, tax cuts – are void
and have no effect if the state decides to drastically reduce its lifestyle.
Keynes taught us already: debts must be repaid only when the economy
recovers. Otherwise: growth will be stifled in an environment where
activity is very fragile. Tax increases, debt repayment and reduction in
public spending can only be achieved without risk in a healthy econo-
my. Knowing that, contrary to myth – or horror story – we the happy
orthodox economists and “neo-cons” politicians, it is perfectly possible
to arrive at a healthy economy despite, and in the presence of, a large
public debt. Thus the true fiscal cliff would put into place today in the
U.S. austerity measures comparable to the rigorously imposed dementia
in Europe. It is not possible – or honest – to be guided in half measure




Financial Repression and Regulation
It has now been about five years that orthodoxy has been paralyzing
all economic recovery and political correctness paralyzing the central
banks. High unemployment – which will only worsen in 2013 in a
country like France – changes nothing here. The obsession with deficits
and anxiety about punitive markets unite the best of adversaries – the
right and the left – in the same battle against the common enemy,
though imaginary, namely inflation! Nothing should be done to stoke
inflation, and everything must be sacrificed in terms of austerity. For it
is said that we will one day be rewarded in return: in this life, or more
likely in another life… A major nation – Japan – however just found the
guts to break the touching consensus. In deciding to approach the prob-
lem from the right point while finally identifying its real priorities. It is
indeed long before the Western world went dark, in 2007, that the dress
rehearsal of our economic crisis wreaked havoc in this country. Howev-
er late and timid were the reactions and actions of governments which
followed since the implosion – in the early 1990s – of its real estate and
stock markets. Constrained by the neo-liberal dogma that sees deficits
equal to the Antichrist, the Japanese leaders systematically committed
the childish mistake of reducing public spending before the current
economic recovery was strong enough. To make room for a chronic
deflationary regime to reign supreme in the late 1990s. A man – Shinzo
Abe – who was just elected Prime Minister of that country by a sweep-
ing majority nevertheless just decided to implement an “audacious
monetary policy, a flexible fiscal policy and a strategy to encourage
private investment”, in the words of his statement after his election
victory. The sequence of this unconventional man’s arrival to power, as
a radical change in approach to remedy this endemic evil, inflation,
should not, however, leave anything to chance. Indeed, for the first time
since 1980, this country is carrying clearing a trade deficit! If the Japa-
nese fiscal deficit was actually tolerated by its citizens and its elite, just
as was until now the anemia to its economic climate. If it did not matter
after all that Japan’s public debt stood at 230% of its GDP (this figure
being 110% in the U.S.), because 85% owned by nationals. The fact that
Japan is no longer a creditor nation and that Japanese begin to owe
money to foreign creditors has caused a national revival, intelligently
operated by Mr. Abe, who has promised to transform the country’s
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deficits into surpluses. To achieve this objective, the new Nippon gov-
ernment urgently needs the unwavering cooperation of its central bank –
the Bank of Japan – which proved to be the least failed in its fight
against deflation, as against the huge appreciation of its currency – Yen
– having seen its value doubled since the early 1990s! These are the
foundations of this new Japanese policy where “audacity” means weak-
ening the Yen and inducing beneficial reflation into the economy
through the lever of quantitative rate cuts, so deserved. Why preserve
the independence of central bankers – personalities who occupy strate-
gic positions of the first order without benefiting from the popular vote
– if they refuse to make their ammunition available to economic growth,
under the false pretext of the fight against inflation? As the monetary
policy of a nation and the level of its national currency should serve
business and employment, it is only natural that political leaders –
elected officials – control them. Shinzo Abe’s platform consists precise-
ly of intensive money creation which will also weaken the Yen, and at
the same time allow the recovery of Japanese exports. Hence the stimu-
lus program very recently enacted by Abe and which will reach the
equivalent of 103 trillion yen ($ 116 billion). An impressive amount that
will inevitably produce positive results on the front of the fight against
deflation, particularly in light of the bleak Japanese demographics. The
Japanese example can inspire our European economic and monetary
officials for the Japanese experience – the current one with Abe but also
that of the “lost decades” – demonstrates the urgent need for determined
and energetic measures to fight the recession.
Which already produce significant results, since the Yen began to
depreciate greatly and optimism is gradually taking hold of the economy
and investment in this country. Japan, widely studied and analyzed for
its deflation and dramatic implosion of its speculative bubbles, will it
one day ever be cited as an example for its about-face against ortho-
doxy? Accustomed to deflation, the – aging – Japanese population
prefers by far saving to consumption. A very understandable attitude
because it is actually better to refrain from buying today, if we know
that the prices will be lower tomorrow or after tomorrow. As the Japa-
nese economy has been stagnant for too long and Keynesian-like public
spending virtually no longer has an effect on a jaded population, accus-
tomed to an endemic recession, only a revolution in attitudes is likely to
recover the activity of this country. In this regard, the most efficient way
to induce such a psychological change is to reignite the appetite for
consumption by adopting explicitly a target for inflation. The clear
message sent by the new Japanese government and its central bank to
their citizens is: “as your Yen is worth less tomorrow spend them to-
day!” Posture for less heterodox, coupled with a completely new growth
target fixed to the country’s stock market index. Indeed, the Japanese
Financial Repression and Regulation
145
Minister of Finance, Akira Amari, who said that his government would
do everything possible so that the Nikkei reached 13,000 points by the
end of the first quarter of 2013. This is the first time in world history
that a government – responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the
second or third largest economy in the world – clearly defines to its
country’s stock markets a goal to be achieved! “Let the party begin”, is
therefore the directive to the Nikkei required to take 17% more in six
weeks. In reality, “the party continues”, since this index – which has
already soared more than 30% since November 2012 – now finds itself
at its September 2008 levels. Thus it has enriched domestic firms by
about 38 trillion Yen in favor of the appreciation of their security,
according to Mr. Amari’s calculations. The directives formulated by the
Japanese Minister of Finance define therefore a general framework for
increasing this index, with the knowledge that the operators, investors
and speculators will only experience respite and “inner peace” when the
13,000 points will be met or exceeded. This, in order to unveil the new
objective which will be defined therefore by the Japanese executive.
Knowing that their investment stock – just like a car trip – always
moves in the direction where we look… Still, will this chronicle of a
spike announced by the Japanese stock market – which will further
enrich and certainly the caste of traders and bankers – probably only do
very little to benefit the vast majority of citizens of this country? To be
useful, the nominal appreciation of the Nikkei – just as spectacular as it
was, and it is! – combined with the devaluation of the Yen, should also
result in an increase in the average Japanese income, and not only in a
higher cost of living. In fact, Mr. Amari is not the first leader to desig-
nate the stock market with a goal to attain, since the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, claimed
in 2011 that the market capitalization would be “a central ingredient to
economic recovery”.
The Japanese laboratory shows that it is therefore possible, under
certain conditions, for a united regional group to take control of their
destiny. To do this, a genuine financial repression must be put in place
that can take many forms and paths. The objective is to smoothen the
economic climate and healing, under duress, from the financial actors.
In this context, it is vital to develop tools that will curb the appreciation
of interest rates on the public debt, even that will cap them. In so doing,
several avenues are possible which could be alternatively explored by
government depending on the national context and the extent of the
crisis. These very strict or more subtle measures will have the ultimate
goal of containing certain capital funds within the national arena so that
stakeholders benefit from the real economy or that they can be used by
the state in the interest of collectivity. They are available in foreign
exchange control and capital flow. Requiring higher reserve ratios from
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financial institutions. Legally requiring banks to hold a certain portion
of their reserves in Treasury bills of their home country or the regional
organization to which they belong. Establishing a cap on the compensa-
tion of banking deposits and on the applicable taxes but also on fees
collected on credit granted to economic actors. Offering preferential
privileges and conditions to banks holding deposits with their central
bank. Prohibiting or at the very least establishing a tightly controlled
regulatory framework and taxing certain financial transactions. Taxing
trading which would naturally lead investors to prefer tax exempt tools
such as bonds, even those issued by certain corporations. The objective
of these measures is to clearly channel funds which would have other-
wise fled the country into maximizing the benefit to the real economy
while facilitating the financing of public debt. This arsenal of financial
suppression therefore leads to intense pressure applied on interest rates,
which logically allows a reduction in public spending linked to the
repayment of debt. Even better, since the energetic and intelligent
implementation of this suppression may – with buy-in from the private
sector and business which “would play the game” – bring about real
interest rates which would become negative. That is to say that, in other
words, these liquidities would have more interest in being invested in
the economy that finding refuge in bank accounts, and this is precisely
when interest rates would become negative that it is possible to repay its
debts and economic growth benefits us all! That is why the state should
finance ideally its budget by borrowing instead of taxing in the context
of negative real interest rates. The efficiency of this financial suppres-
sion is even more assured when it offers the considerable advantage of
being much more easily accepted and adopted than the increase in taxes
or VAT. It is applied through leverage, like financial regulation, even
inflation, otherwise less delicate and less direct than very unpopular
(and often unfair) tax increase. Of the rest, increased regulation within
the framework of this repression only responds to lax financial regula-
tions, systematic during prosperous economic times. Since a so-called
regulation must be evidently counter-cyclical, that is to say, that it must
be shown to be stricter during the good times, whereas, the facts show, it
is released under a stronger financial and banking system when the
situation is more favorable. Indeed, it goes without saying that the first
interest of finance is to manoeuver within a minimal regulatory frame-
work which stimulates and maximizes its profits. Still, this financial
repression may (and should) be limited in time, a time necessary to
proceed with liquidating (partially or wholly) the debt load. This finan-
cial repression is only repressive for a privileged minority, since it
defines a new way of how a transfer of wealth and resources is carried
out from the creditor and the investor towards the consumer and debtor.
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Let us note that these “liquidations” are also likely to be conducted
through a resurgence of inflationary pressures which suddenly reduce
the debt load. Contrary to the biases of the majority of the economists,
this phenomenon of deficit reduction as another form of financial re-
pression which is inflation is beneficial provided that it is operated
properly, knowing that there are only a few countries like Argentina or
Zimbabwe which profited from it and, in these last two examples, have
suffered. Thus it is Great Britain which benefited from liquidating its
debts in phases for nearly half the period between 1945 and 1980 while
the U.S. themselves could have offloaded part of their deficits thanks to
negative interest rates for approximately twenty-five years during this
same period. It is therefore possible to infer that each of these two
countries could have reduced its deficits by 3 to 4% per year within this
“liquidation” context permitted by financial repression knowing that the
U.S. could have even reduced their debt at a significantly higher rate
between 1945 and 1947, when they had negative rates of 9%! As for
Australia, where the inflation rate was even higher, it would have been
able to shave off deficits of 5% per year during this same period. As
noted, the episodic use of this type of financial repression can reduce
30% of deficits if 3% is earned annually… There are therefore only
developing or badly managed nations which experience a resurgence of
inflationary pressures, and our central banks should have the wisdom to
agree to let inflation run occasionally with the objective of relieving
populations and deficits of all kinds since it can precisely slice quickly
through all debt, both public and private. Our monetary and financial
regulators could therefore do better by being more flexible and less
stringent behind their ideological barriers by admitting that even reme-
dies like inflation should be administered depending on the circum-
stances. From a practical point of view, it is enough that interest rates do
not rise at the same rate as inflation. It is actually this delay – or this
disconnection – between nominal interest rates (fixed by the central
bank) and the inflation rate which sets off this gradual liquidation of
debts in a quantity equivalent to the differential which is established
annually between these two rates above. This financial repression must
therefore be orchestrated with intelligence, even harmoniously, by the
central banker, who must therefore work hand in hand with the execu-
tive branch of the country in question, and in the public interest. Coop-
eration even more precious than establishing these liquidations in favor
of high inflation may only successfully implemented if the state has a
more or less long term debt (five years) at fixed rates. Fixed rates which
would avoid having to increase its repayments to adjust them when rates




Inflation: Servicing Growth and Employment!
The central banks of our Western countries can boast of a total victo-
ry over the front of the fight against inflation in the last thirty years. If
they have indeed been successful in maintaining wages well below
productivity, performance in the fight against recessions over the same
period, however, leaves much to be desired. This lackluster report – the
result of a consciously applied strategy – thus, resulted in a heavy trend
of increasing unemployment in Western societies. Firmly rooted in
attitudes, conditioning the actions and reactions of almost all employees,
high and endemic unemployment has been insidiously implanted in our
psyche as a new “normal”. For central banks whose ultimate goal is to
control inflationary pressures, admittedly, full employment is certainly
not a panacea! Indeed, a low unemployment rate often leads workers
and employees to play the rule of supply and demand, i.e., to demand
salary increases. Hence an acceleration in inflation. Central banks will
not recognize it, but that is why they naturally tend to raise their interest
rates when the economy improves: to keep unemployment at a level
such that wages are always under control. Why? On the one hand to be
able to display their success in their mission in terms of price stability.
On the other hand to preserve capital and investors who, as we know,
fear inflation. And not to harm corporate profits and thus to support the
stock market… Let us be clear: this is in no way a plea for inflation.
However, it would have been nice if the “track record” of our central
bank contained slightly less success stories on the inflation front, and a
little more marked in the fight against recession and unemployment.
Since the interpretation in the “strict sense” of their mission by central
banks has translated over the last thirty years into a very unfortunate
consequence, i.e., the “wages” portion in the economy has steadily
decreased. Not all is, however, lost, since the U.S. Federal Reserve
unveiled at the end of 2012 an initiative refreshing on all fronts. For the
very first time in its history, it announced the continuation of its quanti-
tative tax cuts programs until the unemployment rate in the U.S. reaches
6.5%. Indeed, the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act gave it two objectives:
inflation and low unemployment. However, the Fed had never men-
tioned its concern about unemployment in its publications and state-
ments until 2010. It had even pointedly ignored this priority since Paul
Volcker until the first years of Bernanke as chair, including during the
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long reign of the very controversial Alan Greenspan. In reality, the Fed
like other central banks, relatively high unemployment was the key
instrument allowing them to achieve their goal of controlling inflation.
As it stands, the goal of the unemployment rate to 6.5% certainly does
not seem ambitious enough. After all, the significant improvement in the
labor market (and growth) contributes to narrowing the deficits “me-
chanically”. The resolution of the U.S. Federal Reserve will nonetheless
constitute a revolution in attitudes, which we hope – however without
any illusions – will be followed by the ECB… A profitable business
must choose where to put its profits and cash. In this respect, when a
business decides to invest, or otherwise conserve cash security, mone-
tary policy of a central bank proves decisive. In fact, the problem is far
from trivial. Indeed, without getting into espousing Apple’s stunning
reserves – which amount to $100 billion – and which makes some
people say that this company is richer than the U.S. government! U.S.
companies, to name a few, are sitting on a total cash of about 2,000
billion… The “uncertainty” factor is constantly cited by CEOs and their
CFOs, who prefer to inflate their war chests or place them in in very low
yield instruments, rather than commit to the future – by committing their
funds. This uncertainty is nevertheless an integral part of any decision-
making process and, in this regard, any self-respecting entrepreneur can
handle this variable and adapt. For the entrepreneur, everything is
actually uncertain: from technological evolution to consumer behavior,
through tomorrow’s taxation… Corporate managers are obviously
unable to predict the international environment or regulations in the
years to come. This uncertainty is therefore a part of corporate daily life.
Which did not prevent Google or Samsung, among others, from prosper-
ing. In fact, it is not so much this “uncertainty” factor which drives
businesses to invest in low return investments and bet sparingly on the
future, as it is the rate of inflation, or, at least, inflation expectations.
Indeed, why would a treasurer be puzzled when he is sure that the
inflation rate will not exceed 2% in the near future? The more this rate is
low the more the company will actually be comfortable in this position
to emphasize a very low profitability for its cash? These considerations
relative to the absence of inflationary pressures go together, of course,
with a pessimism – or skepticism – with respect to the prospects for
growth. Strict common sense suggests indeed to refrain from any in-
vestment when the economy is sluggish or depressed, where nothing is
lost in remaining liquid. In other words, it is only when prospects for
growth re-emerge or there is a resurgence in inflation expectations
should business be tempted to channel their cash into less secure hori-
zons. Not until the consideration of uncertainty has disappeared from the
radar. But the company may consolidate this change into asset allocation
– in the direction of more aggressiveness – on a rational basis. This
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“entrepreneurial” attitude thus will induce a virtuous circle because the
investment itself will cause an increase in production and a revival of
the inflationary trend. This is where the role of the central bank is
instrumental, through its quantitative rate cuts program, i.e., its asset
purchases in circulation, combined with a well-defined and tenable
objective in terms of GDP. In the context of a depressed economy, only
the central bank can indeed install this virtuous circle because its acqui-
sitions and cash injections will lend credit to this growth target. Where
growth prospects have improved, they, in turn, will have an optimal
impact on its asset purchases. Moreover, the credibility of the central
bank, as renewed confidence in future business conditions, can be
further strengthened if the expansionist policy leads to a widening of the
range of purchased assets by public institutions. To be reassured and
heartened, businesses and consumers must be convinced that the central
bank is in control, and just as energetic and determined. Indeed, it is
only if the central bank orchestrates carefully this renewed optimism
that confidence – which is a feeling and therefore volatile and emotional
– is waiting for you. Only his unequivocal commitment to boost growth
and restore jobs – even to tolerate a dose of inflation – will allow busi-
nesses to consider the future under more promising prospects. In the
same vein, critics – often violent – against the U.S. Federal Reserve are
unwelcome and exasperating. How indeed do you accuse this institution
of contributing to the distortion of economic and financial conditions
through its many programs to create money, as markets and the econo-
my are themselves in such an upheaval? It is time to realize that our
world today is nothing more than a cash trap since it has become next to
impossible to reduce unemployment by reducing interest rates… which
are already at zero. In such extreme circumstances, the duty of the Fed –
as any other central bank – is to correct these distortions with a priority
objective being restoring employment. Only its action in the sense of an
increase in inflation expectations will contribute decisively to lower
“real” interest rates when the nominal rate, itself, is at the bottom. The
riskiest position – and certainly the least accountable and least befitting
of a central bank – is to do nothing; the Fed (like the ECB in an ideal
world) must engage in asset purchases to avoid liquefaction of its econ-
omy and curb unemployment. That’s why the only approach that moti-
vates businesses to make their cash available to the real economy and
for the benefit of future investment is in the hands of the central bank.
Odysseus had asked to be tied to the mast of his ship to resist the song
of the sirens. Today central banks find themselves in a similar situation.
So much less poetic than the Odyssey, they are faced with a mission –
inherently schizophrenic – which requires them to fight against infla-
tionary pressures, while maintaining growth and economic fundamen-
tals. How to honor a mandate to stabilize prices, which happens to be
Capitalism without Conscience
152
fundamentally incompatible with the resumption of growth, reducing
unemployment and redemption of government bonds and debt that
nobody wants? Can central banks continue navigating this path, forcing
them to adapt their monthly monetary and cash injections policy to
changing economic and financial conditions, without risking the doom
Ulysses faced with the sirens? For the first time in the history of central
banks, the U.S. Federal Reserve has yet to cross the Rubicon commit-
ting to continue with its programs to create money (quantitative rate
cuts) until the U.S. unemployment rate drops to 6.5%. This institution –
under the leadership of Ben Bernanke – which certainly made us accus-
tomed to his dynamism and pro-activity, yet is revolutionizing the
profession of the central banker by correlating unequivocally printing
money with the fight against unemployment. When, at the same time,
the European Central Bank still displays on the main page of its website
that its “primary mission is to maintain the purchasing power of the
Euro, and thus price stability in the Euro Zone”. When it clings tena-
ciously to maintaining – on paper – the rate of inflation below 2%.
While its moral obligation is to acquire Greek, Spanish and Portuguese
Treasury bills to avoid a disaster in these countries and support the
affected European populations. And while the very essence of this
mission that it finds so hard to honor is inflationary. Very well aware of
this fundamental incompatibility, the founding fathers of the ECB
nevertheless focused all the vital energies of their institution on the
quest (and maintenance) of the Holy Grail of stable prices. The German
economist Otmar Issing, Member of the Board of the ECB, and its first
President, the Dutch Wim Duisenburg, thus took the side of attaching
their central bank to the mast of the sacred fight against inflation. At the
expense of growth and jobs.
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Regulation: Deconstruct and Stabilize
Emerging and developing nations are very susceptible to shocks
caused by the interrupted capital flow. In this regard, future jolts which
will affect the European Union, strongly risk being the catalyst of a
substantial upheaval on the front of capital movements across the globe.
The only perspective – however quite benign and highly probable – of
Greece exiting the EU would thus provoke a massive exodus of liquidi-
ties outside Greek banks toward Germany, while precipitating a world-
wide stampede outside assets deemed “at risk”. If the economies of
regional blocks are obviously subjected to multiple shocks, the respon-
sibilities of inflow or outflow of capital are fundamental in reestablish-
ing growth or in the advent of the recession. The Irish resurrection –
following the liquidation of its banking system – is indeed beholden first
and foremost to the strict control of foreign exchange, the rest of which
was established with the consent of the IMF. As for emerging countries,
their dependence on the inflows of capital well documented. Nations
(like the U.S.) which regularly need short-term liquidity to financier
their deficits are therefore threatened down to their vital powers in the
event of capital flight, following a sharp reversal in their economic
conditions or political pressures (we think, of course, of China and its
massive Treasury bills holdings). That is why the best placed countries
and regions of tomorrow which can amortize the inevitable shocks to
come and, thus, benefit from a more stable growth will be those which
will have implemented an arsenal of preventive measures regulating
these flows while neutralizing certain speculation directly impacting
these movements of capital. Capital flow transitioning globally and
freely is actually very harmful for economies – mainly on developing
ones – and must therefore be restrained to smooth out financial shocks.
Indeed, nothing replaces preemptive regulations which will reduce
definitively erratic fluctuations on public accounts and which will
protect upstream our economies. It is therefore the entire system which
must be redesigned, or at the very least, reviewed through another
prism, that of global imbalances and their collorary, namely a reform of
the international monetary system whose objective would be to allocate
capital more equitably. Under this optic, why would countries affected
by a deficit in their balance of payments not levy a tax on the inflows of
capital from nations with which they maintain a bilateral deficit? Under
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this new interpretation, nations, benefiting from substantial surpluses in
their current accounts, would thus actively participate in readjusting or
compensating these imbalances. It is certainly clearly more complicated
a priori to regulate capital flow than to influence trade surpluses and
deficits. However, chasing massive deficits of the balance of payments
between countries and regions would embrace the entire spectrum of
imbalances which are the source of financial shocks and economic
slowdowns. Nothing will be obviously accomplished without world
cooperation and it is urgent to act. New economic and econometric
research indicates that regulating capital would breathe a good dose of
calm into markets. A recent study by the Bank of England – which
cannot be accused of protectionism! – found a general increase in the
financial and economic conditions if there was an international coordi-
nation of foreign exchange control. Finally, the IMF has data in suffi-
cient quantities which attest that emerging nations which best resisted
the crisis are also those which introduced before 2007 true regulation. It
is therefore the political will to challenge the rules at the root of global
investment and trade agreements which today are still lacking. Only a
narrow and unequivocal coordination between industrialized nations,
with integrated economies, and developing nations would regulate the
two sides of capital so as to ensure stable growth. One of the fundamen-
tal lessons of this crisis is that the regulator may also be carried away by
catastrophes. The mere mention of the Madoff name is in this regard
sufficient to give him a lesson in modesty… As the error is human,
regulation rarely succeeds in swimming against the current of estab-
lished trends. As regulation further imposes common rules for the
economy of the country, regional block or even the entire world, it is the
entire system which has become weakened if the regulator errs.
Concerned with transparency, preoccupied with avoiding excessive
risk taking and protecting investors, the regulator may, nevertheless, fail
under the weight of too many complex laws. Such an example is the
“Dodd-Frank” law, passed in 2010 in the U.S. whose objective – praised
by all – was to prevent financial abusive behaviors and to allow authori-
ties to seize – even dismantle – behemoth institutions, “too big to fail”.
However, how do we act rapidly and optimally within a context where
this legal text comprises 850 pages, i.e. more than twenty times more
than the famous “Glass-Steagall” law adopted on the heels of 1929? The
regulations alone (of the Dodd-Frank legislation) likely to include risky
corporate transactions for bank capital – the famous “Volcker rules” –
include 382 issues and 1,420 sub-issues! Certain explanations or clarifi-
cations of this law concerning technical points are also laid out in hun-
dreds of pages. So that not even the regulator can claim to have read this
law in its entirety… or understood it! Of the rest, only a third of the
legislation is now in effect since, even by the own admission of Sheila
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Blair, the former head of the FDIC (the U.S. regulator), this reform “se
noie dans un océan de complexité”! Statistics published by a think tank,
the “Sunlight Foundation” revealed an absurd number of consultation
meetings about this reform between U.S. regulatory agencies and the
largest financial institutions. Thus we are talking about 181 meetings
organized over a two-year period with Goldman Sachs, 175 with
JP Morgan Chase and 150 with Morgan Stanley, during which these
banks tried by any means to influence and make the famous Dodd-Frank
law more flexible with the obvious intention of gutting it its essential
substance. Among some of the examples, Dodd-Frank is part of an
increasingly more tortuous regulatory process whose key characteristic
is however to create voids and blanks exploited by those who strive to
violate these laws with impunity. Finally, did the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment not abandon all legal proceedings against Goldman Sachs for the
alleged subprime embezzlement in August 2012? Hasn’t the long inves-
tigation lasting four years on market manipulation of money charged to
JP Morgan not been in legal limbo since the summer of 2012? Of the
rest, this hypercomplexity is also disastrous for the economy itself, like
this other example of a U.S. law passed in 2002 to fight against the
“Enron” type of fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley law. This led to an absurd
result to discourage businesses strongly from raising funds on the stock
market. With the initial objective of encouraging transparency, in reality
this law accelerated the opacity of new companies that were no more
than 12% in 2011 wishing to be publicly traded as opposed to 67% in
2002. The context, like financial products, is certainly more and more
sophisticated. However, the regulator and the legislator should not fall
into the trap of complexity which is precisely the trend of the world of
finance. They should, on the contrary, fight with the assistance of simple
and unequivocal regulations, with the singular priority being always the
protection of their economic fabric. Since “more the state degrades, the
more numerous are the laws”, said Tacite.
Concerned with transparency, preoccupied with avoiding excessive
risk taking and protecting investors, the regulator may, nevertheless, fail
under the weight of too many complex laws. Such an example is the
“Dodd-Frank” law, passed in 2010 in the U.S. whose objective – praised
by all – was to prevent financial abusive behaviors and to allow authori-
ties to seize – even dismantle – behemoth institutions, “too big to fail”.
However, how do we act rapidly and optimally when this legal text
comprises 850 pages, i.e. more than twenty times more than the famous
“Glass-Steagall” law adopted on the heels of 1929? The regulations
alone (of the Dodd-Frank legislation) likely to include risky corporate
transactions for bank capital – the famous “Volcker rules” – include 382
issues and 1420 sub-issues! Some explanations or clarifications of this
law on technical points are also laid out in hundreds of pages. Even the
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regulator claims that it has not read this law in its entirety… or under-
stand it! Moreover, only a third of this legislation is now in effect since,
as even admitted by Sheila Blair, former head of the FDIC (the U.S.
regulator), this reform “is buried in an ocean of complexity”! Statistics
published by a think tank, the “Sunlight Foundation” revealed an absurd
number of consultation meetings about this reform between U.S. regula-
tory agencies and the largest financial establishments. Thus we are
talking about 181 meetings organized over a two-year period with
Goldman Sachs, 175 with JP Morgan Chase and 150 with Morgan
Stanley, during which these banks tried by any means to influence and
make the famous Dodd-Frank law more flexible with the obvious inten-
tion of gutting it of its essential substance. Among some of the exam-
ples, Dodd-Frank is part of an increasingly more tortuous regulatory
process whose key characteristic is however to create voids and blanks
exploited by those who strive to violate these laws with impunity. The
context, like financial products, is certainly more and more sophisticat-
ed. However, the regulator and the legislator should not fall into the trap
of complexity which is precisely the trend of the world of finance. They
should, on the contrary, fight with the assistance of simple and unequiv-
ocal regulations, with the singular priority being always the protection
of their economic fabric. Moreover, the scission of banking activities
between commercial and retail establishments – whose deposits are
covered by government guarantee – and the banks which deal with
investments and speculation proves in this respect to be indispensable.
The Volcker rules were indeed likely to remedy this, still less complex
to interpret and apply a 298-page legal text! In comparison with the
simplicity of the now defunct 1933 Glass-Steagall law, repealed in
1999, and which only had 37 pages… How does the legislator expect to
make an unequivocal distinction between the banks which invest for
their own account on the one hand and those which only carry out client
instructions on the other hand? The effective line of demarcation be-
tween these two types of operations are a matter of interpretation and
intention, with the knowledge that an establishment, or a trader, can
quickly change – even cheat – by passing from one to the other accord-
ing to its interest, even mood? Didn’t the Libor scandal actually reveal
that the UBS traders in London were challenging one another over who
could manipulate this rate the most? Therefore it is exclusively – almost
mechanically – when Glass-Steagall was abolished that the volume of
transactions exploded. These over-the-counter transactions, opaque and
unregulated deals were only able to prosper when this law was repealed.
As Glass-Steagall deprived investment banks from banking deposits –
and therefore from financing at a cheap price –, its collateral effect was
naturally to limit the increase of their puts, and therefore their risks. All
the while increasing and diversifying the number of stakeholders in the
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financial markets, thus becoming more liquid. While the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall law would permit the rise in power of investment banks
that were then able to develop a myriad of new financial instruments
beyond the control of any regulatory agency. This separation between
commercial banks and investment banks will thus allow the financial
markets to become resilient, in the hope that the next conflagration will
not be as dramatic as that of 2007-2008. While restraining considerably
the power of banks which will by necessity have different objectives and
priorities, even divergent. It is therefore vital today, in the interest of the
real economy but also to save the financial sector from itself, to proceed




Redefining the State – A Lever of Public Health
Keynes was one of the promoters of social democracy built on a fun-
damental pillar, full employment. It started of course from the principle
that only capitalism guarantees individual liberties, private initiative and
free enterprise. This does not prevent it from denouncing the faults of
such a system promoting deregulation, itself generating intolerable
anomalies in any civilized society. To this end, let us take its “General
Theory” where it stated (in loose translation) that “the major faults of
the economic society in which we live are not to provide full employ-
ment and consist of an arbitrary and unfair redistribution of wealth and
income”. How to ensure that full employment and equity in the alloca-
tion of resources if it is not done through the active intervention of the
state, and while it is important not to count on the charity of the private
sector? That’s why the supporters of Keynesianism are also strengthen-
ing the powers and prerogatives of the state, whose only action is likely
to smooth over the glaring inequalities, while imposing a protective
regulation of public interest. It is not, however, going back to the teach-
ings of Ricardo and Marx who argued that the capitalist system makes
its profits by constantly maintaining a “reserve army of unemployed”.
Their concept actually had a congenital defect wanting that this army of
unemployed would disappear when the very notion of profits would be
eradicated. Keynes, for his part, showed that long-term unemployment
was caused, not by the pursuit of profit, but by variable and volatile
private investment in uncertain times. As it is the fall in this private
investment – or misused investment – which is the source of economic
downturns and climbing unemployment, it is imperative to “socialize”
this investment. To do this, businesses – as the government itself is an
employer – must assure their employees’ purchasing power by allowing
ongoing private investment, guaranteeing full employment. The essen-
tial prerequisite for the socialization of investment is a redistribution of
income that would be the basis of full employment. In the Keynesian
view, the public sector must therefore act in addition to the private
sector, without ever trying to replace it. Today, seventy years later,
equality and employment are still – and more than ever – the core
concerns of our developed nations. Although the front line has moved
significantly. Indeed, while the protagonists at the time of Keynes
owned the means of production – i.e., the industries – and to a lesser
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extent the pensioners. It is actually the power of finance – as a result of
globalization – that crops individual freedoms while increasing imbal-
ances and inequalities. This finance whose only priority is to maximize
its profits instead of investing in the economy, its production tools and
its jobs. This finance which uses all its resources to tear down barriers,
decimate regulations and operate at levels to fight governments on equal
terms. In this context, once again, only the action of the public authority
is able to regulate, to smooth and fill gaps, so it is impossible to rely on
the private sector, whose role is not to do thus. Keynes’ fundamental
contribution to democracy resides in this vision of the state as protector
of the public good and as supreme regulator of private sector activity
and market forces. To achieve these objectives, the state must therefore
limit at the same time the power and profits of this finance.
Therefore, it’s not because the state no longer has money or because
the banks are empty that it can no longer do anything – it is neoliberal
ideology that prevents money from being printed. It’s not because the
state no longer has money or because the banks are empty that it can no
longer do anything – it is neoliberal ideology that prevents money from
being printed. If nothing more can be done today, this powerlessness
and this paralysis of state creates the neoliberal affairs that were not
prevented from calling on them whenever the system was on the brink
of imploding. Nowadays, it’s more about saving capitalism than recog-
nizing that it is impossible for it to reach full employment. Indeed,
capitalism has no more of a philanthropic vocation than the financial
markets have – which are the most visible and irritating product of it –
and this is precisely why state intervention proves essential in calming
down the economy, guaranteeing and protecting employment, and
cracking down on abuse. If the state decided not to get involved in the
money creation process, its sole source of financing would be in the
issuance of bonds, knowing that the amounts borrowed within its na-
tional borders would be deducted from economic activity, rendering it
lacking in money. Each Euro that the state lends to its nationals shall be
one Euro less for investing and for business and consumer credit. Fol-
lowing the same reasoning, just as much employment is created thanks
to government spending as is not created by the private sector. Indeed,
state stimuli will allow new schools to be built, the road network to be
improved and just as much work and expenditure that will clearly be
made at the expense of industry and the services industry. Needless to
say that good governance of public affairs leans towards sobriety and is
clearly more advantageous – not only for public accounts but especially
for developing initiatives and intelligence – with the private sector
making the economy live on and prosper. It is due to all this that public
deficits are rarely looked into by political authorities willingly or by
choice, but rather out of a pressing need to compensate for the weak-
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nesses of the public sector and what it lacks. It is therefore crucial to
understand that public deficits are simply the consequence of the decline
in aggregate demand and not their cause – deficits that will automatical-
ly be covered when the economy picks up. It is therefore crucial to
understand that public deficits are simply the consequence of the decline
in aggregate demand and not their cause – deficits that will automatical-
ly be covered when the economy picks up. By running into debt, by
reducing taxes and by increasing spending, the state does nothing but fill
gaps and holes left by the private sector. The economic cycle effectively
works according to an interconnected diagram, in other words, a busi-
ness area can only generate profit if another area spends or gets into debt
at the same time.
In doing so, the state fulfills its public welfare obligations and puts
people back to work by taking on, at least partially, the task of investing
in the economy, temporarily put on hold by the private sector during the
crisis. In this respect, tax reductions represent a leverage that admittedly
matters, but which is also quite limited in effectiveness given the virtu-
ally zero impact on business profits and personal income. The same
applies for maintaining low interest rates, which does not significantly
favor lending to the real economy due to investors quickly resorting to
more lucrative investments. With regards to money creation, if it is
essential and if it undoubtedly occurs during a crisis period, it will not
be able to continue on forever due to its implications on inflation and the
bad practice that it instills in economic agents. These economic agents,
in knowingly being able to rely on the generosity of the state, would be
able to take part in more risky ventures. The state is therefore expected
elsewhere, with its most effective and constructive action being on
another level – that of the stabilization and regulation of private invest-
ment. It is by no means an issue of the government nationalizing com-
panies, but rather of building partnerships with private sector operators
so that its altruistic action serves as a regulator and conduit for private
investment. Effectively limited to the areas of activity, the strength of
companies and depending on the impact of a specific sector on the entire
economy, this cooperation must lean towards achieving full employ-
ment, which could not be achieved without the stabilizing effect of the
state. Contrary to what monetary theories would claim, the future is
uncertain, the information available to us is incomplete and the markets
are not perfect. This renders these partnerships and joint initiatives
between public and private sectors imperative in achieving growth,
buying bower and employment. It is therefore essential to restore the
state to its rightful place in the economic system, on condition that it can
exercise its control rationally and without political calculations. Indeed,
only the state can reduce uncertainty.
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That is why capitalism must become the business of all, since it is –
and it is not only a recent phenomenon – in the hands of a tiny minority
who is in control and who jealously guard it. An imperceptible shift
nevertheless took place since the beginning of the 1980s, as the power
of money passed from the hands of the captains of industry to those in
high finance. In doing so, this financial oligarchy has gradually extend-
ed its domination to end up by, toward the mid-2000s, reigning over the
entire real economy to which it became totally addicted through leverag-
ing financialization. This ultimate sophistication in finance (which led to
the subprime crisis in 2007, which itself was the starting point of our
actual crisis) has become essential to the economy by showering it with
liquidities. In passing, this financialization granted credit to households
to give them the illusion of making progress in their way of life. All
businesses and economic actors therefore adopted the market as the
supreme reference and welcomed regulations meant for them. Without
realizing that this financialization reverted in fact to an accrued monopo-
lization of powers. Powers which were imperceptibly passed from the
captains of industry and business men (who had at least were familiar
with their workers and their production) between the hands – and com-
puters – of a tiny elite of financiers whose role was more or less to open
the tap wide with liquidities. Entrepreneurial tradition had up until then
really created an added value to our society. Technological revolutions
left a profound mark on it in order to have formed the genuine driving
forces for corporations to become prosperous and the individual to
develop. Indeed, profit had only ever been an instrument for these true
businesses, not the ultimate objective for finance, since it was constantly
reinvested, indeed in the interest of these entrepreneurs, but also for the
entire human chain participating in it.
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Profit only for the Horizon and only for Ambition
While profit is now the only horizon for finance and financialization
which has contaminated everything in its path and which now only
considers businesses as a lever for profit, a slot machine in the global
casino which would buy and sell businesses, hire and lay off employees,
according to the expected benefits. The dichotomy between industry and
finance has in fact disappeared. Whereas it was still possible some
twenty years ago to draw an unequivocal distinction between Renault
and General Motors on the one hand and financial institutions like
Société Générale or Goldman Sachs on the other hand. We are now
witnesses to comical arrangements where a business like General Mo-
tors calls for help because its financial sector, the provider of credit, is in
disarray. It is as if the production of vehicles was a side business, just
good enough to justify and feed a financial sector which had proved far
more lucrative than its traditional activities. Should we be surprised, in
such a context, that Goldman Sachs rushes to buy up wheat stocks to
leverage this other bubble? Mixing genres has therefore become global,
completely in favor of finance and in defiance of any commercial
interest and industrial strategy. It is the whole spectrum which is today
contaminated by financialization: energy, real estate, foods. Even the
functioning of the state and collectivities is also marked by the seal of
this hyper financialization: whereas it was enough for them, in the very
recent past, to issue bonds to finance their lifestyle, our leaders today are
calling on banks to create scholarly arrangements for them based on
“interest rate swaps”… Of the rest, nearly half of the derivatives in the
world are interest rate swaps, coincidentally directly related to the Libor,
whose scandal and manipulations were mentioned above… Would the
next bubble to burst be these famous interest rate swaps? To which case
our states and its taxpayers – i.e. us – would be the first to pay the price
of this umpteenth speculative tribulation, potentially devastating for the
world economy. Indeed, it has been estimated that the four largest U.S.
financial institutions had on their books approximately $170,000 billion
in derivatives in favor of the economic actors of that country. Knowing
that the international outstanding amount in derivatives represents
twelve times the global GDP! All the facets of economic activity are
thus entangled in a complex web woven by financialization. Of the rest,
the sectors of activities do not matter at all in this financialization able to
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prevail today in the machine tools sector (for example) to abandon it
completely for investments in the agricultural sector, if it proves to be
more profitable. The single only objective being to generate profits in
cold cash: indeed, such is the ultimate expertise to the exclusion of all
others. Hence for example Goldman Sachs which in 2012 invested $10
million in the prisons of the State of New York, with the following
perspectives: recover their money if recidivism drops by 10%, earn 2
more if this rate improves more, or lose 2.4 if the New York criminals
do not change! Our societies have today attained such a degree of
decadence that they have delegated such responsibilities to the financial
sector, and their most elementary homework vis-à-vis citizens in need.
The moral obligation of the collectivity is therefore vanishing in the face
of “corporate bonds” – “social impact bonds” – issued by financial
institutions which raise funds to generate profit while replacing the state.
Organize the understaffed, to neglect working conditions, modernize
reluctantly the tools of production, such have therefore become –
amongst other things – the guidelines for managers of modern business-
es, completely under the yoke of the financiers. How can we be sur-
prised in such a context of the wave of suicides in a number of business-
es confronted with the coldness of the juggernaut of money? These
restrains imposed by the shareholders actually require the working ants
to perform like world-class athletes. Without equivalent salaries, of
course… Thus is the employee called upon to adapt instantly, even
agree to lose his job, if such is the price to be paid for progress – or to
maintain – profits? The ideals and energies of our politicians, financiers
and even our intellectuals unanimously tend toward this singular objec-
tive of profit, elevated to the rank of pragmatic religion, which defined
new codes which all of society must soak up and be inspired. That is
why Anglo-Saxon countries and Germany are entirely focused on the
gains of productivity as the single and only means to exit the crisis and
reduce deficits. While categorically rejecting to pass through the exit
door consisting of investing in business and training, understandably
much more expensive for them. As the only improvements tolerated are
those which affect productivity, all the criteria, optimization and re-
search for solutions are scrutinized and shelled in terms of productivity.
The only credo is therefore improvement in sacrosanct productivity –
whose only priority is to find savings in both the production processes
and salaries – whereas the gains in productivity which truly enrich a
business over the long-term instead tend toward strategies for products
sold, their range, their quality, and conquering new markets… so many
determining factors obviously impacting on the success of any business
and which can only succeed by adhesion and motivation of all of its
employees. This supreme contempt for the value of work that we all
accept in the interest of swollen speculative revenues – therefore on the
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short-term – is it not the hallmark of decadence in our civilization? In
fact, the life and management of businesses have been contaminated by
the ills inherent in finance. With the assistance of always more sophisti-
cated products, it raided both management and the working tool, consid-
ered therefore as a crude commodity negotiable upward or downward,
depending on the needs and profit of the hour. Work has become a
“commodity” – a crude raw material – deprived of any moral, and even,
human regard. In fact, businesses which lay off are very often rewarded
by the markets through an increase in their shares while, at the same
time, those which hire run the risk of being judged with great caution by
the armada of financial analysts comfortably seated in their armchair.
Our financial system has thus forced our businesses to learn how to have
only 100 employees do the work of 200 to maximize its profits. It is
absolutely unlikely that no financial guru or an astute Wall Street ob-
server” has ever, up to now, conducted the relation between this policy
of the optimal spin of the employee and the very bad statistics of unem-
ployment which defeat growth. When will the guardians of the temple
finally understand that workers and employees contribute just as much
as the shareholder to their wealth and winning “deals”? Let us
acknowledge that it is clearly easier for a camel to pass through the eye
of the needle that it is for the capitalism of today to be self-critical…
The iconic case in this regard is the British pharmaceutical giant
GlaxoSmithKline, which all too recently pleaded guilty to federal
crimes vis-à-vis the U.S. authorities by agreeing to pay fines in the
amount of $1 billion for circulating two medications not approved by
the U.S. health regulatory authority (the FDA) and without having
passed basic safety tests required by U.S. law for a third medication.
GlaxoSmithKline was also forced to pay an additional $2 billion to
settle a class action lawsuit accusing it of having circumvented doctors
to establish false certificates, all with the objective of accelerating the
distribution of these relevant medications. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, the total amount of $3 billion represents restitution
for the biggest fraud in the entire pharmaceutical industry, bigger than
the $2 billion paid by Pfizer, the $1.4 billion paid by Eli Lilly and the
billion dollars by Johnson & Johnson. Of the rest, the fines paid in 2012
to U.S. regulatory authorities by financial and industrial actors achieved
a record $8 billion. It is, for example, the $37 million paid by the mili-
tary construction company ATK Launch Systems for having sold defec-
tive materials, or the 200 million paid by Oracle accused of having
overbilled the U.S. government. From the intense pressure exerted on
their employees (at all levels of the hierarchy) to achieve and exceed the
objectives, to the permanent stress to which management is subjected as
to the development in the stock price of the company that employs them.
Returns on investments, figures related to their domestic and interna-
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tional sales for their operating efficiencies. The violations of the law and
the corruption now seem to be part of the rules of the game for busi-
nesses and the financial world, only concerned with producing good
figures, exceeding the competition, conquering new markets and cli-
ents… until a few are mistakenly made to feel the “pinch”. Blithely
trampled upon, ethics and morality are being eclipsed by promotions,
bonuses and falsified accounts and reports. In this regard, Glaxo is only
one more turn of events in a long path of corruption and scandals having
affected (for a good fifteen years now) Worldcom, News Corp or Wal
Mart… It is therefore the whole spectrum of the working world (and not
only finance) which is infected by the conflict in interest, fraudulent
accounting, false declarations and attacks on private life. Is modern
capitalism therefore condemned to create monsters? Milton Friedman
asserted that capitalism is freedom. Indeed, unless this freedom remains
the preserve of a tiny minority who co-exist apart from and on top of an
ocean of serfs.
The historically low level of interest in rates, against all odds, deci-
sively inhibits any investment in the medium and long term by business-
es. By trying to save the system through the lever of cash injections and
quantitative rate cuts, central banks have actually contributed unwitting-
ly to the swelling of a new speculative bubble. In fact, the really tiny
interest rates, even negative, in some countries designed to encourage
investment and boost economies have created a monster! While the
stock market traditionally offered profitability and growth over the long
term for investors, the bond market generated income. Quantitative rate
cuts have indeed shaken this given because global liquidities have been
therefore gradually clumped to international equity markets which had a
big advantage in these times of depressed rates: dividends. As investors
in search of profitability realized that the distribution of dividends on
equity portfolios responded honorably to their search for yield. So they
turned the stock market away from its original vocation of financing
business into a machine to produce yield by proxy dividends. Unprece-
dented phenomenon for fifty years, the stock market has become an
alternative bond market. This molting of global stock markets as a till
for investors, fond of regular and substantial income, is clear evidence
of consequences for the world of business, for workers, and of course
for central banks as for politico-economic leaders. Whereas the primary
purpose of the stock markets was to put the providers of capital in touch
with businesses in need of their cash. Whereas investors are supposed to
receive a share in the development of the business in return for the risk
assumed by putting their capital at its disposal. The low interest rate
environment sterilizes de facto the full range of investments. And the
increased dependence of these businesses on the holders of cash –
concerned about getting a return on the short term – redistributes thor-
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oughly the resources. While forcing companies to change their strategy
or the way they lead and manage their working tool. The same applies to
central banks that find that their policy, often aggressive, of interest rate
close to zero – far from forcing the hand of businesses to invest over the
long term – leads them to opt instead for instruments favoring liquidity
in the short or very short term. As the distribution of dividends or re-
demption of a portion of their own shares. Like Ford, which recently
decided to double (from 5 to 10 cents) its dividend: this transaction will
cost $762.5 million but also authorized the soaring f its security by 35%
in the last three months! As always, the world of money has found the
solution to overcome – or circumvent – the pitfall of zero rates and cash
injections by managing to find a new “cash cow”. Its greed has indeed
inflated another bubble and, incidentally, distorted and perverted the
whole economic theory that interest rates at such levels and dynamic
money creation should logically benefit economic actors. Instead, the
monetary transmission mechanisms were diverted to transform the
capital markets into arm bandits systematically spitting out currency. In
addition, the concept of risk management – designed to favor bond
markets safer than the much more speculative stock markets – has faded.
Conversely, the escalation of the risk premium – i.e., the compensation
offered to the shareholder in exchange for the risk assumed – reached
such levels that holders of cash (pension funds, big investors, sovereign
wealth funds, etc.) do swear by the stock markets, with the considerable
advantage of paying dividends, while the economy is somewhat de-
pressed. The context of near absolute zero interest rates has only exacer-
bated this relentless quest for profits of global investment with, once
again, disastrous consequences for the real economy. Entrepreneurs
prefer to be able to devote their cash flow to pay dividends instead of
investing in the medium and long-term in the interest of their company
and its employees. Did central banks know that their hyper lax monetary
policy would only exacerbate the war between labor and capital? In
2011, U.S. companies indeed spent $650 billion in dividend payments
and share repurchases compared to $580 billion in investment and
development. Given that the trend for 2012, the best year for stock
markets in 10 years, should be even more damaging to jobs traditionally
benefiting the tool of work. Worse yet, since the corporate bond issu-
ance activity which planned to use these funds to invest in production
facilities were heavily shunned in favor of those who had announced
their intention from the start to recycle these sums into dividends and
redemptions of their own title! The dominant influence of ownership on
the strategies of companies listed on the stock exchange distorts there-
fore the business of the entrepreneur. To yield to temptation – some-
times warnings – holders who took their cash as hostage, the business
manager and CFO have gradually become purveyors of regular income
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at the expense of investment and of course employment. That political,
economic and monetary officials finally deign to look closely at the
stock theater and behind the scenes, if their concern is to restore eco-
nomic growth and reduce unemployment. Because the big bosses of
companies whose shares are listed have now completed their molt in
central bankers, and play the game of financialization in the background.
That is why it is no longer possible today to rely on them, or on their
businesses, to boost our economies.
169
29
Enshrine and Reevaluate Work
Competitiveness itself – repeatedly invoked – is it not a vague con-
cept designating the ability of a country and its companies to confront
competition? By focusing on competitiveness from the bottom – reality
internal devaluation – which involves lowering the export prices simply
by reducing the costs of production. Public discussion therefore focuses
on labor costs while the cost of capital is never mentioned, whereas net
income distributed today represents 10% of the added value of non-
financial corporations. This historically record level since the Second
World War, compared to 5.5% in 1999, concludes that the share for
shareholders has increased to a considerable extent over the past twelve
years. In other words, the complaints of employers who threaten to
lower investments and research have no traction. In fact, they ignore the
increasingly higher share that companies choose to distribute to owners
of capital, regardless of the intensity of the economic and financial
crisis. With a profound questioning of the ability of businesses to cope
with all the rough edges of competitiveness due to these distributions.
That is why the rights of employees undergo an unprecedented attack,
which is why the costs should be compressed if the goal is to win mar-
ket share in exports: these are clearly the requirements if the goal is
always to remunerate more shareholders, capital and finally those who
bet on the stock market… Logic however taken in inextricable contra-
dictions, knowing that the Orwellian speech of industrialists and corpo-
rate bosses attain summits of implausibility and arrogance when they
explain that the fight against job cuts is… to fight against the job!
Understand once and for all that competitiveness is not necessarily
synonymous with unemployment, with precariousness or with the
explosion of inequalities, contrary to what markets and employers
impose on employees and workers for over twenty years. Let’s rebel
therefore and reject with disgust the allegations of the President of the
union bosses (MEDEF), Laurence Parisot, who said in 2005 in the
Figaro: “Life is fragile, love is precarious, why should work be secure?”
Indeed, such statements devote the defeat of the policy of which one of
its tasks should be the determination of the rules of the economic game
and the tutelage of neo-liberalism which is only a ploy aimed at putting
Europe on the automatic pilot of a competition intended to resolve all
issues. To replace the culture of the state with the obsession of sales
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means to trample on the very essence of work, however, the source of
all economic value.
This is why the only way to restart the economy is to give purchasing
power to those who really spend in the real economy. Indeed, only the
poor and middle classes are concerned and actually benefit from the
economy. They alone are responsible for growth. The upper classes, for
their part, hoard or invest in financial products. This is why it is impera-
tive – even essential – to raise wages, including the minimum wage.
Confiscation in good standing of the economic apparatus has been
undertaken since the late 1970s by a tiny minority that has redistributed
the product of the work of others largely in its favor. They are actually
not so much our factories, industries and businesses that are not produc-
tive. This productivity was actually monopolized for the benefit of an
elite who assisted, totally indifferent, to the widening of a gap between
real wages and productivity. Germany itself, which stands as donor in
the lesson of productivity was only able to benefit from growth above
the European average due to constant sacrifices required of its popula-
tion. The German export engine roars not only thanks to the productive
power of its businesses. In reality, it is the so-called reforms to the
“Hartz” businesses between 2003 and 2005 – which consisted of trans-
ferring resources and wealth of citizens to businesses and to the finan-
cial sector – that Germany must have boosted its exports. Actually, it is
the wage cuts to, and drastic reforms of, its labor market that have
improved significantly its productivity, compressing it at the extreme
cost of labor. Reform claims initiated in August 16, 2002 where a group
of experts led by the Director of Human Resources Volkswagen, Peter
Hartz, presented to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, his proposals
for the reform of the labor market. Ten years later, German society has
become deeply transformed by these reforms. Indeed, an OECD study,
published in late 2012, concluded that there had been a dramatic in-
crease in income inequality in Germany, more than any other member of
that organization. Having very finely maneuvered, the Hartz Commis-
sion was able to create a market of subsidiary – or parallel – work in its
country dominated by low wages and not subject to social rights. In fact,
these reforms deprive unemployed Germans of all their rights to unem-
ployment benefits. They are therefore reduced to the status of social
beggars! Thus, it is only after a year of unemployment that the worker is
entitled to request a paltry monthly allowance of EUR347 per month, on
condition that he has first exhausted his savings and on the express
condition that his spouse is unable to support him. Why not also men-
tion the obligation he has to accept any job, regardless of their qualifica-
tions and previous earnings. Hartz is therefore both a trap and the best
way to poverty, how to arrive at a state of absolute insecurity, unthinka-
ble and intolerable in a rich country like Germany. A study by the
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German Equality Welfare Association actually reveals that three-
quarters of those affected by these laws remain forever dependent on
Hartz. Given that, moreover, the mere threat of falling into Hartz forces
the unemployed to accept low-wage part-time jobs, devoid of security,
pension rights and other benefits. The German dogma of the “low cost”
worker was the result of these reforms… And, in fact, only 29 million
Germans (of nearly 42 million workers) now have employment under
the social security scheme while some 5.5 million of them work part-
time, and more than 4 million earn less than EUR7 an hour! The Ger-
man low-wage sector pulls by the bottom of all wages in the industrial
sector by acting as a kind of infernal lever. The worker endures condi-
tions similar to those still in force in the Third World and emerging
countries.
It is therefore at the price of the sacrifice, hardship and sometimes
humiliation of its employees that Germany owes its trade surpluses, not
rational or qualitative productivity improvement. Would we in the rest
of Europe – and even in Great Britain – accept such “Hartz” sinister and
cynical measures, when the state becomes the Grand Inquisitor by
requiring a list of accounts and jewelry from the employee so as to fix
his unemployment compensation or benefits? Therefore it is at the
expense of its employees, pushed ever more precariously, that business-
es and major banks in this country owe their international success. It is
therefore vital to raise Western wages today, not only to correct this
outrageous inequality. But also to re-establish the traditional correlation
between productivity, real wages and consumption. Therefore, it is
inevitable to ask: the insistence – even the sheer determination – of neo-
liberals to claim an improvement in the competitiveness of our busi-
nesses, is it motivated by a search for additional benefits for investors
for this caste of shareholders or is it really intended for growth that
would benefit all players in the economy, i.e., the consumer base? It is
certainly legitimate to advance the productivity of each one… provided
that its improvement translates into purchasing power for the ordinary
citizen. Because growth will only be perpetuated by the transmission
belt of increased income, which is why it is crucial to proceed first to the
increase in the minimum wage. As, on the contrary, it is economically
unjustified to leave so many resources in the hands of those who spend
less or wrongly.
Let us for a few minutes consider the theory of the plot which, as it
happens, would indicate to us that the financial world and business
leaders are against full-time employment. The intervention of the state is
however able to effectively address unemployment among our people.
Through public investment, as in the construction or renovation of
schools, hospitals or roads. Through social benefits, subsidies on staples,
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even a reduction in direct taxation on certain fiscal households and
SMBs. Through a reduction in VAT. So many measures which, com-
bined according to an appropriate and targeted schedule and in rational
doses are likely to result in a substantial reduction in unemployment. It
goes without saying that this increase in the revenue of impoverished
and average households would benefit first and foremost consumption,
that is to say businesses and therefore, definitively, their general man-
agement as well as finance the provider of credit. They are, however,
fiercely opposed to this type of economic recovery beholden to the state,
as they vehemently fight against any increase in social benefits. Despite
the positive impact on their own businesses and on the strong perfor-
mance of the financial system. In reality, they are ideological reasons
which feed the condemnation of big business and high finance against
the growing role of the state in public life as well as in economic activi-
ty. It is of little importance that full-time employment can be reestab-
lished by the intervention of the state, as they sweep a backhand that
subsequent swelling of their own profits following this action by the
state, if the price to be paid by them is losing control over the economy
and government. That is why it is now high time to draw a final conclu-
sion: the righteous and outraged attitude of finance and neo-liberals
against public deficits is only a posture that gives them an excuse to
dismantle social programs and reduce the size of government. As such,
neo-liberalism actively seeks out confrontation by not having to con-
stantly shake the specter of deficits, of which it doesn’t give a damn!
Knowing that its one and only objective is the very deepening of this
crisis which will allow it to call for more shrinking of the government.
Indeed, let us be under no illusion: the neo-liberals and high finance
have an interest in fanning this psychosis of public deficits, whose
increase in intensity will give them the perfect excuse to cut public
spending and aid to needy citizens.
Finance – which today holds the keys to our prosperity – is indeed
opposed to the use of public deficits to stabilize and reboot our econo-
mies, since it is aware that the return of the state would mean its death
sentence. According to it, jobs would only be a variable of private
investment in the economy: it improves in case of a recovery in confi-
dence and must be reviewed without qualms downward depending on
the decline in production and the decline in agreed upon funding with
the economic actors. Full-time employment – or, at the very least,
substantial improvement in unemployment is therefore not a priority for
financers who view it, on the contrary, as a danger of the proper running
of their businesses. In the large financial and employer system, the
employee and worker are actually pawns – or dead weight – to move
forward and backward – even throw away – according to the profitabil-
ity of the business and the investor strategy. When the value of work is
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sacred, the employee becomes a “troublemaker going around in cir-
cles”… Moreover, it makes sense that employers are – at least intuitive-
ly – against full employment which would reverse the balance of power
that would suddenly no longer be in their favor.
This confiscation of all power made our world slip de facto from
state imperialism to financial imperialism, while profoundly changing
our values along the way, since the benchmarks were all violated when
dignity and respect were removed from the work ethos, yet holding our
societies together. This financial imperialism has taken on another face
and another character different from what dominated in the 20th Century
since interest groups in certain former colonized countries or third world
countries – since then given a promising new name “emerging” – are
aligned and associated with the new elite of the former colonizing
countries to exert their dominance over the mass of workers and em-
ployees throughout the world in favor of globalization, the ultimate
creation of financialization. Only the state, even a union of states, is now
even channeling this imperialism. The violence of today’s crisis, which
seriously made high finance falter and which challenged its strangle-
hold, should stimulate a crystallization and encourage the emergence of
a common front between corporate and political forces aiming to de-
throne – or at least humanize – this oligarchy. It is of course out of the
question to return to Marxism. But why not be inspired by Marx and his
critical mind, not only to assassinate capitalism, but particularly to
transform it, even bestowing ideological fundamentals on it, which
would contribute to the material and moral enrichment of our societies?
Even there, only the state – as the incarnation of the collectivity – can
give this impulsion, even if it is also out of the question here to return to
the classic notion of the state, since it is all the more imperative to
rethink its role. It is indeed with great difficulty, at the price of sacrific-
ing dozens of millions of human beings and at the risk of a new world
war, that the communist dogma of the predominance of the state over
the individual has given up the ghost. It has therefore been ruled out that
the increased role of the state – which some call rightly vows – dons
once again the robes of the former barbaric formulation where the state
apparatus knew what was better for the citizens than they. Rethink the
state and consider emphasizing its role in economic life should neces-
sarily be bearing constantly in mind the sense of obligation of this same
state vis-à-vis its citizens as well as its own limitations. If dismissing the
financial oligarchy has been ruled out in order to replace it with a politi-
cal autocracy, the present day crisis must nevertheless force an overhaul
or a recalibration of the primary role of the state as protector and regula-
tor. Keynes constantly told us that, far from accomplishing what the
“individuals do already”, the state must start to do “things that it does
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not yet do”. Whatever it is, the state must “become part of the solution”,
to borrow the Reagan’s phraseology, by pushing it further.
Is it not pathetic to note that the employer (mainly Anglo-Saxon, it is
true) is clearly more concerned with engineering, financial arrange-
ments, and other trading affecting his business that modernizing his
production equipment and reducing unemployment? And for good
reason: this financialization pushed to its present extremities transferred
almost all wealth from the working world to the famous privileged “1%”
who naturally found their account there. And who get richer and richer
due to this financialization, without any consideration given to society
as a whole. That is why the average person’s income has not increased
as much as work productivity. That is why we are constantly required to
improve the productivity of our businesses. A marked improvement in
their income revitalized the poor and middle classes, while having a
relatively benign impact on corporate profits, of which the majority
enjoyed result in total disconnection from the somber economic reali-
ties. The production and productivity abilities of our businesses must
actually be improved. But they will not be sustainable or equitable
unless the consumer buys goods and products and pays for services.
Therefore if his income benefits from a substantial increase.
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We Need to Free Sisyphus
Milton Friedman published an article in the New York Times Maga-
zine in September 1970 titled the Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits”! There he referred to his book “Capitalism and
Freedom” where he assured that “there is one and only one social re-
sponsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game…”. In fact, Friedman uses this analysis throughout to denigrate
any hint of “corporate responsibility” where businesses should not stray.
For him, an executive or a manager concerned about the social order
does not act in the interests of his employers… Optimizing profits must
thus be the only priority in the knowledge that whatever frees “social
responsibility” must be restricted to the bare minimum required by law.
According to Friedman, the position of a few CEOs who are concerned
with moral and material comfort of their employees – in short, those
who look to do more and better than required by law – equates for them
admitting the predominance of “political mechanisms” over “market
forces”. How thus can we be surprised by the often irresponsible attitude
of the business and financial world justified by the doctrine of a very
influential Nobel Prize winner? Which doctrine espouses the merits of
non-profit organizations, but imposes them as absolute dogma against
which all other considerations and any value were to be eclipsed?
Remember James Tobin, the Nobel Prize Laureate for Economics in
1981, who humorlessly declared: “Let’s consider three propositions:
Money is not important. Money counts. Only money is important”.
Friedman too often shifted from the second to the third”… This quest
for profit – which became an absolute criteria – contributed to the
fragmentation and compartmentalization of society where individuals
had to – according to this logic – seek their fortune and safeguard their
interests, far from all morality and at the risk of harming others. Since
after all, and it is Friedman who asserts it in this article “society is a
collection of individuals” whose only obligation is to seek out the best
for themselves. For Friedman, individuals only have one obligation
which is to ensure their prosperity and that of their employers.
Furthermore, and as if confirming what he said, the U.S. trading in-
dex, Standard & Poor’s 500, recorded an increase of nearly 170%
between August 1980 and August 1990 – i.e. in a space of ten years –
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during which it soared by 340% more during the next ten years! How
can we not be tempted by such a godsend which forced the hand and
pocketbooks of the U.S. middle class into investing hope, savings,
retirement funds and even their borrowing in market investments,
including in the most speculative capitalizations? The rate of equity
investments experienced an uninterrupted rise in U.S. households of
whom 57% did speculative trading in 2001, compared with 39% in
1989. The following generation of investors was clearly less lucky than
their parents, and for good reason… the S&P Index lost nearly 30%
between August 2000 and August 2010. In reality, the losses were even
more marked since with inflation at 25% during that period, the overall
net losses of these investors amounted to more than 50% during the first
decade of the 21st Century. However, this market nightmare which has
been developing for about ten years now is further accentuated by a
brief analysis of wages in the U.S. According to data from the U.S.
Revenue Department (Internal Revenue Service), the average worker’s
wages increased by 140% between 1980 and 2000, moving from
$12,850 in 1980 to $19,875 in 1990 and reaching $30,650 in 2000. A
figure of 140% from which inflation of 110% should be deducted,
leaving a net improvement in the average wages in the U.S. by 30% in
twenty years. A trend which is however also reversed – in any event
which was largely challenged – at the dawn of this century since the
increase in these wages, net of inflation, was no more than 3% over the
following ten years. In reality, the Western citizen has been suffering
from an insidious deflation in his income for more than ten years. At the
same time, the gap widens irretrievably with the very wealthy, the
famous “1%” who hold among themselves 42% of the national wealth!
According to statistics established by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank,
these 1% would have increased their fortune by 2% between 2008 and
2011 while the middle class would have seen theirs melt by up to 39%!
Today, in a country like the U.S. the Gini coefficient – which is a
measure of the degree of inequalities between the rich and poor in the
same country – is comparable with the current coefficient in China! That
China, which is building its economy and working on developing its
social fabric, experiences massive imbalances between its classes is
understandable. It is however disturbing to say the least that a nation
such as the U.S. entertains – or indeed is content with – such inequalities
between its own citizens. In 1970, the gross income of CEOs of large
U.S. corporations was thirty times the average salary of a worker in the
U.S. – this proportion being forty-five times for Great Britain. Today,
these gaps in salaries have reached 260 and 80 times, respectively, for
the U.S. and Great Britain! Since the end of the 1970s to this day, the
income of the wealthiest 20% in these two countries has increased by
approximately five times that of the poorest 20%. What does one make
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of a boss who is 260 times better paid than the average worker? In a
world where income is supposed to reflect the added value of the work-
er, is a CEO really worth, and does he really bring, 260 times more than
the average employee, to his business or even society? Indeed, we are
today living in a world where all the benchmarks and values (genuine
values, not valuations) have been turned upside down. As such, nothing
justifies such monumental gaps between the income of the top corporate
leaders and their employees, as it is understandable that the average
person may be offended by such an inequality, that I would not hesitate
to call it “against nature”. In the same way that it is unacceptable that, in
our Western nations with integrated and well developed economies, the
income of the average person is entirely dependent on growth. His
standard of living and his salary fall when economic activity slows
down. It is therefore those with a ringside seat who pay the price of the
recession, or indeed the idiocy – when it is not dishonesty – of others.
Weighed up, would it not make sense, or indeed be natural, that improv-
ing the average worker’s income be a combination of the product of
growth and better redistribution? Is not an equitable distribution of
wealth and income within Western nations which claim to be civilized
one of the fundamental keys of economic stability? Was Warren Buffet
not surprised in his editorial of August 24, 2011 in the New York Times
to learn that he paid 17% tax on his income (of $40 million) when his
employees paid about 36%?
Inequality is therefore, the same as greed and excessive deregulation,
one of the fundamental reasons of economic and financial earthquakes
that shook our Western countries these past years. In fact, and despite
cosmetic measures or even by depth of our financial system, our econ-
omies will more or less for short periods be inevitably destabilized by
more or less violent due simply to sudden differences in income. The
damage caused by these flagrant inequalities to our economies is for the
most part amplified by the totally inadequate responses by our political
and economic leaders, who simply take note. Furthermore, the crisis,
only worsened the situation of the middle class since the amount gener-
ously dumped into the system never benefited research or training, not
even the modernization of our production equipment generating long-
term jobs. Instead of putting our backs against the wall by the accumula-
tion of these debts which will not resuscitate consumption, would our
leaders not be better to tackle the sources of this endemic calamity, that
is to say the flagrant inequality of income solidly anchored in our socie-
ties? Applying the same Pavlovian – or demagogic – balm will end up
polarizing or fracturing a society more and more tempted by extremes.
Education, and inequality in wages which is its counterpart, must be at
the center of policies, with decisions hoping to offer our societies stable
growth being the key to individual fulfillment. Social priorities must
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finally be at the heart of any economic project. Because, as President
Obama said substantively in his inaugural address on January 21, 2013,
it is unthinkable that we make choices dictated by the markets and by
neo-liberals who force us to sacrifice our citizens today on behalf hypo-
thetical interests of future generations. Every citizen has a right to
expect “security and dignity”.
Can democracy accommodate such flagrant injustices? Can the re-
spect owed to each citizen – and to any legal immigrant in our country –
be satisfied with a situation – pushed to the extreme since the middle of
the 1980s – where the state gives up its supreme obligation of protecting
and defending the interests of its people? Of its entire people, including
– and particularly – the most needy? Nefarious laws passed in 1834 in
England, such as the “New Poor Law”, which forced the poor to accept
any job – even at a pittance – under the threat of being forcibly enrolled
in humiliating “work houses”. As for the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act, passed in the U.S. at the end of the last century
(1996) affecting the unemployed and the needy who were mainly wom-
en, Blacks and single parent families. All these beneficiaries of social
assistance were deprived of vital aid from their government, under the
scandalous pretext that they would thus be more motivated to find a job!
This “charity” lavished on the unemployed – à la “assisted”, as it is
fashionable to call it – by a society which continually lavishes him with
contempt for being unemployed. Is it tolerable in a peaceful democracy?
In a world enduring a severe crisis where the unemployment indices
mechanically explode because of the private sector – and particularly –
the financial sector – having staked everything, risked everything and
monopolized everything for only its gain, can society continue to dis-
credit and humiliate its citizens without jobs? And can it force them to
accept any kind of work so as to stop showing them its solidarity? Is it
in a peaceful society that we wish to live or in a fragmented world where
the happy “insiders” would be constantly fighting the “outsiders” left on
their own? Governments must make every effort to reintegrate our
unemployed – through work or social activity – and stop blaming men
and women who are victims of their situation. Get rid of this unhealthy
fetish toward deficits and focus our energies instead on re-establishing
full-time work, the only true framework that we can make for future
generations.
Call on the great Keynes who warned us in his “General Theory”
against the “society in which we live are its failure to provide for full
employment”… Why, in this regard, not quantify and measure the
degree of humiliation inflicted by our societies on its members? The
moral abuse – and sometimes physical – inflicted on our fellow citizens
who are less well-off, is it also not a net cost for our society, in the sense
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where it undermines the effectiveness of labor and national harmony.
Who today challenges that health coverage, public transit, national
education and the other social benefits of the state contribute decisively
to social peace and individual fulfillment? In reality, the ultimate ques-
tion is: what price are we prepared to pay collectively to (try to) achieve
a balanced and the most possibly just society? Since the period of
relative economic stability and comfort for the middle class now well
and truly over. Therefore, priorities need to be redefined, and in light of
inevitable social upheavals, such as an ageing population, which will be
one of the factors requiring the most social assistance. Demography
galloping inequalities are therefore the two fundamental reasons which
require the return of the state, since it is better to count on the govern-
ment than on the private sector since it involves supporting the popula-
tion. As the distinction – or so-called separation – between politics and
the economy is only an urban legend maintained by the financial world
to capture true power, it is incumbent upon the state to promote econom-
ic efficiency and competitiveness while actively supporting – even
militantly – the most needy of its citizens To do this, a crucial equation
to be resolved will be – to borrow from President Barack Obama during
his inaugural speech on January 21, 2009 – not whether the “govern-
ment is too big or too small but whether it works”, since the state must
also learn to work efficiently to fulfill honorably its tasks. As the dis-
tinction – or so-called separation – between politics and the economy is
only an urban legend maintained by the financial world to capture true
power, it is incumbent upon the state to promote economic efficiency
and competitiveness while actively supporting – even militantly – the
most needy of its citizens To do this, a crucial equation to be resolved
will be – to borrow from President Barack Obama during his inaugural
speech on January 21, 2009 – not whether the “government is too big or
too small but whether it works”, since the state must also learn to work
efficiently to fulfill honorably its tasks.
It is therefore crucial to have a better understanding of the processes
which led to the deterioration of our economic conditions which coin-
cided with the shrinking of the state. The most shocking – and most
revealing – manifestation of this withdrawal of public power was the
long process of privatization affecting all sectors of Western economies
for thirty years now. At first glance, it is easy to understand the motives
of this genuine cult which seized all governments and which is to be
found on the side of monetarism and neoliberalism. The private sector
has thus intended to optimally manage whole sections of the economic
activity through regulation instilled by markets considered “perfect”.
Furthermore, the state offloaded a huge part of its tasks that it could no
longer perform effectively due to lack of competent and competitive
bureaucrats, unfortunately quite an acceptable argument since our
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Western administrations “functioned” les and less properly, to borrow
an expression from President Obama. In doing so, the transfer of its
assets allowed the state to save, in line with the prescriptions of ortho-
dox economists. In short, these large scale privatizations spread over
three decades would benefit all: the state, which would have less re-
sponsibilities, and the private sector, which would earn more money by
taking over from the government. In fact, the reality was unfortunately
less rosy, in any case from the point of view of a population who there-
fore had to fight against a private sector only concerned with its profits.
Companies expected to assure citizens of services until then provided by
the state knowingly proceeded with a devaluation and depreciation of
the services to optimize their profits. Obviously it is the average person
who was aggrieved by this abdication of the state and large responsibili-
ties in favor of the private sector.
An absolute leader in this regard, the Anglo-Saxon world pro-
nounced with a light heart the end of the “era of big government”, the
famous formula of President Clinton. It then became fashionable to lock
the State in a type of chastity belt of which it would divest itself only to
provide – reluctantly – the bare minimum. The consensus in this sense
was of the rest the largest possible between the political, economic and
financial elites: the company had to get rid of the state, its bureaucrats,
its subsidies and its services… that it would no longer assure what was
left. This regression by the state became even iconic of a West that
showed its higher degree of civilization! The corollary is that society
would henceforth be gradually divided into sections between those
capable of taking flight with their own wings and the assisted of another
age that had inexcusably missed the train of economic independence and
globalization. Without wishing for it – but could it sill? –, the state
became the promoter of a financial communization which sorted those
who had adapted to this ultraliberalization and those who merely sub-
jected to it. This genuine Darwinian selection extolled those who man-
aged not to use public services and the others, considered as dead weight
in society. This apartheid which was crushing and humiliating the less
fortunate and the defenseless naturally rotted the social link by desecrat-
ing the state. In fact, by pleading with activism for the loss by the state
of its essential power and prerogatives, our society had lost a fundamen-
tal landmark which had also served as cement through the centuries. The
state for all had all but disappeared in favor of each man for his own. It
is there that we all lost something vital: this solidarity which made us all
look in the same direction and strive for objectives, not similar, but
compatible. It is around the beginning of this era that Margaret Thatcher
was to proclaim very significantly that “There’s no such thing as socie-
ty… only individuals and families”!
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What we have lost along the way? What still connects us? And what
do we absolutely refuse? Must we be resigned to our present world
marked by corporate and individual domination having taken collectivi-
ty hostage for their own interests? Has democracy become merely a vain
word or will it save us? At a time when solidarity and fraternity – still
only capable of saving the European structure – are sorely lacking
among the political, economic and intellectual leaders of the EU, it is
the people who must set the example and become the engine. This
Europe – so taxed as a democratic deficit – must take its destiny in its
own hands (popular) to reestablish general interest, prior to enthusiasm.
Now that the elites let go – burdened by the fiasco of their neoliberal
ideologies –, we must regain control over our destiny and restore the
social link, far from any political calculation. However, it is those who
are responsible for our destinies that must be the most ready and the first
to react by favoring citizens and entrepreneurial energies to the detri-
ment of financial markets, speculators and investors. But must we – and
can we – wait for them when they are so obsessed with the fluctuations
of these same markets which guide their actions and which dictate their
law to them? How do we not be disconcerted in front of the declarations
of Chancellor Merkel who, on a visit on June 27, 2012 with her French
counterpart on the event of a crucial summit on the future of the Euro
and Europe, cut through with a: “We need more Europe, we need a
Europe which can function, markets are expecting this from us”? There-
fore, must Europe react to the markets, unite more and become more
inclusive? Should we as a corollary deduce that the European Union
would have collapsed without pressure from the financial markets which
gradually forced it to react? Should we compare our political leaders of
today with Pavlov’s dogs, conditioned by the vagaries of market fluctua-
tions that grip them?
Do we pause for a moment on this famous “golden rule” inscribed in
the German, Spanish and Italian Constitutions (which will certainly be
adopted soon by other countries), which requires that balanced budgets
be engraved in the stone of what our democracies hold most precious,
namely their Constitution? The golden rule which – incidentally – is an
admission of scathing failure for a European central bank incapable of
fulfilling its most basic obligation. Nonetheless, what religious dogma
decrees that public accounts must always be balanced? Is this golden
rule something other than the ultimate manifestation of the influence of
financial markets on the political systems supposed to obey the majority
of the popular vote, but which, in reality, comply with the requirements
of a tiny minority of capitalists? Should we not instead inscribe in our
Constitution the right to work, to shelter for all? Since it is only in such
an assumption that we would really start to reduce – mechanically – our
public deficits. Under the guise of this crisis, the Heads of State and the
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European Governments have progressively changed them. As financial
analysts, they anxiously scrutinize market vagaries and are suspended
with respect to the verdicts by the rating agencies. In this regard, the will
to implement this golden rule only proves that our political authorities
have been transformed again into “traders”! Has this golden rule been
adopted with the objective of calming markets, as it is clear that its
ardent defenders are only anxious to caress the markets “up the right
way”? Is the new mission of the Constitution of our democracy to
become the peacemaker of the markets? And does this golden rule not
come to the rescue of speculators justifying a posteriori their bets? In
setting it out, our leaders are in fact sending them an unequivocal mes-
sage which basically says: “You are right to bet against our sovereign
debt. Therefore, we shall apply this golden rule and comply with your
requirements. We are eager to prove to you the serious of our manage-
ment”… Today it is indisputable that the financial markets impose their
temper on our democracies.
So, have we arrived at the stage where the dream and enthusiasm for
the European structure have been replaced with a financial system that
meticulously sculpt, day in and day out, the Europe according to its
standards? Is this a well-oiled European financial system of which we
dream, or do our old democracies deserve nonetheless something better?
Must we resolutely turn our backs on elite leaders who systematically
misplace priorities? How do you explain to them that equality and
justice, essential preconditions for the emergence of genuine democracy
are also the keystones to making the world happy again?
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